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ABSTRACT
The primary aim of this dissertation was to develop
and test hypotheses relating to the constancy of the Income
elasticities of Individual taxes levied by the State of
Louisiana and of Its aggregate tax structure.

These hypo-

theses were then Incorporated Into ordinary least squares
regressions to provide long-run forecasts of tax revenues.
The earliest researchers on the subject of fore
casting state tax receipts by use of the elasticities
approach either made no mention of the possibility of
changing income elasticities or assumed them constant.
Dockel, and Legler and Papke, reached conclusions Inconsis
tent with their assumptions of constant elasticities.
Singer utilized dummy variables to allow for shifting in
Income elasticities due to changes in tax rates, bases, or
administration.

Wilford explicitly labelled his elasticity

coefficients as averages for the time series studied.
Richardson was the first to make explicit a cause of the
phenomenon of Increasing Income elasticity of a tax struc
ture, which was that the relatively more elastic taxes grew
faster over time than the less elastic taxes, and hence
acquired greater weights In the determination of average
Income elasticity of the tax structure.

xi

This dissertation formally models three causes of
changing Income elasticities.

First, Income elasticities

of individual taxes might rise or fall with time or Income.
These were modelled by logllnear functions, with tax revenue
dependent on personal Income.

Second, Income elasticities

might rise or fall as various tax rate or base changes occur,
or as administrative changes influence tax revenues.

These

were modelled by a dummy variable technique similar to
Singer's.

Third, the income elasticity of a tax structure

would rise as Income rose, toward a limit of the most
elastic component of that tax structure.
These concepts were applied to the Louisiana tax
structure, which was partially disaggregated into six tax
groups, five sensitive to Income movements, and the sixth,
the severance taxes, largely independent of the level of
Income.

The time period 1948 to 1974 was selected to test

the hypotheses described above.

This was a period of rela

tive stability in the tax structure, although many rate,
base, and enforcement changes occurred.
The primary results were first, that the Income
elasticity of the Income tax and the sumptuary taxes
declined over time, while the Income elasticities of the
other three groups increased.

Second, the income elasticity

of the tax structure was shown to Increase over time,
approaching unity in ten to fifteen years.

xii

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The level of expenditures by Louisiana state
government, over the very long run, Is presumably deter
mined by a public choice mechanism.

If this public choice

mechanism works well, expenditures will tend toward that
level which provides exactly those goods and services
which Louisiana citizens demand of their state government.
This collective decision is a part of the overall process
by which owners of purchasing power allocate their
expenditures among all possible goods and services, public
as well as private.

However, over shorter time spans,

due to budget constraints and other constitutional
limitations, expenditures are normally constrained to an
amount approximately *equal to anticipated receipts from
state sources.
This view is in contrast to that of Milton Friedman,
who wrote that
. . . in the long run the level of taxes comes closer
to determining the level of spending than the other
way around . . . .
[0]nce the new level of taxes Is
in place, it tends to become permanent or nearly so,
and thereafter spending is determined in large part
by how much the revenue structure will raise.*

^■Milton Friedman, An Economists Protest, Second
Edition, 1975* Thomas Horton and Daughters (Glen Ridge,
New Jersey), p. 87.
1

2
Professor Friedman's statement was written ?.bout federal
revenues and expenditures, but it is more applicable to state
government, since the state of Louisiana, like most states,
has more limited ability for deficit spending than does the
federal government.

The state's new constitution sets

important limits on the ability of state government to
borrow funds, especially for non-capital purposes, and to
incur deficits.2
The level of tax revenue is vital, whether viewed
from short run or long.

This dissertation attempts to

measure the ability of the present structure of state
taxes to provide revenues for future fiscal operations.
By placing attention only on the level of revenues, this
dissertation assumes that expenditures by state government
will at least maintain the scope and quality of current
programs.
In merely maintaining the present scope of state
government programs It Is likely that more dollars will
be required in future years than now.

Many programs

have expenditures in part determined by the number of
people who benefit; as the state's population continues to
grow, and more persons benefit, expenditures on these
programs must also grow.

Some programs require purchases of

materials; if these goods rise in price over time, then

^Constitution of the State of Louisiana, especially
Article Vll. Part I. Section 6(A), Section 7(C), and
Section 10(B).

3
larger expenditures will be required to purchase the same
real quantity as before.

As wage rates rise throughout

the economy, so must wages paid by state government If It
Is to attract the same quality work force as now exists.
Thus In the context of an economy which displays growing
population and upward trends in wage and price levels,
nominal state government expenditures must increase if the
current scope and quality of programs is to be maintained.
Further, a rising standard of living may lead to demands
for new public services.

Thus state government expenditures

can be expected to rise markedly in the years of the decade
ahead.

If these expenditures are to be financed by tax

revenues, these revenues must rise accordingly.
It is appropriate here to define certain terms used
in this dissertation.

The base of a tax is the definition,

by statute or by constitutional provision, of what is
taxed.

The schedule of tax rates is an algorithm for

determining the tax liability incurred by a taxpayer with
a given tax base.

The aggregation of tax liabilities

over all taxpaying units thus measures the entire amount
due the state from the tax.

The quality of enforcement of

the tax laws may affect the fraction of that liability
actually remitted to the state.

Certain administrative

details relating to due dates, source withholding, and
cost-of-collection rebates complete the list of items
which determine the timing and quantity of tax receipts.
The above-mentioned Items, aggregated over all taxes levied

4
by the state, comprise the tax structure.
Individual taxes and the aggregate tax structure
possess certain measures of responsiveness called elas
ticities.

The simplest definition of an elasticity is the

ratio of the percentage change in tax revenues to the
percentage change in the variable, the responsiveness to
which is being studied.

This general form can be presented

as
c

» 3 TR
v

TT~

V
TR *

where ev is the calculated elasticity of tax revenue TR
with respect to the variable V.

Income elasticity is

measured by replacing V with some measure of income.
Similarly, the commonly used rate and base elasticities
are created by the appropriate substitutions.
The ability of the tax structure to generate
revenues can be discussed using income elasticity as the
focal point.

The income elasticity of a tax (or of an

aggregate of taxes) is but one criterion of the "adequacy"
of a tax, but it is the measure that has received the
most attention in academic debates on tax structures. The
elasticity of tax revenue with respect to aggregate
personal income, ey, is a measure which indicates whether
the rate of growth of revenue from a tax can be expected
to exceed, equal, or fall short of the rate of growth
in personal income.

As ey1*!, tax revenues should grow

faster than personal income; as ey <l, the personal income
growth rate should exceed the tax revenue growth rate.
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A similar set of statements can be ,,'.ade abo.’
.t the elas
ticities of tax revenues with respect to other exogenous
variables.
State-federal revenue sharing is still an experi
mental program, and should not be treated as a permanent
part of the state financial resources.

Deficit financing

cannot be regarded as a significant source of funds over
the long run.

The severance taxes are levied on resources

that are declining in quantity.

Even if these taxes are

based on rapidly rising product prices, they cannot be
expected to continue as the dominant revenue producer of the
state.
The reasons above Indicate that primary interest
must fall on the revenues of the remainder of the state's
tax structure.

Of primary interest are forecasts for

fiscal years 1977, 1980, and 1985.

These forecasts will

provide both intermediate- and long-term projections of
the yields of selected state taxes, and of the aggregate
of revenues responsive to income levels, at the current
structure of bases and rates.

Constitutionally imposed

obstacles to altering the state's tax structure provide
adequate reason for projecting revenues from the current
structure.

Such projections can be used as planning aids

for the appropriate state legislators and officials.
The primary contributions of this dissertation are
as follows.

Previous efforts in the areas of tax revenue

forecasting, tax revenue responsiveness to economic change,
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and Louisiana tax structure are stuoied for their possible
contributions.

The tax structure of the state of Louisiana

is examined in detail in order to determine how (or
whether) the responsiveness of tax revenues generated
by the tax structure varies over time.

Intermediate range

forecasts are made of tax revenues, particularly those
varying with income.

These forecasts provide additional

insight to the state's agencies and planning authorities,
and provide empirical evidence concerning the hypotheses
related to variations in income elasticities.
METHODOLOGY
For the general purpose of tax revenue forecasting,
two techniques are commonly used.

One technique uses

appropriate econometric devices to forecast values of the
tax bases, then applies existing tax rates to those values
to obtain the forecasts of tax revenues.
is referred to as the rate-base method.

This approach
The other method,

the elasticities approach, assumes that changes in general
economic conditions are responsible for changes in tax
revenues, at fixed tax rates, base definitions, and adminis
trative efficiency.

Regressing tax revenues against certain

macroeconomic variables yields estimates of the responsive
ness (elasticity) of tax revenues to economic changes.

The

former method is better suited to short-term forecasting;
the latter, to long-term forecasting.
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Both methods can take advantage of 'ihe variety
of econometric methods now available.

The dependencies

of one tax upon another can be accommodated by proper
specification of the model: by utilizing simultaneousequation estimation methods, or by utilizing data aggre
gated in such a way that the dependencies are concealed
in the aggregation.

If, for example, auto license revenues

are correlated with gasoline tax collections, then an
estimate of their sum avoids a separate statement of the
dependency.
This study began as an attempt to apply simultaneous-equation techniques to forecast the tax revenues
and expenditures of Louisiana's state government; however,
the course of further research indicated that the inter
dependency of relationships was not a significant char
acteristic of the tax revenue models.

The revenue of

tax "A" was not a significant explanation of the revenue
of tax "B"; nor did any major non-severance tax rates
or revenues exert significant causation on the variables
designated as independent, which included personal Income,
per capita personal income, and population.

Thus multiple

regression analysis utilizing the method of ordinary least
squares proved sufficient to display adequately the
Important economic relationships that determine the levels
of tax revenues.
This dissertation will utilize the elasticities
approach for two reasons.

First, the aim of this

8
research Is two-fold; to obtain reliable estimates of
future tax revenues and to measure the responsiveness of
the tax revenues to income change.

The latter aim can best

be accommodated by the elasticities approach.

Forecasts of

total income-related tax revenues are desirable, and it is
felt that the estimate of the aggregate of revenues by the
elasticities approach will be preferred to the aggregate
arrived at by summing the forecasts of the Individual
taxes by the rate-base method.

Since this dissertation

attempts to provide clues for long-run state planning,
long-run estimates of tax revenues are required.

Long

term revenue movements are best fit by a logarithmic
function.

The coefficients of such a log-linear regression

can be Interpreted as elasticities.
The other major consideration leading to adoption
of the elasticities approach over the rate-base procedure
is the very complexity of the state's tax structure.

The

state levies many taxes, most of which are subject to large
numbers of exemptions and other forms of special treatment.3
Furthermore, the rate schedules for some taxes, notably
the severance, alcoholic beverage, excise license, and
tobacco taxes, are quite complex.**

These problems

^For example, see the Department of Revenue Tax
Guide. 1975 edition for lists of exemptions from sales tax
and Income tax.
**See Ibid., for examples.
The actual rates may have
been altered since this book was published, but the degree
of complexity is practically unchanged.

combine to make the use of the rate-base estimating method
a difficult task.

This is not to deny the importance of

tax rates; certainly statutory or constitutional tax rate
and tax base changes affect tax revenues.

These phenomena

must be Included in the models if the elasticities method
is to provide valid results.
PLAN OF THE PAPER
The problem set out in earlier paragraphs is
treated in the following steps.

First, the relevant

literature concerning the responsiveness of tax revenues
to economic growth is briefly reviewed.

This survey

serves to place the present study in proper perspective.
Three areas within the literature are examined in Chapter 2.
Responsiveness of revenues derived from fixed tax structures
in general, from theoretical and empirical standpoints, is
the first of these, and is followed by a survey of works on
the responsiveness of other state tax systems and on long
term tax revenue forecasting in other states.

Finally,

attention is given to articles oriented toward the Louisiana
tax structure and toward revenue estimation and responsive
ness for the State of Louisiana.
Chapter 3 briefly describes the current tax
structure of the State of Louisiana in order to provide
the appropriate background.

This discussion Includes

a review of significant events in the evolution of the
state's tax structure, particularly those rate, base, and

administrative changes that have occurred curing the time
span of this project, 19^8 to 197^.

Chapter 3 also

contains the master data record for the dissertation;
this record is an account of revenues of currently levied
taxes, and is organized both by individual taxeB and by
the relevant tax groups.

A discussion of data sources and

data-gathering difficulties is included.

The second

major section of the chapter is devoted to the definition
of the forecasting base: which taxes (licenses, fees,
etc.) should be included in the aggregate to be forecast.
Chapter ^ contains the theoretical aspects of
this dissertation.

For certain special cases, the

desirability of incorporating t i m e - d e p e n d e n t income
elasticities into the structure of the model is demon
strated.

This approach allows for movement of income

elasticities of individual taxes, and allows for signif
icant changes in the income elasticity of a tax structure
over time.
The fifth chapter contains an analysis of the
empirical results of this research.

The models introduced

in Chapter 4 are tested for their ability to provide
adequate explanation of the revenue generating processes.
Where models prove to be inadequate, attempts are made to
improve them through variations in the real and dummy
variables which appear, and in the forms taken by the
income elasticities.

Following this analysis of the

different models is a section discussing those equations
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to be used as the elements of the forecasting models.
Each tax and tax group is represented by at least one
equation.
Those equations are used in Chapter 6 to produce
the tax revenue forecasts.

The first major section provides

the extrapolation of values of income, price level, and
population statistics, which are the exogenous variables.
Several extrapolated series are produced, reflecting dif
fering assumptions concerning the future course of United
States and Louisiana economic growth.

The tax revenue

forecasts are made from the independent variable extrap
olations and regression results; forecasts are presented
for the current tax structure and for some tax structure
variations.

These forecasts are used to test the hypotheses

of Chapter 4 concerning the Upward-Bound Elasticity Theorem.
Hie final section reviews the progress of the research and
recapitulates the major findings of the dissertation.

Chapter 2
SURVEY OP THE LITERATURE
This chapter serves to provide appropriate
recognition of the works of previous researchers relevant
to the present study.

Articles concerned with theoretical

issues relating to Income elasticities, or to state and
regional revenue growth problems, and works on revenue
projections and revenue responsiveness in other states,
are discussed in chronological fashion.

A section discussing

prior contributions concerned with the Louisiana tax
structure concludes the chapter.
THE ELASTICITIES APPROACH
AND STATE TAX REVENUE
GROWTH: GENERAL
William Vickrey, in an important 19^9 article,
proposed several theorems about the responsiveness of
Income tax yields to movements in National Income.^

His

aim was to prove that Income taxes were not elastic
enough to be as counter-cyclical as Musgrave and Miller

^William Vickrey, "Some Limits to the Income
Elasticity of Income Tax Yields," Review of Economics and
Statistics. XXXIX (May, 1 9 W , mo^THT:-------------------
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had earlier proposed.2

The first of Vickrey's theorems

stated that the income elasticity of a group of taxes
could not exceed the elasticity of its most elastic
component; and that the elasticity of the tax system was
the weighted average of the elasticities of the component
taxes.

The second theorem stated that

The income elasticity of the yield of any tax is
unaffected by a proportionate change in all the
rates, if avoidance and incentive effects be neglected.
The third theorem was
There exists a simple income tax, consisting of a flat
rate of tax on all income above a given exemption,
that has an elasticity at least equal to that of any
income tax.3
These results held if the components were independent
and additive.

Independence implied that the yield of one

tax was not dependent on the yield of some other tax.

The

additive characteristic required that the total tax yield
was the sum of the yields of the individual taxes.

It was

not clear why the first theorem required these assumptions.
Vickrey stated that, for a "simple" income tax (i.e., a
tax with only a single rate and exemption), the income
elasticity depended only upon the size of the exemption,
and that "the elasticity of a simple tax Is equal to the
ratio of the total income of the persons taxed to the income

2Richard A. Musgrave and Merton H. Miller, "Built-in
Flexibility," American Economic Review, XXXVIII (March,
19 *18), 122 -1 2 8 .

^Vickrey, op. cit., p. 140.
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above the exemptions to which the t«x rate is applied."1*
This definition of income elasticity of the income tax was
dependent on assumptions about Income distribution.
Vickrey had assumed that as national income varied, the
Lorenz curve of income distribution was constant.
Many of Vickrey*s conclusions depended on the
pattern and time path of income distribution; his primary
conclusion was that it was improbable that a tax of major
revenue producer status could be designed with elasticity
that exceeded 2.0.5

vickrey did not mention possible

changes in income elasticities except through changes in
bases and exemptions.
One article of importance appeared in the American
Economic Review in 1952.

Groves and Kahn conducted an

investigation into the income elasticity of various taxes,
attempting to measure the effects of income growth on
tax revenue changes.^

The principal aim of this article was

to determine whether the taxes were "adequate;" that Is,
whether they could, over time, generate revenues to main
tain the volume and quality of governmental services.

Ibid. , p. 140 .
5Ibid., p. 144.
^Harold M. Groves, and C. Harry Kahn, "The
Stability of State and Local Tax Yields," American Economic
Review, XLII (March, 1952), 87-102.
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To this end, they felt It desirable to have taxes whose
"yields.

. . vary In the same direction as total Income,

but . . . less than In proportion to the variation In
total Income."?
Emphasis was placed on a "built-in stability"
different from the current usage of the term; to Groves
and Kahn It meant to protect state governments from revenue
losses due to recession or deflation.
Hence, if it is deBired to maintain intact at all
times the level of government services and to finance
them from taxes primarily, the total of state and
local tax revenues has to be of less than unit
income elasticity.8
Groves and Kahn clearly did not gear their analysis
to an era of pressing demand for new state government
services, for increasing volume and faster increasing
costs of existing services.

The same tax designed to

prevent the rapid fall of revenues during the recession
will most likely prevent the rapid rise of revenues during
boom, as the percentage increase in tax revenue must by
definition fall short of the percentage Increase in income.
In his doctoral dissertation, and in articles
derived from it, Robert W. Rafuse, Jr., estimated income
elasticities of state and local taxes in order to determine
whether state and local governments acted counter-

?Ibid., pp. 87-88.
8Ibid., p. 88.
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cyclically.^

He found that state and local government

receipts were stabilizing during expansions and destabi
lizing in contractions* and that expenditures were
stabilizing during contractions, destabilizing during
expansions.1®

He attempted to measure the responsiveness

of various state and local taxes to movements in GNF.
His estimate of the income elasticity of general sales
tax collections was E«p ■ 1 .27, and he noted that this
measure was larger than that found by other investigators.11
This estimate was derived by regressing percentage changes
in general sales tax collections against percentage changes
in QNP, for the period 1949-1960, in constant dollars.
The regression coefficient could be interpreted as the
income elasticity.
In a 1964 article in the National Tax Journal,
D. G. Davies discussed the estimation of the elasticity
of motor fuel taxes with respect to income.12

(The exact

measure of income used was not disclosed in the article).

^Robert W, Refuse, Jr., "Cyclical Behavior of StateLocal Finances," in Essays in Fiscal Federalism, edited by
Richard A. Musgrave.
!fhe Brookings Institution, Washington,
D.C., 1965, pp. 63-121. See also, Robert W. Rafuse, Jr.,
"State and Local Fiscal Behavior over the Postwar Cycles."
(Princeton, 1964).
10Ibld., p. 117.
11Ibid., pp. 95-97, especially note 32.
12D. G. Davies, "The Secular Income Elasticity and
Revenue Stability of Motor Fuel Taxes," National Tax
Journal. XVIII (December, 1965), 380- 387.
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Davies referred to this measure as ''secular'1 income
elasticity, arid estimated this value by utilizing a loglinear regression of tax yield against income, so that the
regression slope was the elasticity in question.*3

This

process assumed constant income elasticity and Davies
recognized this fact.

Some states were omitted from his

study because Davies was unable to obtain satisfactory
results with constant elasticities.^

In discussing the

"three groups" into which elasticities may be classified,
he wrote of an increasing average effective rate of
t a x a t i o n . g y a common definition of Income elasticity,
e ■ marginal tax rate t average tax rate.

If the average

tax rate rose, all else unchanged, then the income
elasticity must have decreased.

Thus Davies implied

changing elasticities.
W. T. Wilford turned to an elasticities approach
in order to provide new light on the "adequacy" of a tax
s t r u c t u r e . H e wrote that:
The problem of adequacy is basically two-fold, for it
involves, on the one hand, stability of the revenue
structure during changes in levels of economic activity,

13ibid., p. 381.
u Ibid., p. 383.
15Ibid., pp. 381- 382.
^Wa l t o n Terry Wilford, "State Tax Stability
Criteria and the Revenue-Income Elasticity Coefficient
Reconsidered," National Tax Journal, XVIII (September,
1965), 304-312.
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and, on the other hand, the ability of the tax structure
to increase yields to meet new social needs . . . .
These two goals are basically in conflict . . . .17
He then wrote that in the face of general economic expansion
states were slow to recognize this conflict, and hence
slow to redirect their tax structures toward greater
responsiveness to income increases.
In addition to the point Just made, Wilford's
article made three other contributions.

First, he noted

that the elasticity coefficient e, from the equation
log R - log C + e log y

(2.1)

was an average value, calculated over the time period
studied.

R Is tax revenue, C is a constant,

personal income.

y isaggregate

He advised that the annual values of

jp

* y/Rj which is the income elasticity, be studied for
possible time t r e n d . W i l f o r d was thus concerned that
elasticities might vary with time or with Income.
Second, he incorporated statutory rate changes
into his model.

This was a feature Groves and Kahn had

not treated, by assuming unitary rate elasticities.
Wilford's model was thus formulated as
log R * log C + e log y + f log r

(2.2)

where r Is the tax rate, and other variables are as
defined for equation 2.I.1?

17Ibid., p. 304.
l8Ibid., p. 305.
19Ibid., p. 306.

Finally, Wilford suggested

19
distinguishing between economic "growth" and "development."
To him, the former Implied aggregate personal income growth;
the latter, per capita income growth.

He argued that

economic "growth" might have varying effects on tax
revenues, depending on how much "development" was present.2®
He particularly noted that rising per capita incomes might
lead to changing patterns of household consumption,
generating a different impact on sales tax revenues than
if the same aggregate income growth were caused by increased
population.
Wilford reported estimated income and rate elastic
ity coefficients, using data for the state of Texas, for
several tax categories.

All the rate elasticities were

less than unity; none were negative.

The elasticities

with respect to aggregate personal income were generally
greater than unity; only alcoholic beverage and cigarette
taxes showed less than unit income elasticity.
some anomalies among the results:

There were

the income elasticity of

motor vehicle licenses exceeded that of motor vehicle
sales, and the ad valorem (property) tax had a greater than
unitary income elasticity.

He did not estimate elastic

ities for a general sales tax.21
Pivotal research on the subjects of state tax
revenue functions and the elasticities approach was done

20Ibld.. pp. 306-307.
21Ibld.. pp. 308-309.
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by John B. Le^ler and Ferry Shapiro,22

They wrote that

previous studies, by Groves and Kahn and by Wilford, of the
relationship between personal income growth and state tax
revenue growth possessed two weaknesses, in (1 ) ignoring
the specific linkages between personal income and tax
revenues, and (2 ) assuming that individual taxes could be
studied independently of one another.2 3

They then attempted

to build a theoretical model of state tax revenue genera
tion.

This model assumed a tax structure of an income tax

and a sales tax with rates r^ and r2 , respectively.

Thus

their tax revenue function was
R = rx.Y + r2.Ct

(2.3)

where R - state tax revenues, Y - aggregate personal income,
and C^. ■ taxable consumption spending.

Ct was treated as

a function of Income, of relative prices (of taxed versus
untaxed goods), and of the sales tax rate.

Thus the

revenue function became
R ■ R(y» N, p, r1? r2 )

(2.4)

where y * per capita income, N ■ population, and p *
relative before-tax price.
replaced Y.

The arguments y and N have

The total derivative with respect to time

of the logarithm of equation 2.4 was

22John B. Legler and Perry Shapiro, "The Responsive
ness of State Tax Revenue to Economic Growth," National
Tax Journal XXI (March, 1968), 46-56.
^^Ibid., p. 46.

21
R ■ e-i *JL +
R
y

e;>*N + eo*£X + ->jii*£2. + ■;•(:*£.
N
J n
r2
^ p

(2.5)

Each of the coefficients e^ was a partial derivative;
for example

R .

Each e^ was thus an elasticity of

R with respect to the appropriate argument.
Legler and Shapiro argued that If the e^ were
constant over time, then the functional equation

2.k

became the specific form
R - A-yel-Ne2-r1e 3*r2e4*pe5

(2.6)

where A Is the antllog of the constant of Integration.

In

the appendix of the article, Legler and Shapiro described
a method of testing the hypothesis of constant elasticities
over time.

For each state of the Legler-Shapiro study,

this hypothesis could not be rejected "at high levels of
significance.,l2i*
Legler and Shapiro assumed, as had Wilford before
them, that aggregate personal income could be treated as
the product of per capita income and population.

If

aggregate Income growth were due entirely to population
growth, or entirely to per capita income growth, the effects
on tax revenues might be different.

In particular, they

argued that a rising per capita Income, by changing the
"market basket" of goods consumed, might alter sales tax
revenues by an amount different from that produced by the

2^ I b l d . . p.

52.

22
same increase in aggregate Income due to population.
increase.
Two criticisms can be raised against this important
work.

First, the model did not reflect the interdependency

stated earlier in their article:
If, as in many states, a taxpayer is allowed to deduct
sales tax payments from his taxable Income, it is
clear that a rise in sales tax receipts resulting from
an Increase in the sales tax rate or changes in
consumer preferences leads to a decline in the income
tax base and receipts.26
The revenues of both taxes depend, not on taxable Income as
implied in the above quotation, but on aggregate personal
income.

The argument lists for the two taxes do not

Include any variables that would lead to interdependence;
the level of income does not depend on the level of tax
revenues.
Second, some of the estimated elasticity coef
ficients were negative.

Legler and Shapiro argued

correctly that negative elasticities are plausible in the
real world, due to the Interdependence of taxes.

But

within the context of their own model, which as argued
above lacks Interdependence, negative rate elasticities are
not to be expected.
Two articles appeared in the National Tax Journal
in response to the article by Legler and Shapiro.

25Ibid., pp. 47-48.
26Ibid., p. 47.

The

23
first of these was by Ben-chieh Liu, who pointed out a
technical error in their work.

27

Liu argued that Legler

and Shapiro were incorrect in stating unit rate elastici
ties occurred only when the demand for taxable goods was
perfectly inelastic with respect to price.

Liu suggested

the following correction:
. . . the only condition under which the percentage
change in sales tax revenues equals the percentage
change in tax rate Is, that the consumption expenditures
on the taxable goods are gerfectly inelastic with
respect to the tax rate.2°
Liu stated that the difference arose on goods
subject to two or more levels of taxation, whereby one tax
could affect the price of a good, and hence the revenues of
the other

t a x . 2 ^

Wilford made the same error, according

to Liu.30

Legler and Shapiro replied that Liufs correction

was valid.

They had omitted from the article an assumption

of perfectly elastic supply of taxable goods.

According to

Legler and Shapiro, this assumption would have led to
equivalence of the two positions.31

2?Ben-chieh Liu, "Comments on the Responsiveness of
State Tax Revenue to Economic Growth," National Tax
Journal, XXII (June, 1969)» 29^-298.
26Ibid., p. 295.
29lbld., p. 296.
3°Ibld., p. 295.
3ijohn B. Legler and Perry Shapiro, "The Responsive
ness of State Tax Revenue to Economic Growth: A Reply,"
National Tax Journal. XXII CJune, 1969), 299-300.
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The second article in response to xhe work of
Legler and Shapiro was more fundamental and less technical
in its criticism.

Professors Frledlander, Swanson, and

Due took issue with the specific form of the aggregate
tax revenue function (equation 2.6) posited by Legler and
Shapiro.32

The multiplicative revenue function was

unrealistic and should have been replaced with an additive
function.

According to these critics, Legler and Shapiro

did no more to explore the mechanisms linking income to
tax revenue than previous researchers had done.

Further,

the negative rate elasticities found by Legler and
Shapiro were due to model misspecification.33
Frledlander, Swanson, and Due then developed their
own model of tax revenue generation.

The assumptions of

the model were: (1 ) the tax structure consists of an
income tax and a sales tax, (2 ) taxes are independent of
one another, (3) the supply of taxable commodities is
infinitely elastic, (4) per capita income and its growth
rate are exogenous variables, and (5 ) the estimates to be
obtained are short-run. 3**
Assumption (2) went contrary to the work of

3^Ann F. Frledlander, Gerald J. Swanson, and John
F. Due, "Estimating Sales Tax Revenue Changes in Response
to Changes in Personal Income and Sales Tax Rates,"
National Tax Journal XXVI (March, 1973), 103-110.
33ibid.. p. 103.
3^Ibld.. p. 106.
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Legler and Shapiro, who had attempted to bu.lld into their
model the interdependence of taxes.

Frledlander, at al.

explained that over a short period of time, the inter
dependence of taxes was presumed unchanging, and hence an
unnecessary part of the

m o d e l .

35

Frledlander, et_ al. conducted empirical work on a
cross section of fifteen states.

Like Wilford and Legler

and Shapiro, they treated aggregate personal income as the
product of per capita income and population.

Relative

prices of taxed versus untaxed goods had been among the
arguments of the tax revenue function, but was dropped
when it contributed nothing statistically.

The empirical

phase of this project thus treated sales tax revenues as a
log-linear function of the sales tax rate, per capita
income, and population.3^
They argued that states with food included in the
sales tax base should have higher rate elasticities.

This

should be so since food demand was generally price
inelastic; the lower the price elasticity, the higher the
rate elasticity.37

The average rate elasticity for the

fifteen states was 0 .9 3 ; the average for states exempting
food was 0.87.

Interestingly, the extreme values of the

3 5 l b l d . .

p.

1 0 6 .

3 6 I b l d . ,

p.

107.

3 7 I b i d . ,

p.

1 0 7 .
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rate elasticity were both found in states which excluded
food from the sales tax base:

Maine (0.71) and Florida

(1 .18).38
J. A. Dockelfs dissertation, The Responsiveness of
the Iowa Tax Structure, had many elements in common with
this current study.

His primary Interest was long-run

tax revenue projections; his basic analytical tool was the
use of income elasticities as the measure of responsive
ness; he expressed interest in testing for changes in
income elasticities.39

After demonstrating that the Iowa

tax structure had undergone significant rate changes as
well as administrative changes, Dockel discussed the
separation of tax yield elasticity into a base elasticity
and a rate e l a s t i c i t y . T h i s

concept had previously been

elaborated by Rafuse, and was designed to account for the
effect of a tax rate increase on the purchases of a good
or service not completely inelastic in demand. **1
For the Iowa Income tax specifically, Dockel
regressed income tax revenues against total personal income

38lbld., pp. 108-109.
39j. A. Dockel, The Responsiveness of the Iowa
Tax Structure, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, iowa
State University, Ames, Iowa, 1970). The reader is specifi
cally referred to pages 6 ,7 , and 4 8.
iin
Ibid., pp. 46-7.
^Rafuse, op. clt. . p. 9In.
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In log-linear form, so that the regression coefficient
would be the yield elasticity (and base elasticity as
well, as there was no rate increase to consider).

He

utilized step variables to determine whether shifts had
occurred In tax yields as a result of administrative
changes.^

He aiso used another dummy variable, equal to

the logarithm of personal Income when the step variable
equalled one, and zero otherwise, to determine whether
the slope of the regression line had changed.**3,44
However, he did not state specifically that a slope change
implied an income elasticity change.
For the Iowa tax structure, Dockel estimated an
overall income elasticity of .85, up from .81 due to
administrative changes in 1 9 6 ? . ^

This relatively low

value is due In part to the state’s heavy reliance on an
inelastic property tax.^6

He did not mention the possible

change in that income elasticity due to economic factors.
This dissertation suggests In Chapter 4 that the
Income elasticity of a tax structure changes as income

**2Dockel, op. clt. . p. 45.
^ Ibld. . P*

**8.

^ T h i s device is discussed later In this chapter,
on page 33.
^Dockel, op. cit. . p. 104-105.
1,6IbId. , p. 40.
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changes.

Those taxes more income elastic than the average

for the tax structure will rise in the proportion of tax
revenues generated, those less Income elastic than average
will decline.**7

Dockel’s projections of Iowa’s tax revenues

were not consistent with those results.

Particularly, he

estimated that the property tax, less elastic than average
for the Iowa structure, would gain in share of tax revenues
produced: that the sales tax, approximately average in
elasticity, would lose share; and that the income tax,
corporate income tax, and insurance premium tax, all
greater than average elasticity, would remain about the
same in share of tax revenues produced.**®
The American Council on Intergovernmental Relations
pointed out the desirability of unit or greater income
elasticity in a state-local tax system.

In particular, an

elasticity of unity would allow a state tax structure to
grow as fast as the economy around It; an elasticity of
1.2 would promote a state-federal balance; state sources
would grow as rapidly as federal sources.**9
undesirable from two standpoints.

But this seems

The federal system is

so elastic that fiscal drag is a problem forcing occasional

**7See pp.

129-13^.

**®Dockel, op. cit. , p. 123.
^Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
Federal-State-Local Finances: Significant Features of
Fiscal Federalism, 1973-7** edition, p. 3"!
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tax cuts of varying scope.

While state tax revenues do

not have the same impact as federal tax revenues in terms
of a macroeconomic leakage, the lack of appreciable fiscal
drag creates no cause for a system of such high elasticity.
Second, the income elasticity of the state tax structure
will grow as income grows; if the system has an initial
income elasticity of 1.2, that elasticity will rise to
even higher levels, if any individual tax has an elasticity
larger than the average elasticity for the tax system.

Thus

while the income elasticity of a tax structure can be too
small, it might also be too large.

ACIR suggested that

state personal income taxes should produce about 25 percent
of state revenues in order to get adequate elasticity and
to avoid inequities of property and sales taxes.50
In an article attempting to explain a recent
phenomenon of state tax rate and base reductions, Leon
Rothenberg wrote that an inflationary economy was beneficial
to state government financing.

He argued that state

governments' revenues would rise faster than expenditures;
that revenues were more responsive to inflation than were
expenditures.

Amplifying this statement, he wrote that

such levies as sales taxes and income taxes (the latter
due to withholding) responded quickly to price and wage
level changes.

Expenditures, on the other hand, were much

50Ibid., p. 1.
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slower to respond, as wage and salary payments and many
other state government expenditures were due to contractual
or constitutional restrictions, stable over the short run.51
Rothenberg's opening statement became less profound
as It was developed.

He was not discussing the amount,

either percentage or absolute, by which revenues and
expenditures changed.

Rather, he was writing about

different time lags In the adjustment process.
His arguments are perhaps sound, as short-run
analysis.

Over a longer time frame, it seems plausible

that expenditures would go through a "catching-up" phase,
particularly as wages and salaries rise to remain as
competitive as before.

Of importance to this dissertation

1 b not the lag structure by which revenues and expenditures
react to price level changes, but the longer term percentage
and absolute dollar amount adjustments, for which short-run
timing differences would have been washed out.
In the first of two important contributions to the
literature concerning state tax revenue growth and income
elasticities, Neil M. Singer applied the technique of
dummy variables to a state income elasticity study.
Recognizing the inability of some earlier works to
effectively deal with statutory rate and base changes,

S^Leon Rothenberg, "A New Look in State Finances:
Tax Reduction and Restructured Tax Systems," National Tax
Journal. XXVII (June, 197^0, 175-181.

Singer utilized dummy variables to measure the impact of
these discretionary changes.

He wrote that the frequency

with which some states had changed rates and bases might
have led other researchers not to use the dummy variable
technique.

52

singer assumed constant income elasticities;

he found that the dummy variables were generally significant,
and that aggregate personal income generated better regres
sion fits than other income

measures.

53

He noted that some

state income taxes allowed the deduction of federal income
taxes; in these states, income tax revenues were dependent
on the Federal income tax laws, and thus required dummy
variables to account for the effect of changes in federal
tax laws.5^
Michael Wasylenko noted that Singer's dummy variable
method tested only for change in the intercept of regression*
while discretionary changes in income tax laws might have
altered slopes (elasticities) as well.

Wasylenko wrote

that the addition of another dummy variable would have
provided a test of slope change, but would at the same
time

have reduced the degrees of freedom of the regression.

He also noted that the frequency of discretionary changes
would require several sets of dummy variables.

Rather than

52Neil M. Singer, "The Use of Dummy Variables in
Estimating the Income-Elasticity of State Income-Tax
Revenues," National Tax Journal. XXI (June, 1968), 200.
53ibld.. pp. 201-203.
5**ibid. . p. 201.
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sacrifice degrees of freedom by using the dummy variables
necessary to test for the Impacts of several discretionary
changes, Wasylenko developed an alternate methodology.

He

estimated income tax elasticities and income tax revenues
by utilizing a simulation of the income tax revenue
generating process.55

process he developed was similar

in many respects to the "synthetic" tax revenue series
used earlier by Robert Harris.5®

The pattern of income

distribution was pivotal to Wasylenko's model.

He first

computed the "effective base

ratio"of taxable income

total income for each income

class.

to

Then he computed the

"effective tax rate" for each income class; these rates
were the ratios of tax liability to taxable income.

He

then projected future total income values, and simulated
future tax revenues for each

income class by applying the

previously calculated ratios.57

This method allowed

Wasylenko to determine rate, base, and total elasticity
coefficients, which by his assumptions were constant.58
In avoiding a problem associated with Singer's method,

55Michael Wasylenko, "Estimating the Elasticity of
State Personal Income Taxes." National Tax Journal, XXVIII
(March, 1975), 139-140.
S^Robert Harris, Income and Sales Taxes: The 1970
Outlook for States and Localities (State and Local Finances
Project, Council of State Governments, June, 1966).
57wasylenko, op. cit. . pp. 140-141.
58lbld.. p. 141.
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Wasylenko developed a technique which lacked an Important
feature of the Singer model:

the ability to compare

policy alternatives.
The February 1970 American Statistician published
an article describing a test which involved the use of two
types of dummy variables to test for changes in both
intercept and slope of the regression

surface.

59

a

set

of zero-one variables allowed a test for change of
intercept.

If the coefficient of this variable were

significant, then the data accompanied by the dummy variable
value 1 were responsible for a shift of intercept.

A

second set of dummy variables took on the value zero or
j , where

is the ith observation on the £th independent

variable, as the first set took values zero or one.

These

variables performed a test to determine whether the slope
of the regression (with respect to the variable J) had
changed.

An intercept change could be interpreted as a

once-for-all increase (or decrease) in revenues; a slope
change would imply a change in the effective rate at which
tax revenues grow.
Singer’s second contribution treated analytically
the concept of income-dependent income elasticities of

^ D a m o d a r Gujarati,

"Use of Dummy Variables in
Testing for Equality between Sets of Coefficients in Two
Linear Regressions: A Note," The American Statistician,
XXIV (February, 1970), 50-52.
Also, "Use of Dummy
Variables in Testing for Equality between Sets of Coeffi
cients in Linear Regressions:
A Generalization." The
American Statistician, XXIV (December, 1970), 18-22.
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state Income taxes.6°

Although most previous researchers

discussed the possibility of non-constant elasticities,
few had actually formulated models which specified elas
ticities which varied.

Musgrave and Miller, writing about

the elasticity of the federal Income tax, noted that the
income elasticity varied with income.

Dockel used dummy

variables which tested for changes in the slope of the
regression; he never explicitly associated this slope
shift with an elasticity shift.
Wasylenko noted that elasticities could be shifted
but his research did not further Investigate that possibil
ity.

Wilford urged researchers to examine the time-trend

of the year-to-year elasticity values.

Legler and Shapiro

assumed constant elasticities; their empirical work led
them not to reject an hypothesis of constant elasticities.
Groves and Kahn, and Singer in a previous article, had
assumed constant Income elasticities.

Thus this second

Singer article presented the first model of state income
taxes which explicitly specified variable Income elastici
ties.

Singer noted that the Income elasticity of a

state Income tax should not be treated as constant over
wide ranges of Income.

He listed three effects which

caused income elasticity to vary with income.

The

®°Neil M. Singer, "Estimating State Income
Revenues: A New Approach," Review of Economics and
Statistics. LII (November, 1970), 4^7-433.
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"exemption effect" generated high income elasticities for
those tax payers whose Incomes Just exceeded the tax
exemption.

This effect disappeared as all incomes exceeded

the exemption.

The "rate effect" generated changing

elasticities so long as effective marginal and average tax
rates changed.

According to Singer, this effect continued

until the highest marginal rate had been reached by all
taxpayers.

However, the average tax rate would continue to

change (as Income changed) even after all taxpayers had
reached the highest marginal tax rate.

Thus the "rate

effect" would not vanish when Singer claimed.

Singer

did not mention that the same effect might operate on a
regressive tax structure as well.

The "base effect" caused

the income elasticity to vary as the income aggregate
grew at a different rate than taxable income.

Capital

gains and transfer payments were noted as the primary
sources of variation between the two income measures.®1
Singer then posed the hypothesis that income
elasticity was dependent on the rate structure.

Assuming

constant statutory rates, this implied that income
elasticity was a function of the effective tax

rate.®^

He found the rate effect to be significant, and concluded
that for a progressive tax, Income elasticity declined

6lIbid.. pp. 427-428.
®gIbld., pp. 428-429.
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toward unity

>\a the

effective tax rate rose.^3

Williams, Anderson, Froehle, and Lamb attempted
to define more precisely and to establish quantitative
measures for the tax criteria of yield stability, yield
growth, and countercyclical stabilizing

i n f l u e n c e .

^4

Yield stability was measured by the reciprocal of the
standard deviation of the logarithms of tax revenues.
Yield growth was measured by a long-run income elasticity.
Stabilizing influence was measured by a short run income
elasticity.^5

^ linear regression of the percentage

change in tax revenue against the percentage change in
aggregate personal income was used to estimate the latter
measure.

The long-run income elasticity was measured by a

log-linear regression of tax revenue against aggregate
personal income.

As no adjustments were made for rate or

base changes, this method was equivalent to that used by
Groves and Kahn.

For the cross-section of states studied,

most income elasticities were estimated to be at or above
unity.66

63ibid., pp. 429-430.
^Wi l l i a m V. Williams, Robert M. Anderson, David
0. Froehle, and Kaye L. Lamb, "The Stability, Growth, and
Stabilizing Influence of State Taxes," National Tax
Journal LVI (June, 1973), 267-274.
65Ibld., pp. 269-270.
66Ibld.. p. 271.
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W. T. Wilford responded to the Williams, e t . a l .
article with sharp criticism.®'7

He wrote that the method

of estimating long-run income elasticities gave spurious
results for two reasons.

First, in not specifying rate and

base adjustments, the method used measured cun Income elas
ticity which was biased upward by including the impact of
these discretionary changes.

Second, Wilford argued that

the Income elasticity measured was an average value for
the time period studied, and that Inflationary times result
in increasing elasticities for income taxes.

The possibil

ity of time-dependent income elasticities, Wilford wrote,
made

. . even more imperative trend analysis of the

elasticities."®8
Wilford further argued that rate and base adjust
ments should be explicitly built into models concerned
with income elasticity and revenue growth.

Williams,

et al. had omitted specific treatment of rate and base
changes on the grounds that such statutory and adminis
trative changes were so frequent and regular that they
could be treated as commonplace, and expected to continue.®9
Having argued that the Williams et al. elasticity
estimates were biased upward, Wilford provided a set of

®?W. T. Wilford, "A Comment on 'The Stability,
Growth, and Stabilizing Influence of State Taxes,'n
National Tax Journal. XXVIII (December, 1975), 452-458.
68Ibld., pp. *152-453.
®9lbid.■ P- 453.
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Income elasticity estimated for the Louisiana tax structure
to further support his point.

He accounted for rate

changes explicitly by Including a rate variable in the
regression; he accounted for base changes by utilizing
dummy variables.

Only two taxes, the excise license tax

and the personal Income tax, had Income elasticities
greater than unity.70

Wilford's elasticity estimates are

shown In Table 2.1.
A recent contribution by Berney and Frerlchs
evaluated several methods of estimating Income elastici
ties . ^

They argued that since tax revenue is defined by

the product of tax rate and tax base, that models not
reflecting that definition were most likely mlsspecified.
The model used by Groves and Kahn would be correctly
specified only if the tax rate and tax base were functions
only of the income aggregate.72

xncluaion of the tax rate,

as done by Wilford, led to a mlsspecified model if the
Income aggregate were not the only determinant of the
tax

base.

73

Berney and Frerlchs noted that failure to

70lbld., p. 457.
71Robert E. Berney and Bernard H. Frerlchs, "Income
Elasticities for State Tax Revenues: Techniques of
Estimation and their Usefulness for Forecasting," Public
Finance Quarterly. I (October, 1973), 409-425.
7?ibld.. pp. 410-411.
73ibld., pp. 411, 415-416.
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Table 2.1
Estimated Income Elasticities of Selected
Louisiana Taxes, 1956-1972
Tax

Elasticity

Alcoholic Beverage

.50

Beer

.60

Corporate Franchise

.9*

Corporate Income

.96

Excise License

1.06

Personal Income

1.71

Inheritance

.95

Occupational License

.68

Public Utilities

.73

Sales

.66

Tobacco

.39

Fuels

.59

Motor Vehicle Licenses

.76

Source:

W. T. Wilford, "A Comment on 'The Stability,
Growth, and Stabilizing Influence of State
Taxes,'" National Tax Journal. XXVIII
(December, 1975), 457*

4o
include both rate-revenue and base-revenue elasticities
resulted in substantial and unpredictable bias in the
income elasticity.7**
They concluded that the preferred form of a model
designed to estimate income elasticities and to project
tax revenues would be log-linear and would include variables
to explicitly detail the effects of tax rate and tax base
changes.

These conclusions were based on their observations

that the logarithmic models yielded more conservative
results, and that the models including rate and base
variables were theoretically stronger, than other models
surveyed.75

Another conclusion reached by Berney and

Frerlchs was that "income elasticities by themselves may
be of minimal value for short-run revenue forecasting."76
INCOME ELASTICITY AND TAX REVENUE
GROWTH: LOUISIANA
Thomas R. Beard wrote of recent uncertainty in
revenues from severance taxes and non-tax mineral resources.
He stated that Louisiana, among the fifty states, was most
reliant on this form of revenue, and that
The remainder of Louisiana's state government revenue
sources are simply not sufficiently responsive to

74Ibld., p. 417.
75Ibid., p. 422-423.
76Ibld., p. 423.

m
economic growth to provide a very rapid rate of
expansion in total revenues.77
Of course, federal grants (revenue-sharing funds going into
the state's general fund) and other non-tax revenues were
included in that study, and their responsiveness to economic
growth is suspect.

Thus Beard did not directly state that

the state government's tax structure was "not sufficiently
responsive."

Beard wrote extensively on the most trouble

some area of this dissertation:

the fact that projections

of future revenues are dependent on the political acts of
the state legislature, on the federal government's revenuesharing plans and legislative acts, and on the fate of
petroleum prices in the international political arena.
He mentioned the slow-down in collections of
sales taxes, and the decline in Income tax revenues,
laying the cause of the reduced revenues at legislative
acts reducing the base of each of these

taxes.

78

But both

of these taxes have income elasticities at or above unity;
after these once-for-all base adjustments have been felt,
these taxes will again take on the role of growth leaders
in state tax collections.

77Flnanclng Qovernment in Louisiana: A Comparative
Study by Thomas R . Beard. Occasional Paper No. 21,
November 1974, Division of Research, College of Business
Administration, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, pp. 114-115.
78Ibid., pp. 115-116.
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In three papers prepared fcr the state of Louisiana
Coordinating Council for Higher Education, James A, Papke,
on one occasion with John B. Legler, projected tax revenues
and state government expenditures for the State of
Louisiana.

these

79

Since the projections techniques used in

papers were quite similarto thoseused here,

and

since the time frame for the projections was the same, it
was important to devote space for an analysis of these
works.
Legler and Papke wrote in the appendix of their
article that their revenue estimates were obtained from
the formal model
Rt - A'ytel*Nte2*rte 3
where

(2.7)

Rt ■revenue of tax
yt * per capita income
Nt ■ population
rt * tax rate
t * time index
A, ex, e 2 , e3 are parameters, all but A being
partial elasticities.80

This log-linear model utilized constant partial elasticities
of the tax to be treated.

Legler and Papke reported the

79john B. Legler and James A. Papke, "Long Range
Revenue Projections for the State of Louisiana: 1975,
1980, 1985," pp. 175-193; James A. Papke, "Long Range
Expenditure Projections for the State of Louisiana,"
pp. 195-205; and James A. Papke, "Potential RevenueExpenditure Imbalances: State of Louisiana," p. 207; all
in Waster Plan Supplement, State of Louisiana Coordinating
Council for Higher Education, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1972.
Qn
Legler and Papke, o p . clt.« p. 180.

43
following equation for the estimation of future values of
total taxes for the state.®1
Rt - -10.0374 + 0.5056 y + 2.3715 N (r2 - .9944)
(2 .8 )
In utilizing this model, Legler and Papke correctly
reasoned that future tax revenues would not grow according
to some linear pattern of relatively constant year-to-year
change, but rather would grow more like a sum deposited at
compound interest.

The partial income elasticity of

.5065 is obviously less than unity.

As will be shown in a

later section of this dissertation, the overall income
elasticity can be found by a v e r a g i n g the partial elasticities,
using the growth rates of the respective variables as
weights.

The weighted average elasticity (with respect to

personal income) is O.9 6 , or slightly less than unity.®2
This is in contrast to the value 1.05 reported by Legler
and Papke In the conclusion of that a r t i c l e . ®3
Given that the

basic form of the model Is acceptable

for the purpose of intermediate- and

long-term projections,

emphasis can be shifted to some details of implementing
the model.

Legler and Papke argued that while severance

taxes have no clear bond to levels of income and population,

8lIbld.. p. 192.
®2e . .5065 x
5.15< + 2.3715x 1.65% - 6.523 - 0.96
y
5-15%
+ 1.65*
5700
®3Legl er and Papke, op. clt. . p. 193*

past movement;-; show a close statistical rel ,j,tlonshl o.
Thus the high correlation coefficients were used to justify
the use of an equation not suggested by a priori information.
Since oil and gas production have begun to decline in
recent years, this form of association must be viewed as
invalid.

Severance tax revenues should not be treated by

the elasticities approach.
The study by Legler and Papke made no attempt to
project nominal per capita income by first projecting real
per capita income, then multiplying those results by a
factor representing anticipated inflation.

This would seem

preferable, in light of the current instability of prices
and the reasonable stability of real per capita income
growth.

Such a series as would be generated by the two-

stage technique could very easily be revised simply by
utilizing more current expectations toward inflation.
Papke stated that his model assumed the major
taxes, aggregated, would be a constant fraction of total
tax

revenues

.

as

shown later, the model actually assumed

growing shares for the relatively elastic taxes.

Thus the

validity of his assumption lies in the relative elasticities
of the major and minor taxes.

Papke's assumption would be

8^Ibld., p. 175.
®5papke, "Potential Revenue-Expenditure Imbalance:
State of Louisiana," p. 207.
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correct only if the weighted average Income elasticity
of the major taxes equalled that of the minor taxes.

This

assumption could perhaps have been avoided if other taxes,
as an aggregate, had been estimated using the same
techniques as applied to the major taxes.
Legler and Papke reported the results of their
regressions in tabular form.

Some peculiarities emerged,

hinting that the regressions could have been improved by
some altered specifications.

For example, the estimating

equation for the Corporate Franchise tax had no significant
variables in it.

Only two taxes had all three coefficients

a, ei» E2 significantly different from zero, and one of
these, the Tobacco Tax, had a negative estimated income
elasticity.

Thus some of the equations might have more

meaningfully been estimated by using population as the sole
independent variable, or by using a regression forced
through the origin.
W. T. Wilford's article "Is Louisiana's Revenue
Structure Responsive to Economic Growth"^? attempted to
measure the responsiveness of "self-generated" state
revenues to Gross State Product.

This revenue concept

included all state taxes, licenses, fees, royalties, etc.,
and excluded only federal grants and Medicare/aid funds,

86

Legler and Papke, o p . clt.. p. 192.

^Louisiana Business Survey, VI (April, 1975)*
6-7 , 10- 11 .
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and thus is mere broadly defined than the concept of
Total Taxes used in this dissertation.

Gross State Product

is also a broader concept than Total Personal Income as
used here.

Wilford reported a 1972 weighted average

elasticity of 0.83, for self-generated tax revenues with
respect to Gross State Product.

This

was a bit confusing;

in his Table 2 he divided state revenue into "incomerelated" and "nonincome related," while Table 4 displayed
elasticities of "Tax Revenue" and "Total Revenue" to Gross
State Product.

The text explained that "Tax Revenue" of

Table 4 is in reality "Income-related" revenue, and
"Total Revenue" is the sum of "income-related" and "non
income related" revenues.®®

A terminological problem still

existed, however, since the severance tax revenues were
included in "nonincome-related" revenues.

Wilford noted a

tendency for this elasticity to rise over time.

The 0.83

value of 1972 represented an increase from an estimated
0.71 in 1956.

The equations used to estimate the revenue-

income elasticities contained no formal provision for chang
ing elasticities of individual taxes.
This feature did not represent a flaw, however,
when used to estimate elasticities of individual revenue
sources.

As pointed out elsewhere in this dissertation,

there are two sources of a changing Income elasticity of
the revenue system.

One of these is that the elasticities

88I b l d . . p. 11.

H7
of individual taxes may change with time and/or income;
if this be the case, the estimating equations should
reflect the fact in the modelling process.

Wilford

recognized the second source of elasticity change, at least
implicitly, that the income-elastic revenue sources will
produce larger proportions of Total Revenues (or incomerelated revenues, at least) as income grows, and thus
increase the weighted average elasticity of the revenue
system.
There are yet other reasons for the projections of
this dissertation to differ from Professor Wilford's,

He

utilized a broader revenue base, which included more
nonincome-related revenue.

This would cause his income

elasticity measure to be downward-biased from that of
this dissertation.

He utilized Gross State Product, which,

according to the data he presented, grew on the average,
6.79# annually (from 1956-1972).89

By contrast, Total

Personal Income grew slightly faster, at 6.95# annually
over the same period; this would make Wilford's elasticity
estimates slightly upward-biased from those of this
dissertation.
A second article by Wilford was more complete
than the first in its treatment of the subject of the income

89

I b i d . . p. 7.
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elasticity of the Louisiana tax structure.9^

The more

recent article utilized the same methodology, reached the
same conclusions, and was subject to the same criticisms
as the article above.

In addition, the second article

presented two new points for comparison to the methodology
of this dissertation.
Citing the difficulty of empirically measuring
effective statutory tax rates, Wilford utilized dummy
variables instead of rate variables to account for rate
changes.91

Thus qualitative variables were substituted

for quantitative ones.
for base changes.

Such dummy variables also accounted

Wilford's models thus did not attempt to

differentiate effects on revenue resulting from rate and
from base shifts.

The equations were also incapable of

modelling shifts in rate or income elasticities.
Second, the formulation of the dummy variables
may have been mlsspecified.

Wilford's equations (5) and

(6) purport to be the same economic model,92 but this is
unlikely.

As is shown later in this dissertation.equation

(5) should be
C5') X± - aAYb 10fdi, not (5)

X± -

a1Yfad1f

9°W. T. Wilford, "On the Sensitivity of State
Revenues to Qross State Product: Louisiana's Revenue-Income
Elasticity Coefficients," Review of Business and Economic
Research, XI (Fall, 1975), 1-20.
9IIbld., p. 5.
92I b l d . . pp.

7-8.
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in order for equation (6) to be correct.
Wilford recently published a third article on the
Louisiana tax structure.93

Noting the volatility and

uncertainty surrounding severance tax revenues, Wilford
stated that the purpose of this article was to examine the
"dependability" of the major nonseverance taxes.

More than

one-half of Louisiana's total revenues (total state sources,
less Federal Grants and Medicare receipts) was generated by
five nonseverance taxes:

Gasoline, Personal Income,

Corporate Income, Sales, and Tobacco.

Wilford produced

several tables of revenue and percentage change in revenue
forecasts, based on varying assumptions concerning Gross
State Product growth.

The implicit income elasticities of

these estimates were different from those of the two
previous articles, although the data and methodology were
the same.

Both Income taxes were income-inelastic; the

sales tax Income elasticity was approximately one-half.
Indeed, all five taxes were income Inelastic.

These

calculations led Wilford to the conclusion that
. . . in the absence of new tax rate or base adjustments*
the five sources will contribute a progressively
smaller percentage to revenues as the State Legislature
is forced to search out additional revenue sources to
meet rising expenditures,94

93w. T. Wilford, "Louisiana's Major Nonseverance
Tax Revenues: Long-term Performance and Prospects,"
Louisiana Business Review. XL (March, 1976), 6-8.
94ibld., p. 8.
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Such a conclusion is a tautology.

Naturally, If more money

is to be raised from other sources, a smaller share of the
total is generated by the five taxes in question.
There is a very good reason for Wilford’s estimates
to exhibit low income elasticities.

Despite the long-run

nature of the forecasts, Wilford utilized a linear model.95
The resulting estimates tend to understate the responsive
ness of tax revenues to changes in Gross State Product, and
hence understate the income elasticity.

As argued in this

dissertation, a log-linear formulation would have been
more appropriate, and would have led to higher income
elasticity coefficients.
Professors Beard and Scott in their article,
"Revenue Projections for Louisiana State Government, Fiscal
Years 197^-75— 1979-80",9^ provided two sets of estimates of
revenues for state government; both sets are pessimistic
in outlook.

In only one year (of the six for which

estimates are provided) do anticipated revenues exceed the
anticipated amount of Inflation.

The estimating process

is similar to that used later in this dissertation.
Severance tax revenue and mineral resource revenue estimates
were based on predictions of future oil output and prices.
Revenues of all other state sources (except federal grants)

95ibid., p. 6.
^Louisiana Business Review, XXXIX (February, 1975)*
2-5, 11-114, 16.
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were estimated using an elasticities approach:

income tax

revenues were based, in Estimate I, on an assumed income
elasticity of 1.25 (1.35 in Estimate II).

Sales tax

revenue estimates were generated on the basis of an assumed
income elasticity of .95 (1.05 in Estimate II).
Beard and Scott displayed their results in two
tables, the bottom line of each showing the year-to-year
percentage increase in revenues.

Interestingly, this

percentage is constantly increasing for Department of
Revenue sources (which include most of the states important
taxes).
year, and

Since income is assumed to grow at 9 % in the first

10%

in succeeding years, and since the income

elasticity is the ratio of the tax revenue growth rate to
the respective income growth rate, it seems that Professors
Beard and Scott have predicted an increase in the income
elasticity of the state’s revenue system, although they do
not explicitly state such a conclusion.

Table 2.2 displays

the forecasts by Beard and Scott for growth rates in tax
revenues and in total personal income.

Table 2.3 shows the

income elasticities implicit in those forecasts.

Table 2.2
Revenue and Income Projections, 1975-76 - 1979-80*

1975-76

Projected Annual Growth Rates
1976-77
1977-78
1978-79

1979-80

(1)

Department of Revenue Sources^

3.5

3.9

4.7

5.5

6.2

(2)

All state sources3

4.9

3.4

5.1

4.7

6.2

(3)

Total Taxes Licenses Fees, etc.**

5.4

3.7

5.5

5.1

6.8

(4)

Total Personal Income

9.

10.

10.

10.

10.

*Thomas R. Beard and Loren C. Scott, "Revenue Projections for Louisiana
State Government, Fiscal Years 1974-75 - 1979-80," Louisiana Business Review
XXXIX (Feb., 1975), 4.
^Includes Beer Tax, Corporate Franchise Tax, Income Tax, Sales Tax (General),
Severance Tax, Tobacco Tax, Gasoline and Special Fuels Tax, alcoholic beverage tax,
alcoholic beverage permits, anhydrous ammonia, electricity tax on cooperatives,
power use (none after 197*1-75), gift, inheritance, inspection fees on petroleum,
liquified petroleum permits, motor carrier fees, natural gas franchise, occupational
licenses, public utilities, reforestation, soft drinks, supervision and inspection
fees, and unknown owners.
^Includes Department of Revenue receipts, Mineral Resources, Other Taxes,
Licenses, Fees, Department of Public Safety, and Federal Revenue Sharing Receipts.
**A11 State Sources less Federal Revenue Sharing Receipts.

Table 2.3

Implied Income Elasticity Coefficients
1975-76

1976-77

1977-78

1978-79

1979-80

Department of Revenue Sources
(Row 1 - Row 4, Table 5*1)

.39

•39

.47

.55

.62

All state sources
(Row 2 - Row 4, Table 5.1)

.54

.34

.51

.47

.62

Total Taxes, Licenses, Pees, etc.
(Row 3 - Row 4, Table 5.1)

.60

*37

.55

.51

.68

Source:

Table 5*1
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Chapter 3
BACKGROUND:

LOUISIANA TAX HISTORY
AND STRUCTURE

The purpose of this chapter Is two-fold.

First,

the tax structure of the state Is examined briefly, In
order to analyze changes In that structure that have
occurred during the period 1948-49 to the present.
This analysis Is required If a meaningful econometric
model of the tax structure is to be built.

Second, the

tax revenue data for the taxes to be studied is presented.
These revenue data, singly and In aggregates, with the
various Income, price level, and population data, provide
the quantitative base for the regression studies which
follow in Chapter 5.
The discussion on this and the following pages
summarizes the major tax changes in recent Louisiana
history.

The legislating of new taxes and new tax rates,

the redefining of tax bases, the transferring of a tax from
one collecting agency to another, and changing the
administration or enforcement of tax collections, are
some of the Important features that are considered.
Some readers will find this discussion incomplete for some
purposes; for a fuller description of rate changes and
of statutory references, the Louisiana State Tax
54
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Handbook is recommended.1

This source also provider a

concise treatment of the exemptions to the various taxes.
For a fuller treatment than is available even here, the
reader is urged to consult the Louisiana Revised Statutes
p
directly, or the latest Department of Revenue Tax Guide.
HISTORY OF TAX STRUCTURE CHANGES
Few of Louisiana's taxes have remained unchanged
over the passage of the nearly thirty years under study.
Changes In tax rates, definition of the tax base, methods
of collection, and changes in the degree of enforcement have
taken place in nearly every tax levied by the State of
Louisiana.

In addition, several taxes have been repealed.

The tax structure has been altered by each of these changes.
It is the function of the following sections to outline
briefly the important changes that have taken place in the
administration of each tax.

This analysis facilitates the

construction of a model of the tax structure.

This model

separates those changes In revenues that are due to changing
economic conditions from those revenue changes that are due
to structural changes In the individual taxes.

^Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana. This book is published irregularly,
most recently in 1969*
9
State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue Tax
Guide (1975 edition) Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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This report looks first at those ta:.:es that nave bet:o
repealed; then individual taxes are examined for structural
changes.
Repealed Taxes
Several taxes were repealed during the period of
this study; most of these were not significant Income
producers.

In 1956, the severance taxes on frogs and

lignite were repealed.

The tax on frogs contributed,

for example, less than $1000 in both 1950-51 and 19511952.3
In I960 the Kerosene Tax was repealed.

Collections

from this tax had declined steadily during the decade of
the 1950's to Just over $200,000 annually.1* The Oleo
margarine Tax, which frequently generated no revenue at
all, was one of the four taxes repealed in 1962.

Also

in this group was the Dog Racing Tax, which was not a
tax revenue producer as no dog races were held in the
state.

The Amusement License Tax and the Auctioneers

License Tax were the other two taxes r e p e a l e d . 5

The former

produced about $25,000 in 1955-56; the latter, only $100100.^

3Loulslana State Tax Handbook: 1952. Public
Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
1952, p. 43. Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1953. p. 53.
**State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue Annual
Report. fiscal years 1950-51 to 1960-61.

26-27.

^Louisiana State

Tax Handbook: 1964. p. 2.

^Louisiana State

Tax Handbook: 1956.pp. 24-25,
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The O h s Gathering Tax was the largest revenue
producer to be repealed prior to the major changes of
1970-73*

Suspended December 1, 1958, the Oas Gathering

Tax was later found unconstitutional, and was repealed.?
The state Ad Valorem Tax was eliminated in 1972 amid
growing questions of the constitutionality of the way in
which it was administered.

The tax had produced over
p
$20 million in revenues annually since 1961-62.
The 1973 Special Session of the Louisiana

legislature repealed three taxes: the Power Use Tax,
the Lubricating Oils Tax, and the Tax on Generation and
Sale of Electricity.

Each of these taxes individually

was a modest revenue producer; the three taxes combined
contributed over $10 million annually in recent years.^
The tax repeals of 1973, in addition
favorable, had two side effects.

to being politically

Among other critics,

Public Affairs Research Council had argued for years that
Louisiana had too many taxes that were small revenue
producers and "nuisance" taxes; and that the administration
of these taxes was an undesirable drain on state finances.10
7
Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969. p. 2.
8
State of Louisiana, Office of the Governor,
Division of Administration, Financial Report. Fiscal Year
Ended June 30. 19— (Various years); and Louisiana State
¥ax Handbook: 1969. pp. 114-115.
q
^Louisiana Financial Statement 1972-73. pp. 20,24.
10Loulalana State Tax Handbook: pp. 11-13 (1956 ed.),
pp. 3,10 T1960, 1964 eds.), pp. 4,11 (1969 ed.).
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Thus with the repeal of the dozen taxes outlined above,
total costs of collection decreased.

For example, the

three taxes repealed in the 1973 Special Session cost
$75*000 to collect in fiscal 1972.

This amount repre

sented 0.35 percent of the revenues produced by those
three taxes.11

While this figure is well below 0.78

percent, which was the average cost of collection for
the Department of Revenue in that year,12 it is well
above the 0.14 percent cost of collecting the Severance
Tax.13

As is discussed in later paragraphs, these

recent repeals were part of a legislative package that
increased severance tax rates significantly.

The extra

severance revenues generated should not have increased
collection costs greatly, so that the net effect should
be more tax revenue at lower total cost of collection.
Second, the income elasticity of the tax structure
increased with the repeals discussed.

The Ad Valorem

Tax especially was regarded as a tax highly insensitive
to income changes.

The three taxes repealed in 1973 would,

11State of Louisiana, Office of the Governor,
Division of Administration Budget, Fiscal Year 1972-73.
pp. 10-11.
-*-2State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue
33rd Annual Report, p. 5.
131972-73 Budget. p. 10.

as a group, probably be Judged slightly inccme-inelastic.
Thus the result of these changes, whether Intended or not,
was to give up current revenues for more rapid rate of
revenue growth In future years.

More Is said on this

subject in the next chapter.
The Severance Taxes
As the title Implies, these are taxes levied on
the severance (extraction) of natural resources from the
land and territorial waters of Louisiana.

While the

severance tax on crude oil and condensate, natural gas,
and sulphur provide almost all of the severance tax
revenues, there are taxes levied on several of Louisiana’s
other natural resources.
Revenues of some minor severance taxes are dedicated
to the Conservation Fund;11* while this dedication does not
make the assessment any less a tax, the revenues thus
generated are not counted as tax revenues by the Division
of Administration, by Public Affairs Research, or (by
default) by this dissertation.

The amount of tax revenue

involved is but a few million dollars annually.^5 A

•^Taxes on oysters, salt water shrimp, sand and
gravel, shells, and skins and hides, are collected by Wild
Life and Fisheries Conservation Fund.
Generally, the
revenues are expended on behalf of the contributors. For
example; revenues from the tax on skins and hides serve to
benefit trappers.
^Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969* P. 88.
total in 1967-6 8 was *1,4057^9371^

The
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bill recently Introduced Into the legislature would have
returned unused funds In Wild Life and Fisheries accounts
to the State General Fund.

Had thiB move succeeded, it

would have become necessary to include these minor severance
taxes in the aggregate total taxes.

However, the bill was

not passed, and these tax revenues are still spent (or
accumulated) by Wild Life and Fisheries, and are unavailable
to any other state agency.
Another complicating factor in this series is the
changing of the due dates for remitting tax collections.
Collections were advanced one month on one occasion,
C1960-61), and two months on another (1958-59)
In the years prior to 19^8 the base of all severance
taxes was altered several times : the original tax (1910)
was on quantity; in 1912 the base was changed to value.

In

1916 the base changed to quantity, and in 1920 the base
again became value.

In 1928 the base became quantity,

where it remained until 1973*

Crude oil and condensate

and natural gas provide almost all of the revenue of the
severance tax.

Crude oil and condensate, prior to 197^,

were taxed on a quantity base.

Rates varied from 18 to

26 cents per barrel, dependent on the specific gravity of
the product.

Output of so-called "incapable" wells (wells

of low productivity) was taxed at one-half the full rate.1?

l6Ibld., p. 2.
1?Ibld.. p. 87.
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Currently, crude oil and condensate are taxed ad valorem.
The ordinary rate Is 12*g percent of the value of the product.
Special rates of one-half and one-quarter the ordinary
rate apply to incapable and stripper wells.

Prior to

1958, natural gas was taxed at 3/10 cents per thousand
cubic feet (MCF).

In 1958, in order to avoid the loss of

tax revenues as the Gas Gathering Tax was suspended, the
severance tax rate on natural gas was Increased.

The rate

on the outgoing Gas Gathering Tax and the increase in the
rate of Severance Tax on natural gas were the same, 2 cents
per thousand cubic feet.*®

Thus a much longer historical

series of severance tax data can be assembled if the
revenues for the Gas Gathering Tax are added to the revenues
of the other severance taxes.

For a short period of time

in 1972, natural gas was taxed at the greater of 3-3 cents
per MCF or ll*s percent of value. 19

Natural gas is

currently taxed on a quantity basis, the full rate being
7 cents per MCF.

Four reduced rates apply to low produc

tivity wells and to gas sold under certain contracts.20
As prices rise for oil and other increasingly
scarce natural resources, the value extracted rises at a
faster rate than the quantity extracted.

This change

provides a tax structure with greater potential revenue

l8Ibld., p. 2.
•^Department of Revenue 1973 Tax Guide, p. 63.
2°Department of Revenue 1975 Tax Guide, pp. 73-75-
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growth.

It would be improper to discuss the income elas

ticities of the old and new structures, as growth in
severance tax revenues may be much more dependent on
resource availability than on the income-derived demand
for the resource.

Federal regulation of oil and gas output

and prices may also limit the responsiveness of these goods
to economic conditions.

However, if output can expand as

economic conditions raise incomes and prices (including the
price of oil), the responsiveness of the severance tax on
oil to economic change is greater if levied on the value,
rather that the quantity of oil severed.
The Louisiana Sales Tax
Louisiana Is one of many states that depends
heavily upon a general sales tax for revenues.

The levy

dates to 1938, when a 1 percent general sales tax was
enacted.

This tax became permanent In 19**^; the rate was
?1
raised to 2 percent in 19*18.
In 1970, the tax rate was
raised to 3 percent; food and prescription drugs were
exempted from the 1 percent surtax.

In the 1973 legislative

special session, food and prescription drug items were
exempted from the other 2 percent as well.22

The actual

sales tax paid by the customer varies from 4 percent to

21Loulslana State Tax Handbook: 1969. p. 78.
c T. R. Beard, Financing Government in Louisiana:
A Comparative Study. Occasional Paper No. 21 (November,
Division of Research, College of Business Adminis
tration, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana,
pp. 111-112.
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6 percent, reflecting various city and parish sales
taxes.

Many of these were increased or initiated in recent

years.

It is possible that rising city and parish taxes,

by increasing the final prices of products, have caused
state sales tax revenues to rise less rapidly than would
have been the case in the absence of these local taxes.

The

increase in the prices of consumed goods and services may
have effected a marginal move toward saving.
In addition to rate changes, there were adminis
trative changes to consider.

The most important of these

was the change in collection procedures.

Originally

collected by and from the retailer, the sales tax Is now
collected from wholesalers.23

This 1964 move resulted In

a much smaller degree of tax avoidance, as there are far
fewer wholesalers than retailers to supervise.

The retailer

then remits an amount that reflects the sales tax on his
sales, less the amount of sales tax paid the wholesaler.
The amount of sales tax revenue generated is
reported differently by the Financial Statement of the
Division of Administration and by the Department of
Revenue Annual Report.2** These small differences aside,
the sales tax series displays two major base changes

^ Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969, pp. 79-80.
2**The Financial Statement appears to Include the
"Parish Service Change," while the Annual Report does not.
There are small discrepancies in some recent years even
with this adjustment.
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(1964-65 and 1973-74) and one rate change (1970-71).
The Income Tax
The Income tax levied by the State of Louisiana
taxes the net Income of both corporations and Individuals.
Corporations pay a four percent tax on net Income derived
from sources within the state.

Each corporation Is entitled

to an exemption of up to $2,000, the exemption depending on
the ratio of net income derived from state sources to
total net income.

For Individuals, the rate structure is

slightly progressive.

The maximum marginal rate is 6

percent, levied on net income in excess of $50,000,

These

rates were in effect from 1934 to 1974, but numerous
changes in the tax base occurred during that time.

In

1951-52 the tax base was reduced by an increase In exemp
tions.

The 1961-62 fiscal year showed increased collections

as a result of instituting general withholding In that
year.

In 1970, federal income taxes paid was disallowed

as a special deduction, but was reinstated in 1973.

In

1971-72, the incoming Edwards administration adopted
stricter enforcement guidelines, in part by requiring the
filer to show the amount of income reported on the
appropriate federal Income tax return.

Income tax revenues

for fiscal year 1972-73 were decreased by the passage of a
law, later found unconstitutional, giving state income tax
credit for tuition paid to nonpublic schools.

Income tax

returns for calendar or fiscal 1975 and thereafter will be
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prepared on a form substantially simpler than that of
previous years.
Legislation accompanying the new state constitution
changed the definition of income to coincide with the
definition utilized by federal income tax returns.
Previously, certain forms of income were taxable at the
state level, but not at the federal level; and certain
items were deductibles or adjustments for state purposes
but not for federal, and vice versa.

For example, FICA

(Social Security) payments made by Louisiana residents were
previously deductible on state income tax returns, but tax
able for federal returns.

Conversely, most medical payments

were not deductible at the state level, but were allowable
on federal returns.

Two exceptions still remain:

federal

income taxes paid are still deductible from state Income tax
returns, and interest earned on government bonds is treated
differently by state and federal laws.
The State of Louisiana gained in two distinct ways
by moving toward greater compatibility with federal income
definitions.

The cost of auditing state returns was greatly

diminished, by having reduced the amount of extra effort
that once went into searching out those parts of a state
return that were not subject to federal audit inspection.
The cost of enforcement was reduced and the degree of
enforcement increased.

Second, the new definitions mean

that there now exists a unique relationship between federal
income taxes paid and state tax liability.

A Louisiana
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taxpayer now merely uses a table to look up state iticome
tax liability, based on federal tax liability.

This table

still takes Into account the dollar value of personal
exemptions In Louisiana, and the 2, 4, and 6 percent
marginal tax brackets.^5
These gains in simplicity and ease of administration
were not without cost.

The new state income tax schedules,

in tying state income tax liability to federal income tax
liability, make Louisiana's state income tax revenues more
sensitive to changes in federal income tax laws.

For

example, the special tax credit employed on federal income
tax returns for 1975 reduced federal income tax liability,
and in turn reduced state income tax liability.

The special

tax credit for 1976 is generally larger than that for
1975» and hence will reduce state income tax liability by
a larger amount.

These revenue losses are on the order of

several million dollars per year.
not be treated as a temporary one.

This experience should
The federal income tax

structure is relatively income-elastic, and thus exerts
"fiscal drag" as income grows.

Further federal income tax

cuts are a plausible policy option to relieve this growthstunting phenomenon.

2^State of Louisiana, Department of Revenue
35th Annual Report, p. 14. Also, Department of Revenue
1975 Tax Guide, pp. 39-41.
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Gasoline Tax
The State of Louisiana first levied a tax on gas
oline in 1921.

The tax has been levied on a cents-per-

gallon basis throughout its history.
not collected on gasoline sales.

State sales tax is

In 1948 the gasoline

tax rate was increased from 7 cents per gallon to 9 cents
per gallon.

This additional tax was repealed in 1952.

The tax rate remained at the 7 cent3 per gallon level unti]
the legislature voted a 1 cent per gallon Increase, which
became effective January, 1969, and remains in effect at
this writing.

Exemptions from the tax are minor, but tax

rebates are allowed for certain users.

As noted in

Public Affairs Research Council’s Louisiana State Tax
Handbook, 1969* fuel used in commercial fishing, school
buses, aviation, and agriculture is subject to a refund of
state gasoline tax paid.2^
Federal gasoline tax was 4 cents per gallon through
out the period 1948 to the present; state gasoline taxes
have been deductible on federal income tax returns for the
entire period as well.

The most notable influence on

gasoline usage, and hence on tax revenues, has been the
increase in living standards.

This rising standard of

living has been responsible for the trend of Louisiana
residents to own more cars, bigger cars, and to travel

^

Louisiana

state Tax Handbook: 1969. pp. 48-50.
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longer distances.

Post-war changes In life style have

Increased the average distance from home to work; the
nation's highway system Is significantly Improved over the
system of 19^8.

Both of these factors have led to greater

per capita gasoline consumption.

Recent rapid Increases

In the price of gasoline have caused some decreases in the
rate of gasoline usage, and perhaps have caused a reversal
of the trends suggested earlier.

In Chapter 4, the income

elasticity of the gasoline tax will be analyzed.
Tobacco Tax
The state's Tobacco Tax was first levied In 1926.
In 19 48, rates were increased to a level which remained in
effect until 1972 when rates
Cigarettes are taxed

were again increased.
on a unit basis:8 cents per

pack from 1948 to 1972; thereafter, the rate Is 11 cents
per pack.

Cigars are taxed on a unit basis, but are

scheduled as well on an atJ valorem basis:

the tax per

1000 cigars Increases with the retail price of the cigar.
Higher priced cigars pay proportionately higher effective
tax rates, until the top schedule
tobacco is taxed ad valorem.

Is reached. Smoking

The schedule of taxes on this

form of tobacco is relatively flat rate:
27 percent

approximately

of the retail price prior to 1972, now 33

percent of value.^7

102.

^ Louisiana sta^,e Tax
PP* 100Also Department of Revenue 1975 Tax Guide, p. 80.
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Reveni.es from sales of the dominant revenue
producer, cigarettes, thus rise only as unit sales rise,
but revenues from sales of other tobacco forms rise as
dollar sales rise.

This is an important consideration in

inflationary periods.
Beer Tax
The beer tax in Louisiana originated in 19 33 as a
quantity-based tax.

The original rate was increased the

following year, from $1 to $1.50 per standard barrel.

The

next change in rate occurred in 19*18, when the per barrel
levy increased to the current rate of $10 per barrel.2®
No significant changes in the definition of the tax base
have occurred during the period under study.
Alcoholic Beverage Tax
The same legislative act that increased the beer
tax in 1931* enacted the taxes on other forms of alcoholic
beverages.

Unlike the beer tax, the Alcoholic Beverage

Tax has undergone several rate changes.

In 1935, 1938,

19*10, 19*18, 1956, 1964, 1968, and 1972, either rates were
increased, or administration of tax collection was improved.
This tax also is a levy on the quantity of goods sold.
Liquor tax rates have risen from $1.58 per gallon in 19*18
to $1.68 per gallon in 1956, to $2.50 per gallon in 1972.

2 fl

Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969, pp. 29-30.
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Still wine rates, which depend on alcohol content, orere
constant from 1948 to 1968.

Sparkling wines, which were

on a variable rate basis until 1956, are now taxed $1.58
per gallon.^9
The administration of the Alcoholic Beverage Tax
collection was improved in 1964 with a change in the
collection
b a s i s . 30

procedure, from tax stamps to a tax reporting
The collecting authority for Alcoholic Beverage

permits has changed three times in the period studied.
Until 1951-52, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board
(ALBC) collected permits, while the Department of Revenue
collected all other beverage taxes.

Prom 1952-53 to

1955-56, the Department of Revenue collected taxes and
permits.

The ALBC collected permits again from 1956-57 to

1971-72.

Since that time the Department of Revenue again

collects all beverage taxes and p e r m i t s . 31
Corporate Franchise Tax
The Corporate Franchise tax originated in 1932.
The only rate changes were in 1935 and 1946.

For the

period under investigation, the tax rate was $1.50 per
$1,000 of capital stock, surplus, undivided profits, and
borrowed capital of firms doing business in Louisiana.

^ Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969. pp. 23-24.
30lbld., p. 24.
3!l951-52 Department of Revenue Annual Report,
p. 12; 1956-57 Department of Revenue Annual Report,~~p. 5.
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Non-profit firms are generally exempted, as are insurance
companies and new industries granted s D e c i f i c waivers.

As of

1969, no new industry exemptions had been granted.32
Two factors have influenced the pattern of tax
receipts.

As new industry is exempted from this tax, its

rate of growth would be reduced.

Second, the basis of the

tax is a firm’s capital stock of the prior fiscal year,
and the tax is due three and one-half months later.

Thus

there can be a significant lag between the economic events
that alter capital stock and the payment of the tax.

Prior

to a 1958 change in the due date of this tax, the time lag
was several months

l o n g e r .

33

Motor Vehicle Licenses
At the close of the administration of Governor
Jimmy Davis, the procedure for collecting the fees for
motor vehicle licenses was changed.

Act

318 of the 1962

Legislature made the purchase of private passenger vehicle
licenses biennial rather than annual.

This resulted in

increased collections of these revenues in fiscal 1963-64,
the last year of Davis' administration, and reduced collec
tions in fiscal 1964-65* the first year of the McKeithen
administrations.

This change caused the revenues of motor

vehicle license fees to vary in a biennial cycle.

32L oulslana State Tax Handbook:

33Ibid., pp. 33-34, 114-115.

Since

1969* pp. 5-6, 33-35*
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the due date for private passenger vehicle licenses is in
the spring of even-numbered years, collections are greater
in those years than in odd-numbered years.

Thus a fiscal

year beginning in an even-numbered calendar year will have
vehicle license revenues approximately twice those of the
preceding year.

Fiscal years beginning in odd-numbered

calendar years generate revenues from this tax only on new
vehicle sales, on truck and trailer licenses, on tractor,
school bus, and other commercial vehicles, all of which
continue to purchase licenses annually. 3**
The preceeding paragraphs have outlined some of the
more important changes that took place in the state's
revenue structure during the period of time under investi
gation.

Emphasis was placed on identifying the shifts in

tax revenues of the more important taxes levied by the
state, as brought about by legislative or administrative
action.

The following section of this chapter examines

the current structure of taxes to point out which individual
taxes should be examined for the task of projecting future
tax revenues.
The remaining sections of this chapter accomplish
two objectives.

Firstj it describes the process of

collecting the data:

the time series of revenues of the

taxes selected for study.

Second, the time series

b o

collected are organized by logical units, generally in

3**Louislana State Tax Handbook: 1969» pp* 107-108.

73

accordance with the economic factors which cause their
revenues to change.
TAXES TO BE DELETED
The next task is to assemble from original data,
generally State of Louisiana documents such as the
divisional Annual Reports and Financial Statements, the
time series for the revenues of the taxes relevant for the
problem at hand.

Where possible, these series will

exclude all "inspection fees", as they are self-generating
and self-sufficient.

Also, the data will exclude funds

that are strictly dedicated to be spent on behalf of the
contributors, as these are not taxes in the true sense of
the word, but special industry assessments.^

As mentioned

in an earlier paragraph, those taxes collected by and
dedicated exclusively to certain agencies are not counted.
This study is not concerned with those taxes which the state
government collects for local and parish governmental units.
Thus the Chain Store Tax, the City/Parish beer and sales
taxes, and Hotel/Motel Occupancy taxes are not considered.
Finally, there is no need to Include in thie dissertation

^ T h i s item may seem trivial, but such taxes were
included in the measure of Total Taxes by Public Affairs
Research Council.
See Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1956,
pp. 82,96-97.
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those taxes which yield no revenues what soever.

The following

paragraphs will examine each of the above cases in turn.
Self-Generating Inspection
^ees
Certain taxes levied by the State of Louisiana
do no more than raise enough revenue to recover the cost
of services provided.

These taxes are for the most part

inspection fees; the fees assessed are in an amount Just
sufficient to provide the inspection services.

Their

revenues are either completely or predominately withheld
as a cost of

c o l l e c t i o n .

serve no purpose.

36

t o

project these revenues would

These taxes are self-generating and

self-sufficient; they neither add to nor subtract from the
ability of the state to provide other governmental goods
or services.

Thus such items as the Motor Carrier Regula

tory Pees, Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Fees, and
Petroleum Products Inspection Fees do not appear in the
list of taxes studied, nor do their revenues appear in the
measure of Total Taxes.
Special Industry Assessments
There are several levies In the State of Louisiana
that, despite their being named taxes, and despite their
being collected by the various state tax collection

36see State of Louisiana Financial Statement
1973-74, pp. 20-24.
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agencies, are really no more than special industry
assessments.

The nature of these assessments Is such

that producers, growers, and sellers of certain goods
contribute to an advertising fund or industry development
fund, which is then expended on behalf of the contributors.
The so-called taxes perform no allocative, distributive,
or stabilization function, and thus are not considered
taxes for purposes of this dissertation.

Assessments

that fall into this category include the Sweet Potato
Tax, Egg Tax, Soybean Tax, and Strawberry Tax.

The Egg

Tax and the Soybean Tax were authorized by the state
legislature in 1968; the Strawberry Tax was suspended
in 1966.37
Taxes Collected for
Local Government
To promote efficiency of collection, the state
provides certain collection services for subsidiary
levels of government.

In particular, the state collects

the Chain Store Tax, the Hotel/Motel Occupancy Tax, and
various city and parich beer and sales taxes.

The local

governmental units pay a service charge for this state
activity.

Certainly the revenues produced by the tax

^ Louisiana State Tax Handbook: 1969» pp. 3-^.
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collection process should not be included If the funds
play no part in the provision of state governmental
services.

Thus, where possible, the above-named taxes

are not included in this dissertation.
Dedicated Severance Taxes
Reasoning along similar lines, the revenues raised
by minor severance taxes will not be included.

These

revenues remain dedicated to use by the Wild Life and
Fisheries Department, and hence are not available for the
provision of any governmental service other than that to
which they are dedicated.
No-Yield Taxes
The State of Louisiana has legislated some taxes
that now yield no tax revenues whatever.

These include

the Bank Tax and the Royalty Gas Excise Tax.

The Bank

Tax would tax at a rate of 5 percent the interest earned
by banks which do business in Louisiana but which are
domiciled outside the state.

However, such a form of bank

organization has been declared illegal by the Federal
Reserve System.

The Royalty Gas Excise Tax insured that

natural gas producers did not profit by reselling royalty
owners

* interest.

The tax confiscates the difference

between the higher price realized by the producer and the
price originally paid.

This tax had no yield in 1967-68,

but had occasionally provided a few thousand dollars
annually.

The Oleomargarine Tax and the Dog Racing Tax
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were no-yield taxes but have now been repealed.
MAJOR TAX GROUPINGS
The preceedlng section pointed out taxes which are
of little

value in a model designed to project the state's

ability to provide governmental goods and services.

This

amounts to specifying which taxes are to be included in
the study.

They are presented alphabetically in Table 3*1,

and by tax groups in Table 3-2.

The taxes are grouped into

some logical arrangement to reduce the number of individual
items to analyze and forecast.

This is reasonable since the

promary aim is to achieve productive forecasts of tax
revenues in the aggregate.
First, those taxes based on resource extraction are
grouped together; these comprise the Severance Tax Group.
Those taxes which stem from use of internal-combustion
engines comprise the Automotive Tax Group.

The Sumptuary

Tax Group includes levies on beverages and tobacco products,
since these are the goods typically singled out by most
state legislatures, including that of Louisiana, as "sin
taxes" for the purpose of raising tax revenues.
major taxes are treated singly:

Certain

these are the Sales Tax

and the Income Tax.

All other taxes comprise a residual

group, Other Taxes.

This system of organizing the state's

taxes put practically all of its tax revenues into six
categories.

These groups and their aggregate do not include
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any funds received from federal grar.ts, Medicare or
Medicaid, non-tax assessments, rentals, royalties, or
bonuses, since these funds are less subject to state
legislation and other state policy action.
The severance tax group includes Severance TaxGeneral, Severance Tax-Reforestat ion (since the data cannot
for all years be segregated from the former), and the
now-unconstitutional Gas Gathering Tax.

This tax group

contributed a large and stable share of Louisiana's tax
Table 3.1
List of Taxes Comprising Total Taxes
1.
2.
3.
it.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
lit.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
2it.

Alcoholic Beverage Dealer Permits
Alcoholic Beverage Tax
Anhydrous Ammonia Permits
Beer Permits
Beer Tax
Corporate Franchise Tax
Electric Cooperative Fees
Excise License Tax
Gas Gathering Tax
Gasoline Tax
Gift Tax
Income Tax
Inheritance Tax
Liquified Petroleum Gas Permits
Motor Vehicle Licenses
Natural Gas Franchise Tax
Occupational Licenses
Public Utilities Tax
Sales Tax
Severance Tax-General
Severance Tax-Reforestation
Soft Drink Tax
Special Fuels Tax
Tobacco Tax
Source:

Primary
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revenue collections, ranging from

.k%

Taxes during the decade of the i960's.

to

12.

of Total

The portion of

total taxes contributed by these taxes rose significantly
during the 1950's to the current level; an almost uniform
increase can be noted from 21.7 percent in 19*18 to 31*7
percent in 1958.
The sumptuary tax group includes the Alcoholic
Beverage Tax, but not gallonage and inspection fees;
Alcoholic Beverage Dealer Permits; Beer Tax; Beer Permits;
Tobacco Tax; Soft Drink Tax.

Generally, dealer permits

are included and inspection fees are not.

In some years all

three items— tax, dealer permits, and inspection fees— are
aggregated; in others, only the tax is present.

One

reason for such vagaries in reporting is that the responsi
bility for collecting dealer permits has oscillated between
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board and the Department of
Revenue.

Inspection fees, since they are withheld in their

entirety as a cost of collection, are not to be included
here, as such fees do not contribute to fiscal operations.
Thus, considerable searching of state documents is necessary
in order to obtain a series that contained only tax and
dealer permits for the relevant time period, 19*t8-*19 to
1973-7*1 *
The automotive group includes Gasoline, Special
Fuels, and Vehicle License Taxes.
make up the category "Other Taxes":

The remaining ten taxes
Corporate Franchise

Tax, Excise License Tax, Inheritance Tax, Electric Cooperative
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Pees, Gift Tax, Occupational License Taxes, Public
Utilities Tax, Natural Gas

Franchise Tax, Liquified

Petroleum Gas Permits, and

Anhydrous Ammonia Permits.

Thus

the taxes appropriate to this study have been grouped as
shown in Table 3-2.
Table 3*3 displays the time series of revenues of each
of the individual taxes listed in tables 3*1, and 3*2, and
the time series of revenues of the Gas Gathering Tax.
Table 3*4 shows the revenues of each tax or group of taxes,
as described above, for the period 1948 to 1974.

Table 3-5

shows the revenues of each

tax or tax group as a fraction

of Total Taxes, as defined

in this dissertation.

The revenues for the above twenty-four taxes only is
measured by the category "Total

Taxes"

.39

with the

exception of the Gas Gathering Tax, a tax repealed between
the fiscal years of 194 8-49 and 19 73-74 would therefore not
be included in "Total Taxes".

This category measures the

39Most of the taxes in this list are collected by
the Department of Revenue, while some are collected by
other State agencies. Thus the label "Total Taxes" as
employed in this dissertation does not coincide with the
total of taxeB collected by the Department of Revenue.
Similarly, "Total Taxes" is not the same as the list of tax
and non-tax revenues reported by the Division of Admini
stration in its Financial Statement, which includes several
minor taxes excluded by the definition used in this
dissertation.
The Division of Administration also includes
in revenues received the receipts of Medicare, Medicaid,
Rentals, Royalties and Bonuses, Unemployment Compensation,
and Federal grants paid to the state.
In earlier years, it
was common to refer to the amount "Revenues Affecting the
General Fund," which excluded revenues specifically dedicated
to state agencies or projects.
The new constitution removed
almost all such dedications.
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Table 3.2
Six Major Taxes and Tax Groups
Automotive tax group
Gasoline tax
Special fuels tax
Motor vehicle license taxa
Income taxb
Sales taxc
Severance tax group
Gas gathering tax®
Severance tax-general
Severance tax-reforestatlon
Sumptuary tax group
Alcoholic beverage dealer permits
Alcoholic beverage tax
Beer permits
Beer tax
Soft drink taxd
Tobacco taxd
Other taxes
Anhydrous ammonia permits
Corporate franchise tax
Electric cooperative fees
Excise license tax
Gift tax
Inheritance tax
Liquified petroleum gas permits
Natural gas franchise tax
Occupational Licenses
Public utilities tax
Total taxes
aexcludes
^personal
cincludes
^includes
erepealed

Certificate of Title fees
and corporate
tax on automotive sales
dealer permits
December 1, 1958

Table 3.3
Louisiana Tax Revenues
(in thousands)

19k9/50

19U8A9

1951/52

1950/51

1952/53

1954/55

1953/51*

1 . Alcoholic Beverage
Dealer Permits

2 . Alcoholic Beverage Taxi
3k.
5.
6.
7.
8.
910.
11.
12.
13.
Ik.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Anhydrous Ammonia Permits
Beer Permits
Beer Tax 2
Corporate Franchise Tax
Electric Cooperative Fees
Excise License Tax
Gas Gathering Tax^
Gasoline Tax
Gift Tax
Income Tax
Inheritance Tax
Liquefied Petroleum
Gas Periaits
Motor Vehicle Licenses
Natural Gas Franchise Tax
Occupational Licenses
Public Utilities Tax
Sales Tax
Severance T a x 1*
Soft Drink Tax?
Special Fuels Tax
Tobacco Tax?

Total Taxes

$

81*9-0
kllO.l

0
a

11109-2
361*6.0
5 .k
k 3 k2 . 5
U9 1 1 . 6
38731*. 9
126. 3
19051.5
1 U8 2 . 0

$

852.1*
1*528.6

0
a
l l k l k .2
1*1*29.6
6.3
3572.7
6133.2
1*21*95-2

110.1
18678.6
1399.9

5862.1
100.8

17-0
6306.2
112.2

3932.1
lkl.8 .1*
1*1*1*20.9
U561*
1001.7
2 U 8 .1*
1 5 7 81 . 1

3691.8
1551.1
1*5000.7
52073
971.1
293.0
1 8 1 2 6 .1*

16.9

20511* 5.1

221763-3

$

61*2.6
1*109.7
3.0
a

$

8 kl*.7
l*069.k
5-8
160.5

11165.3

11662.2

1*891.5
7.6
3773.0
7355-7
1*5513.8
1 2 2 .1*
19955.3
1597.2

531k.9
8 .1*
1*397.**
9030.7
1*9630.8
121.3
22766.1*
1851*.5

23.0
6753-8
1 3 1*. 1
3817.7
168L .1
50335-3
57196

6898.0
192.0
351k. 8
1 8 1 0 .9
51*3 0 6 . 8
61721

1 0 5 1* . 8
!*l6 .9
18125 .2

978-3
583.8
18779-3

238368.0

258682,3

30.1*

$

823.8
5078.8
2 2 .0
166.3
1161 *1*. 0
5861.1*
8.9
1*817.1*
1011 *1*.5
1*361*3.5

$

871.6

5000.8
26.1
173.k
12205.1*
6k70.9
9.9
5290.1*
10951.2
1*1*613.2

$

8 6 l.k
k933.8
2 9 -k
172.0
12121.0
7k96.2

18.8

100.8

156.1

5726.2
12kk8.3
k702k.S
119.1

18586.1*
1388.7

17027.8
1997.7

19128.8
21k5.6

38.5
769'6.2

1*1*. 1
8283.9

1*3.6
8863.5
288.3
3982.k

236.8
1*1 2 0 . 8
2013.**
59293.9
65539
1025.T
635.0
1961 *8 . 6

26253k.1*

270.0
3 9 k k ,7
221*9 . 1
631*55,1
6 7 kk 8 .li
1099.9
6 6 k .9
19580.5

271835.1

2370.6
6 k8 0 2 . 2
661*79.8

1018.6
760.9
1959k.2

280kk9.6

Table 3.3 (Continued)

1955/56

1. Alcoholic Beverage
Dealer Permits
2. Alcoholic Beverage Tax-13- Anhydrous Ammonia Permits
1*. Beer Permits
5- Beer Tax 2
6. Corporate Franchise Tax
7- Electric Cooperative Fees
8. Excise License Tax
9- Gas Gathering Tax^
10. Gasoline Tax
11. Gift Tax
12. Income Tax
13- Inheritance Tax
It. Liquefied Petroleum
Gas Permits
15- Motor Vehicle Licenses
1 6 . Natural Gas Franchise Tax
17- Occupa tio na l’Licenses
18. Public Utilities Tax
19- Sales Tax
20. Severance Tax
21. Soft Drink Tax^
22. Special Fuels Tax
23- Tobacco Tax^
To ta l Taxe s

$

856.8
5625-U
29-0

1956/57

1957/58

888.5

1959/60

1958/59

$

881*. 8

1961/62

$

889-6

55761.6
79.1*
29281*.1
2660.7

6170.3
21* .9
a
1287**-1*
10292-9
1 6 .U
7123-0
18665 -9
57808.1
151-9
29101*. 0
2675-1

870.1*
6170.7
26.5
173-7
12930.1*
21362.1
13-3
7615.8
1581*3-6
59750.0
90.9
2993b. 1*
2818.1

1*1.2
9673.9
306.5
1*217.5
2603.9
73570.3
73109-8
1203.1*
989- 0
2071*0.5

1*3.1
10028.9
32U.1
1*658-1
2750.9
80759-2
82517.0
111*8 .5
111*6.0
22323.2

51.1
1021*5.6
323.9
5061.3
2769.1
831*18.2
79096.2
1202.2
1370.5
23399.6

51*. 3
10653.1*
330.1*
5163-2
29bl.l*
81*257 -1*
1111*36.5
1186.3
1708.3
21*727 .9

5b .8
10986.3
1307-1
5 3 3 b .8
3200.5
881*89. 2
136319.7
1221*. 1
2006.2
2671*3.1*

5322.5
321*9.3
85356.5
11*7 0 6 5 . 0
1197.1
2202.0
271*70.8

1*9-3
11589-8
710.7
5522.5
3bl3.8
90062.5
11*9830.1
1222. 3
2553.3
279b3- 0

312 0 2 5 . 6

3b6077 .C

352812-9

1*00059-9

1*191*19-5

1*28052- 3

1*1*9667-1

168.0
12251*. 9
8032.!*
1.5
51*89.3
13897-6
5221*9.7
11*3.0
21*256.:
2562.?

$

878.1
6097.0
21*. 8
a
12987.0
8823.7
15.6
719*1. T

16566.0

$

$

1960/61

6510.3
25-3
176
1 33 1 b - 3
11*312.8
8.1*
81*51-9
10.2
61916.8
110. 5
30830.8
7201.3

$

903-8
6191-9
28.2
181. 2
13727-7
1 U 1 1 6 .1*
15.7
8759-2
76.8
6131b. 0
21*0. 5
31*218. 5
1*651*-2
52-2

10827.0
881.8

6692.7
23-1
181*.7
13929-7
15197-9
13-9
91bl*.1*
b
635U0.6
150.1*
1*211*8.8
1*801* . 0

Table 3.3 (Continued)

1963/61*

1962/63
1. Alcoholic Beverage
Dealer Permits
2. Alcoholic Beverage Ta x 1
3. Anhydrous Ammonia Permits
1*. Beer Permits
5. Beer Tax 2
6 . Corporate Franchise Tax
7. Electric Cooperative Fees
8 . Excise License Tax
9- Gas Gathering Tax3
10. Gasoline Tax
11. Gift Tax
12. Income Tax
13. Inheritance Tax
l4, Liquefied Petroleum
Gas Permits
15. Motor Vehicle Licenses
l 6 . Natural Gas Franchise Tax
17- Occupational Licenses
IS. Public Utilities Tax
19* Sales Tax
20. Severance Tax**
21. Soft Drink Tax^
22. Special Fuels Tax
23* Tobacco Tax^
Total Taxes

$

968.1*
6712.8
25.1*
183.1*
14862.3
15532.3
13.7
9540.5
b
65981.2
231.1
36016.7
5336.7

$

1*7.9
121*57.9
61*2.1

51.2
15221*. 9
7U5.3
5781.1*
3635.8
IOL 7 L 7 . 8
172232-7
2077.6

5688.6
31*91-8

96929.9
163159.7
1362.5
2 9 1 1*, 9
29080.7
1*71310. 8

966.7
7186.1*
21*. 5
182. 5
15399.7
16019.8
15.3
1021 *6 . 8
b
69003.2
11*7 .1
1*081*0 . 8
l*ll*l* .1

$

196U/65

1965/66

1066/67

1967/68

1960/69

992.6
5251*.9
22.5

$ 1007.8

$ 1019.5
8589.5
23.8
368.5

$ 1042.9

t 1049.7
9370.6

18678.9
21316.1
15.8

19218.1

14156.7
b
84602.7
230.1*
70204.3
5272.3

15246.1
b
88161.4
379.0
T3317.2
6l85.7

53.?

59.0
21857-0
877.7

183.2
16790.1
17377.2
11.7
11151* .1
b
731*01*. 1
169. 1
50871.1
5013.1*

7765.0
27.U
189.1*
1751*3.1*

18832.0
16.1
12U75.3
b
79523.2
215 . 8

62210.6
511*2 . 8

2981*6.6

1*8.7
10573.5
761.3
6330.7
3837.9
1181*02.5
178587.5
2170.0
3911.9
31179.2

55-6
171*88.2
811.9
7000.8
1*098.1*
132213.5
201*973.3
21*04.1*
1*6 1 6 . 1
32257.3

501787.3

537050.5

6 1 0 8 6 8 .3

3262.1

111*2 2 .0
825.3
7503.5
1*21*5.6

9010.0
24.8
376.0
22128.7

12.0

7836.2

213892.1
2685.4
5192.4
33075.4

4520.9
152229.3
238053.0
2726.9
5559.8
32870.5

649385.0

702192.2

1 U6 0 0 6 . 1

23.1
556.8
20112.7
23617.3
21.5
16624.8
b
98232.7
256.3
79095.5

6312.0
82.2
13678.8
948.2
8233.5
4835.9

159810.6
239512.5

3015.0
6650.2
33128.4
725160.3

Table 3.3 (Continued)

1. Alcoholic Beverage
Dealer Permits
2. Alcoholic Beverage Tax 1
3. Anhydrous Ammonia Permits
L. Beer Permits
5. 3eer Tax2
6. Corporate Franchise Tax
7. Electric Cooperative Fees
8. Excise License Tax
9. Gas Gathering Tax^
10. Gasoline Tax
11. Gift Tax
12. Income Tax
13- Inheritance Tax
1L. Liquefied Petroleum
Gas Permits
15- Motor Vehicle Licenses
16. Natural Gas Franchise Tax
17. Occupational*Licenses
10. Public Utilities Tax
19- Sales Tax
20. Severance T a x 1*
21. Soft Drink Tax5
22. Special Fuels Tax
23- Tobacco Tax^

Total Taxes

1969/70

1970/71

$ 1092.1
9707.8
19.3
398.1
22191.0
25759.6
11.7
18239-9
b
112262.0
1*18.9
82762.2
6305. 9

$ 1102.2
131*2 0 . 2
20.9
1*17.2
21957.9
281*35. 7
16.3
19626.5
b

$

1971/72

1972/73

1973/7L

778.3
11*860. 7
23.6
UL5.lt
22827-1
29098.5
19-8
21523. 1*

$ 1172.0
15660.8
22.3
1*53.3
2387L.6
3 0 6 U7 . 8
21*.2
23989.2

$ 1176.0
15705.0
21.9
321.3
25321.2
3U0 L6 . 7
1 U. 7
26237.7

b

b

b

116178.8
523.3
133165.8
7021 *. 5

125151.0
1*87.8
I 8 L8 7 6 . 6
9Lll. 0

135766.8
1139-1
168197.7
11231.1

135569.8
637.7
167558.7
11356.3

1062.9
8728.2
5157.1*
1661*85 .1
21*9070 .7
3221.7
7580.1*
33178.5

73.5
161*10. 5
1213.2
9020.9
5623.7
233T58.9
251*878. 0
31*1*7.9
81*12.2
1*1*581. 5

T2 . 6
239L8.3
1 U1 2 . 2
9731.8
6173.1
2T7765.5
2LL297.1
3578.3
982L.5
L7 L6 L.O

98.9
18680.1
1726.5
105 2 B.7
6936.0
308817.6
265399.2
3725-2
11215.L
L 9 9 L 5 .2

1 0 L. 8
28027.5
3118. L
11U85.5
8 3 0 L.L
337730.7C
387850.0
UUL5.2
129LL.9
51910.1

775981*.?

919309.6 1033760.6 1109251.7 1263889.0

71-3

22257.0

Table 3.3 (Continued)

Source:

Division of Adninlstration Financial S t a t e m e n t . Fiscal year 19
of Revenue Annual R e p o r t . Fiscal year 19
-19

-19

* and Department

^Excludes gallonage and inspection fees
^Excludes parish tax
^Rate doubled by 1938 regular session; tax suspended In 1936 special session, effective
December 1, 1938

L

Includes Severance Tax — Re forestation.

^Includes dealer permits
^Included in Beer Tax
^No revenues after tax repealed
c Parish service charge inseparable in 1973-7**.
sales tax.
Parish charge included in latter.

Sales tax separated from motor vehicle

(X>

o\

Table 3.U
Louisiana Tax Revenue, by Tax Groups
(in thousands)

1 9 U 8 /U 9
191*9 / 5 0
1950/51
1951/52
1952/53
1 9 5 3 / 51*
195W55
1955/56
1956/57
1957/59
1958/59
1959/60
1960/61
1961/62
1962/63
1 9 6 3 /6 ^

196V65
1 9 6 5 /66
1966/67
1967/69
1963/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1 9 7 I/ 7 I

Sales1
Tax

Severance2
Tax

Income^
Tax

Automotive^
Tax Group

$ 1U120.9
1*5000.7
50335-3
51*306 .8
59293-9
6 3 I*5 5 -1
61*302.2
73570.2
80759-2
831*18.2
81*257 .1*
33489.2
85356.5
90062.5

$ 1*91*75.6
58206.2
61*5 5 1 . 7
70751.7
75683.5
78399-6
-75 9 2 8 .1
87007.!*
99083.0
97762.1
127280.1
136329.9

$ 19051.5

$ 1*1*81*5-1*
U 9 0 9 U, 1*
5268U. 5
57112.6
51971* . 7
53562.0

96929.9
101*747 .3
i:6**C2 .5
132213- 5

196006 .1
152229.3

15 9610.6
166485.1
233759.9
277765-5
303817.6
337730.7

ll*7Ul .3
11*9880.1
163159.?
172232.1
176587.5
2 0« 9 7 3 - 3
213692.1
238053.0
239512.5
21*9070.7
251*878.0
21*1*297.1
265399.2
387650.0

18678.6
19955-3
2 2 7 6 6 .1*
10586.1*
17027.8
19128.8
21*256.1
2928U.1
29181 *. 0
29931*. 1*
30830.8

34218.5
4 ? 11
*8 .8
3 6 0 4 6.7
• ~ :- 0 .e
5C;-71.1

62210.6
70201*. 3
73817.2
79095-5
82762.2
133165.8
181*876.6
138197.7
167553.7

56669.3
62912.6
66936.5
69^21*. 2
72112.6
7UQ09.3
71*31*3 . 0
77633.7
81351* -0
871*95 -?
87339.5
101627.5
101217.1
115578.2
II 8 5 6 1 . 7
11*2099.1*
11*1 0 0 1 . 5
158923.8
165662.3
1765U2.2

1 Line 19, Table 3.3
2 Lines 9,20, Table
22, Table 3.3
5Lines 1 ,2 ,It,5 ,21,2 3 , Table 3-3
Table 3.3
?Lines 1-23, Table 3.3

Sumptuary^
Tax Group
$32851.1
35892.7
35297.6
3 6 U 9 U .u
38387.2
38931.6
38701.0
1*001*9. 0
U3U33.8
1*1*5 3 5 . 0
1 *6059- u

1*8852 .9
1*9672. 5
50862.0
53170.1
55659.5
56570.0

61167.3
61*1*17.2
652UI* .1*
67233.2
69789.2
81*926.9
89953.8
9U831.1
98879.3

Other^
Taxes
$15101.2
1U890.7
I6 O U 3 . 6
17250.U
18608.7
201*59. 0
22220.2
231*30.2
26580.1*
28U89-1*
1*01*1 6 . 0
1*0007 . 4
37320.0
39030.0
1*065 0.1*
1*0811 .3
1*1*729.9
1*8676.1
5361*8 .2
5727.0.1
6 0 9 5 1 * .8
65778.1
71578.5
7791*3.8
8631 *3 . 8
95323.1

Total?
Taxes

$ 2057U5.T
221763.3
238868.0
258682.3
262531 *.U
271035.1
2 8 0 UU 9 . 6
312025.6
3U6077.0
352812.9
1*00059.9
1*191*19.5
1*28052.3
U 9 6 6 7 .I
1*71310.8
501787.3
537050.5

610868.3
61*9335.0
702192.2
725168.3
77598U. 7
919309.6
1033760.6
1109251.7

1263889.0

3-3
3Line 12, Table 3.3
**Lines 10,15,
^Llnes 3 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,11,13 ,l1*,16 ,1T ,18 ,

Table 3.5
Ratio of Tax Group Revenues
to Total Taxes

Sales
Tax

19^8A9
191*9/50
1950/51
1951/52
1952/53
1953/51*
195V55
1955/56
1956/57
1957/58
1958/59
1959/60
1960/61
1961/62

1962/63
1963/61*
1961/65
1965/66

1966/67
1967/68
1960/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1973/71
Source:

.216
.203
.211
.210

.226
.233
.231
.2 36
.233
.236
.211
.211
.195
.2 00
.206
.2 08
.220

.216
.225
.217
.220
.215
.251
.269
.273
.267

Table 3.1*

Severance
Tax

Income
Tax

Automotive
Tax Group

Sumptuary
Tax Group

.21*0

.093
.081
.081*
. 088
.071
.063

.210
.221
.221
.221
.198
.197
.202
.202
.193
.197
.180
.179
-171*
.173
.173
.171*
.161*

.160
.162

.073

.11*8
.11*1
.11*6
.11*3
.138
.131

.067
.067
.071
.075
.079
.075
.077
.08l
.101
.095
.087
.087

.262
.270
.271*
.288

.288
.281
.279
.286
.277
.318
.325
.311
-333
.316
.31*3
. 333
.336
- 329
.339
.330
.321
.277
.236
.239
.307

.068
.078
.085
.083
.075
.071*
.080
.09'.
.076
.081
.095
.102

.166

.108

.156

.105
.109
.107
.11*5
.179
.170
.133

.163
.183
.153
.151*
.11*9
.11*0

.165

.126
.126
.115
.116
.116
.113
.113
.111
.105
.100
.099
.093
.093
.090
.092
.087
.085
.078

Other
Taxes

.067

.086
.081
.083
.080
.083

.082
.081*

.085
.078
.075

.078
.075

09
inconsistencies brought about by change of 'jase, change of
rate, or change of efficiency of administration, but will
not reflect revenues of taxes not now in effect.
This measure of Total Taxes includes some funds
which were restricted in use by legislation under the old
constitution or amendments to it.

Thus sizeable amounts of

tax revenue generated by the taxes under consideration here
could not be utilized freely by legislators.

It might

appear more practical to estimate general revenues and
dedicated revenues separately, and in fact, such was
commonly done in past y e a r s . H o w e v e r ,

two considerations

lead this study to continue efforts to estimate the aggregate
Total Taxes, as defined earlier.

First, if dedicated

revenues exceed expenditures, excess funds are returned to
the general fund in many dedications.

Should dedicated

revenues fall short of anticipated expenditures, appropria
tions from the general fund would fill the gap.

Thus the

general fund serves as the account-balancing agent even
where funds are dedicated.

The total of tax revenues would

be important even in this case.

Second, the new constitution

contains considerably less revenue dedication than was
present under the old.

Thus the general fund is nearer to

the aggregate total taxes than was previously true.

For

^ N o t e the previous importance of "Revenues
Affecting the General Fund" in many tax revenue projections
by state government and private researchers.
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both reasons, it is relevant to work with the concept of
tax revenues, whether dedicated or not, used to provide
public goods and services which perform some stabilization,
distribution, or allocation function.

The term Total Taxes

still excludes those self-supporting items as inspection
fees and special severance taxes.

Total Taxes is thus an

aggregate that has been developed for the purposes of
this dissertation.

It is not the measure "Total Taxes"

used by Public Affairs Research Council or by the state's
Financial Statement.

Rather, it is the total, for each

year, of those taxes levied by the state, less inspection
fees and other self-financing assessments, which are
currently in existence.

Thus this measure will be less

than total taxes reported by other researchers in earlier
years, as it will exclude taxes levied in those years but
which are now repealed.

This provides a consistent

revenue base on which to make forecasts of future tax
receipts.

Chapter 4

ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA’S TAX STRUCTURE
The previous chapter examined in detail the Indi
vidual taxes levied by the State of Louisiana.

One purpose

of that examination was to enable a logical arrangement of
the many taxes Into a few tax groups.

The base for fore

casting future tax revenues was divided into six functional
categories:

Sales Tax, Severance Taxes, Income Tax,

Automotive Tax Group, Sumptuary Tax Group, and Other Taxes.
A second major purpose was to provide details of the rates
and bases of the individual taxes, so that theories of tax
revenue generation could be formulated.
The construction of these models of tax revenue
generation for the six taxes and tax groups is a major
purpose of this chapter.

The first section of this chapter

investigates the relationships between changes in revenues
of each of these six categories and movements in total
personal Income and other Income measures.

These models

explicitly Include, where appropriate, Income elasticities
which vary with time, with Income, or with legislative or
administrative changes in the Individual taxes.
models are tested in Chapter 5-

These

The best regression fits

are used in Chapter 6 to forecast future revenues of the
six taxes and tax groups.
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The second purpose of this chapter is to analyze
possible movement in the income elasticity of the tax
structure of the State of Louisiana.
in two stages.

This is accomplished

First, the Upward-Bound Elasticity Theorem

is set forth and demonstrated by hypothetical cases.

This

theorem suggests that, under certain conditions, the
weighted average income elasticity of a tax structure rises
with the level of income.

The Upward-Bound Elasticity

Theorem is then combined with the models previously
constructed.

The result is a model of the time path of the

income elasticity of a hypothetical tax structure similar
to that of the State of Louisiana.

This model demonstrates

that, even where the income elasticities of some individual
taxes may decline, the income elasticity of the entire tax
structure may continue to rise.
MODELS OF REVENUE GENERATION
FOR LOUISIANA TAXES
AND TAX GROUPS
Each of the tax groups being estimated must be
represented by a mathematical model.
four criteria.

This model must meet

First, it should provide for estimates of

future tax revenues that are of a reasonable and consistent
quality.

Second, the model should provide for a test of

the hypothesis that tax revenues for the group in question
are sensitive to movements of some measure of Income.
Third, the model should provide for a test of the hypothesis
that the Income-elasticity of the tax or tax group In
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question varies with time or income in a predictable manner.
Fourth, the equation chosen to represent the determination
of tax revenues for a particular tax or group must make
good economic sense, yet not be an identity or tautology.
The second and third criteria are rather direct; it is easy
to ascertain whether they have been met by a particular
equation.

The first and fourth criteria are much more

Judgmental:

how does one measure the "reasonableness" of

an estimate, or grade the "economic good sense" of a
particular equation?
The basic form of the models treated the revenue
of each specific tax or group of taxes as the dependent
variable.

In this way, estimates of the revenue of each

tax or tax group were made independently, then aggregated.
The independent variables were those whose behavior should
logically have a significant influence on the level of tax
revenue of the tax or tax group in question.

Thus some

measure of income was present as an independent variable.
For the most part, total personal income was the measure
chosen.

In some equations, this measure was decomposed into

two or three multiplicative components, so that the "income
variable" beceme two or three independent variables.

If

the tax rate had been changed during the study period,
efforts were made to include it as an Independent variable.
Regressing tax revenue against only the tax rate and tax
base in log-linear form was avoided.

This is obviously a

tautology, represented mathematically by the form TR - r*B.

Several dummy variables were Introduced to reflect
shifts In revenues brought about by factors other than the
variables already described as the set of independent
variables.

A dummy variable Is normally a zero-one variable

zero when not present, one otherwise.

In logarithmic form

this is satisfied by using a zero-one power of ten, since
log^o 1*0, and log^o 10»1. Assume that the model
Y » A.Xia

(4.1)

is incorrectly specified, and that it requires the addition
of the shift variable X2 ; the resulting model will appear
as Y - A . X 1 a .10b X 2.

When X2-0, 10bX2-io°« 1, and does not

change the value of the independent variable Y.

When

X2*l, 10bx2"10b , and does affect the regression by showing
the Impact of X2 .

The regression is linear in its log

arithms :
log Y » log A + a*log

X^ + b-X2

(4.2)

If the model Is still not properly specified, and requires
an elasticity shift variable, it can be Incorporated into
the model as
Y - A*X!a+cX2*10bX2

(4.3)

This model is also log-linear:
log Y » log A + a*log
The constant log A represents
independent of X^ and X2 .

X^ + cX2 *log Xj + b •X2
the value of Ywhich

is

The coefficient a is the

elasticity of Y with respect to

The term b X2 is the

shift In the regression intercept (log A) due to the
Influence of X2 .

(4.4)
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Since the term b*X2 is a logarithm., its numerical
value indicates a percentage shift in the value of Y,
rather than an absolute shift.

The term

finally, is

the change in the elasticity of Y with respect to X^.
The models were generally constructed in log-linear
form.

This method provides the best fit in most cases, but

equally important, is preferable a priori.

This latter

fact is best explained by the following hypothetical example.
Figure 4.1 shows a relationship between total tax revenues

Tax
reve
nue
$500

300

200

100

time in years

Figure 4.1
Linear versus Logarithmic Curve
Fitting and Extrapolation
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and time, and shows the straight line representing the
simple linear regression of tax revenues on time.

While

this fit may seem quite good, it is inferior, for purposes
of forecasting, to a log-linear regression.

Forecasts taken

from this regression will be along the vector A, while
actual values will be near the vector B.

The linear

regression, even for forecasts Just beyond the observation
period, seriously understates the growth in tax revenues,
and hence understates the income elasticity of the tax.
It Is apparent that a tax revenue function which
has an exponential shape on a linear scale has a linear
appearance on a logarithmic scale.

The vector of forecasts

and the vector of future values will be much closer together.
Thus the log-linear form of regression can be used to
reduce forecast error, and to improve regression fit, in
cases where the underlying trend is exponential in nature.
Long-term predictions of tax revenues will require
long-term predictions of income in order to establish
those gross revenue movements.

For this purpose, it is

appropriate to separate total personal income, or other
appropriate income measure, Into various components.

For

example, total personal income divided by total population
equals per capita Income, and that total personal income
divided by the consumer price Index equals real per capita
income.

Combining these two results, it is apparent that

total personal income is the product of three factors: real
per capita Income, population, and the consumer price
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index.

Regressing revenues of a specific tax or segregate

of taxes against these three variables will yield not one
elasticity, but three partial elasticities.

The regression

will show the responsiveness of tax revenues to movements
in each of the three factors separately.
The important reason for treating total personal
income as the product of three component parts is that it
may provide better estimates of future tax revenue movements.
Since an important aim of this project is revenue estimates,
this fact alone would make the disaggregation preferable.
A one percentage point rise in total personal income could
be due solely to a movement in any one of the component
parts.

A one percent change in population might not yield

the same change in revenues as a one percent change in real
per capita income or a one percent change in the price
level, all else being equal.

Total personal income would

rise one percent in each case, but the tax revenue impact
might be different in all three cases.

Thus the cause of

the change in income needs to be considered.
The disaggregation provided adds flexibility to the
model.

In predicting future tax revenues, the future

values of total personal income must also be estimated.

As

these estimates are in error, so are the resulting revenue
estimates.

The disaggregation used here allows for more

useful alternative series.

For example, a predicted

series might be altered by examining the effect of only a
changed rate of growth in population, all else remaining
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equal.

Alternative series might be compile.; using the

same real per capita income and total population figures,
but reflecting different future price level movements.
The following example illustrates the regression of
tax revenues against the independent variables per capita
income (PCI) and population (POP), and shows the method of
incorporating partial elasticities that change over time.
TR

- A*PCIa *POPb

(4.5)

The tlme-dependency of the elasticities is found in the
coefficient a; a * a^'d-St), where t is the variable time.
Thus the equation h .5 can be rewritten as
TR

= A*PCIa '^1“6t^.POPb

(4.6)

log TR “

log A + a >(l-6t)*log PCI + b.log POP

log TR *

log A + a'log PCI

wheren replaces a"6.
arithms.

-r\t

(4.7)
log PCI + b*log POP
(4.8)

Equation 4.8 is linear in its log

Thus to incorporate the time-dependent elasticities,

an additional variable t*PCI was added.

An additional

parameter must now be estimated; the set of parameters for
equation 4.8 is a', 6, and b.

The parameter 6 can be found

by returning to the relationship n “ a^6.
model, when
TR

The equivalent

Income is broken downinto three components, Is
- A* (RPY* CPI)a "f1* ,5t5 *POPb

(4.9)

which becomes
log TR *■ log A + a d o g R P Y + a d o g C P I - adl o gRPY
- adt*logCPI + b-logPOP

(4.10)

Another necessary step is to ascertain whether there

is an analytical way to reconstruct the income elasticity
if the appropriate regression utilized as independent
variables not total personal income> but per capita income
and population, or real per capita income, consumer price
index, and population.

As the following simple example

shows, a weighted average of the partial elasticities is the
total elasticity with respect to total personal income.
Let population grow 1 percent each year, and let the
partial elasticity of tax revenue with respect to popula
tion (e^) be 2.

Let per capita income grow 10 percent per

year, and let the partial elasticity of tax revenue with
respect to per capita income (e^) be 1.

These assumptions

comprise the model
TR - A PCI1 POP2

(4.11)

Over the time interval of one year, total personal income
will grow (1.01 x 1.10 - 1) x 100 ■ 11.1 percent, while tax
revenue will grow 1% x 2 + 10% x 1 * 2% + 10% * 12 percent.
The total income elasticity will then be
H J L - 1.081
For small growth rates, this result can be approximated by
£y - ci-gl + e2-82

(l).l

«1 + 62
In the general case, the total income elasticity can be
approximated by the formula
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where the e.^ are the partial elasticities of the independent
variables, and the g^ are their respective growth rates.
Thus the total elasticity is a weighted average of the
partial elasticities, with growth rates being the weights.
Thus Chapter 4 investigates the relationships
between income movements and income elasticity movements
for each of the major taxes and tax groups.

The question

of whether such an income elasticity exists, and if so,
whether it is influenced by income movements Is entertained.
In turn, the discussion focuses on the Sales Tax, the
Severance Tax, the Income Tax, the Automotive Tax Group,
the Sumptuary Tax Group, and the residual group Other Taxes.
Sales Tax
Prior to 1970, the State Sales and Use Tax would
have been considered regressive with respect to income, be
cause the two percent levy applied to most goods and services
sold at retail.

As it applied only to consumption items,

the tax would have tended to distort the savlngs-consumption
choice, and tax relatively more heavily those households
that, voluntarily or not, had the higher consumption/income
ratios.

This led to the conclusion that the sales tax

was regressive with respect to an income base, exacting a
larger percentage of smaller incomes than of larger ones,
as larger incomes had generally lower consumption/income
ratios.
When the state sales tax rate was increased to
three cents in 1970, prescription drugs, prosthetic devices,
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and food consumed off premises were exempted from this
surtax.

In 1973, these Items were exempted from the two

cent state sales tax as well.

The food exemption especially

should serve to moderate or erase the regressivlty of the
sales tax with respect to income, In that a variable expen
diture exclusion is introduced.

It Is believed that the

sales tax as now enforced is very nearly proportional with
respect to income.^

However, the regressivlty or progres-

sivity of a tax does not bear directly on its income
elasticity.
If the sales tax is roughly proportional to Income,
the percentage of Income paid in sales taxes will be
approximately the same at all Income levels.

A one percent

increase

in disposable Income will generate a one percent

Increase

In consumptionof taxed goods and in sales

revenues.
Is equal

The marginal

tax

propensity to consume taxed goods

to the average propensity to consume taxed goods.

The relationship between Income and consumption of goods
subject to state sales tax Is thus proportional.
Disposable income does not rise as rapidly as
adjusted gross income or total personal income, due to the
progressive impact of federal Income tax liabilities.

Thus

the consumption function assumes a flatter slope as Income

1Roger L. Burford, "Relative Merits of Income and
General Sales Taxes for Louisiana— Some General Principles"
Louisiana Business Review, XXXVIII (July, 197*0* 3.
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grows, and successive one percent increases in total
personal income generate ever smaller percentage increases
in sales tax revenues.
As living standards rise, the portion of income
spent on subsistence declines.

Pood, housing, and pre

scription drugs are part of that subsistence, and all are
now exempt from the state sales tax.

Thus, over time, an

ever larger portion of income earned in Louisiana becomes
subject to the sales tax.

This statement should hold true

even though absolute expenditures on these exempt items
also increase over time, as the standard of subsistence
changes.

These exemptions should make the sales tax elastic

with respect to income; the decline of exempt items relative
to total income should give the sales tax an increasing
income elasticity.

Sales tax revenue is proportional to

consumption spending (spending on taxable commodities),
and takes the form
TRsal * rs*c »
where

(4.1*0

TRgal ” sales tax revenues, in dollars
rs ■= the sales tax rate, and
C » spending on taxed goods.
The paragraphs above have given reasons for modelling

the sales tax, not with a constant income elasticity, but
with an income elasticity which varies with total personal
income or time.

Thus a consumption function of the form

C - TPIbt
where

TPI - total personal income, in dollars

(4.15)
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b = parameter determining oime path of income
elasticity
and

t = time index,

might be appropriate.

Thus the following basic model was

suggested.
TRsal “ r3a ',rplbt
where

(4.16)

a * rate elasticity.

This equation, in logarithmic form, appears as
log (TRsal) “ a*log r + b*t*log TPI

(4.17)

The shift in sales tax revenues which occurred due
to the change to collections at wholesale rather than
retail was modelled by the dummy variable D2.

Revenue

growth changed noticeably when food and prescription drugs
were

exempted, first from the third cent of thestate

tax,

then from all three cents of the state sales tax.

sales

Both administrative and legislative base shifts were
accomodated by the dummy variable D6.

The income elasticity

of the sales tax should have increased with the introduction
of those exemptions.
into

Incorporating both

dummyvariables

the sales tax model resulted in the following equation:
TRsai » ra.TPIbt+dD2+eD6.10fD2.10gD6

(4.18)

Two more models of the sales tax revenue generation
function will now be examined.

Income elasticity is viewed

as a constant, but subject to shifts.

A consumption

function which meets this criterion is
C » Ab t *TPIc

(4.19)

In this model, A Is a constant representing the relation
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ship between total personal income and taxable expenditures.
The income elasticity is not time-dependent.

The wholesale

collections shift variable D2 was omi t t e d from these

formulations.

This function resulted in the sales tax

revenue equation
TR

,

sal

=r

s

a - A b t * TPIc +dD 2+e D6

.xof*0 2 -1 0g D 6

(4.20)

The log-linear form of this model is
log TRsai * a-log r3 + b ' t + c *logTPI + d • (D2 •logTPI )
+ e(D 6 *logTPI) + fD2 + gD 6
where

b " = b log A.

(4.21)

The multiplicative term dD6 shows

the shift in revenues due to the exemption of food and
prescription drugs from the sales tax.
Severance Tax
The various severance taxes are levied on the
extraction of generally non-renewable resources.

At fixed

tax schedules, the tax revenues generated can be viewed as
dependent on the value or volume of the resource removed.
For a variety of reasons, this tax base is not related to
the level of income in Louisiana.
The extraction of some taxed commodities is
occurring at near maximum rates, limited by availability
of the resource.

Extraction of other resources, notably

natural gas, is at rates well below maximum, limited by
factors more political than income-related.

Much of the

extracted material is exported from the state of Louisiana;
this volume is largely independent of the level of income
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In Louisiana.

For the above reasons, it Is appropriate

that the models constructed here assign severance tax
revenues an Income elasticity of zero, that remains zero
over all income levels.
One of the two major objectives of this dissertation
is to investigate the role of income growth in determining
future levels of tax revenues.

While changes in severance

tax revenues are not thought to be caused by changes in
economic activity, it remains necessary to forecast
severance tax revenues in order to forecast future levels of
total tax revenues.

Since severance tax forecasts will be

by methods other than those developed elsewhere in this
dissertation, the forecasts which follow are largely drawn
from those recently done by Beard and Scott, and by
Richardson .2
Income Tax
This dissertation will attempt in later sections of
this chapter to analyze some of the relevant character
istics of the tax structure of the state of Louisiana.

One

of the most important single taxes is the income tax, which
has both personal and corporate components.

The following

^Thomas R. Beard and Loren C, Scott, "Revenue
Projections for Louisiana State Government, Fiscal Years
197^-75-1979-80," Louisiana Business Review, XXXIX
(February 1975), 2-5, 11-1*1, 16; and James A. Richardson,
"Louisiana's Revenue Outlook," Louisiana Business Review,
XL (March, 1976), 2-5, 8 .
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paragraphs will examine some of the economic character
istics of the state's personal income tax payers; later
paragraphs will study the corporate income tax.
Theoretical Considerations.

It is the primary

purpose of this section to discuss the possible range of
values of the Income elasticity of the Louisiana personal
income tax.

The initial points to consider are first, that

the personal Income tax Is progressive in that rates are
moderately graduated with respect to income and there Is an
income exclusion; and second, that the effective rate of
taxation is reduced by the fact that federal income taxes
paid are a special deductible item tantamount to an
exclusion for state income tax purposes.

It should be noted

that the Income elasticity of the Income tax exceeds unity,
by virtue of the above-mentioned exclusions and graduated
rates.
The actual income elasticity of the income tax at
a point in time could be computed as follows:
1.

determine total tax paid and total income
earned by taxpayers in each of the three (2,4,6
percent) marginal brackets
2.

compute average rate of taxation for each of
these brackets

3- compute the average elasticity for each bracket,
using the relationship:
Ey = Marginal tax rate * Average tax rate
4. compute the average elasticity by weighting
each elasticity by the respective portion of income
earned by taxpayers in that marginal bracket.
Two points should be noted here.

First, the weights of

Item 4 can be expected to change over time.

During a
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general rise In money Incomes, more taxpayers will move to
higher tax brackets than vice versa.

In particular, the

weight appropriate for the open-ended 6 percent marginal
tax rate bracket should rise during periods of rising money
incomes.

Second, incomes below the taxable threshold

represent a fourth marginal bracket (0 percent); elasticity
for this group is indeterminate.

Thus the elasticity

computed above applies only to those householders who
actually had state income tax liability.
An alternative computation would measure the average
tax rate of each tax return, compute the elasticity for
each taxpayer, and compile the weighted average of all
returns, using shares of taxed income as the weights.
Lacking facility for such a census, the same result might
be achieved by use of a stratified sample of Louisiana
taxpayers.
The above techniques give a value to the income
elasticity of the state's personal income tax at a single
point in time, and hence at a particular pattern of income
distribution.

The discussion below points out the minimum

and maximum values of elasticity that might be obtained
over time and over different income distribution patterns.
Income elasticity of the income tax is generally
larger where income is equally distributed among all
residents of the state than for any other distribution of
the same aggregate income.

The following statements provide

an Intuitive proof of this hypothesis.

At this distribution,
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all Individuals would pay the same marginal tax rate.

The

average tax rate would be at its minimum value, assuming
a progressive schedule of tax rates.

If any one individual,

by virtue of an income redistribution, earned enough more
than the other individuals to be taxed at the next higher
marginal rate, the average rate of taxation (and tax
revenue) would rise, and income elasticity would fall.
Similarly, an income redistribution placing one individual
only into a lower bracket, tax revenue also rises.^

Again,

the average tax rate rises and income elasticity falls.
The following hypothetical cases illustrate some
preliminary findings concerning the income elasticity of
the income tax.

The first example (Case A) makes the

following assumptions:
1.

the household consists of husband, wife, and
one other dependent

2.

the household takes standard exemptions

3.

the household ha 3 deductible expenses equal to
the greater of the standard deduction (15? of
AGI, $2000 maximum) or 10? of AGI
the household files a Joint return

5-

perfect income equality exists.

To illustrate the calculations, let adjusted
gross income (AGI) in each household be $10,000.
197*1 tax laws, Federal income tax is $1047.50.

Utilizing
Louisiana

3as sume n taxpayers each earning an income that is the
dividing line between marginal tax rates ri and r 2 * Let n-1
taxpayers each gain an amount of income 6 . The taxpayer loses
an amount of income (n-l)i . Tax revenue changes by r2 *5 (n-l)
less ri(n-l) 6 . If the tax Is progressive, r2 > ri, and tax
revenue rises.
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income tax » .02 x $2,552.50 ■ $51*05.^
rate is |.^.^ -^Q.5 . .51 percent.

The average tax

The income elasticity is

therefore 2 percent * .51 percent - 3 -9 2 .
Now let income change by 1 percent to $10,100.
Federal taxes become $1063.65*
becomes $2626.5

Louisiana taxable income

Louisiana income tax will be .02 x

2626.35 ■ $52.53.
income generated

The
a

^qqq = 1 percent increase in
5 2 .^3~51•05 = 2.89 percent increase in

state income tax revenues.
is not 3.92, but 2.89.

Thus the effective elasticity

The reason for the difference is

that a one percent increase in adjusted gross income does
not generate a one percent increase in income taxable in
Louisiana.
case

For example, an extra dollar earned in this

yields ($1.00 - $0 .1 5 ) x .19 = $0.16 in federaltaxes,

a deductible item.
rate is 19 percent.

At an AQI of $10,100,the marginal

tax

Income taxable in Louisiana rises by

^Taxable Income in Louisiana would be $2,552.50.
This figure is obtained as follows:
$10,000
-1,000
-5,400
-1.047.50
$ 2,552.50

Adjusted Gross Income
Itemized Deductions
Personal Exemptions
Federal Income Tax Paid
Income Taxable in Louisiana

5The calculations are as follows:
$10,100
-1,010
-5,400
-1,064
$ 2,626

Adjusted Gross Income
Itemized Deductions
Personal Exemptions
Federal Income Tax Liability
Income Taxable in Louisiana
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$1.00 - $0.10 - $0,162 * $0.7385.

This reduces the measured

elasticity from 3.92 to -7385 x 3.92 * 2.89, the actual
percentage change in tax revenues.

The two measures of

income elasticity arise because two definitions of the
concept are being used.

The larger value of Income elas

ticity is calculated by ey = marginal tax rate * average tax
rate.

The smaller value, the "effective income elasticity,"

is calculated by
' m % change in tax revenue
y
% change in income
*
where "income" refers to adjusted gross income.
z

Income elasticity would be undefined until house
hold income reached almost $6600, since the tax liability
and hence the average tax rate are zero.

For an income

incrementally larger than $6600, income elasticity would
become infinitely large, declining as household income grows.
At a household income of approximately $36,000, elasticity
will have fallen to its minimum value in this range, as the
marginal rate becomes 4 percent for further increases in
income.

Elasticity at this point will be 1.87-

incrementally larger income, e

At an

doubles, to 3-7^; then

declines toward a second minimum at incomes of approximately
$275,000.

The average effective tax rate at this extreme

would be 1.31 percent— lower than in other brackets because
of deduction of progressive federal taxes.
this extreme will be

« 3 .0 6 ,

Elasticity at

A $1 increase in AGI

increases taxable income by 90$; increases federal income
taxes by .7 x 90 3 63 $; and increases Louisiana taxable

Ill

Income by $1 - 10$ - 63 $ * 27<t .04 x .27 “ 1$.

Louisiana taxes rise by

Even though the marginal rate is 4 percent,

it applies to only 27$ of each new dollar of AGI.

The $1

increase in income represents an Increase of .000364
percent.

The 1$ rise in Louisiana Income taxes represents

a rise of .000278 percent.

This ratio Is the income

elasticity *000 364 = .764.

As income increases beyond this

second breaking point, elasticity begins a steady decline.
However, very few Individuals in Louisiana are taxed at the
70 percent maximum federal income tax bracket.

Such large

income values as these are for the most part, not Important.
The path of the income elasticity is shown In Table 4.1.
Similar calculations, under different assumptions
concerning the taxpaying units, are made to generate two
additional cases.

Case B is typical of a Louisiana family

unit; Case C Is typical of an unrelated Individual.

Series

B assumes a household taking four exemptions, filing
jointly and Itemizing deductions equalling 15 percent of
AGI.

Series C assumes a taxpaying unit with one exemption,

itemizing deductions totalling 15 percent of AGI.

The

calculations for cases B and C are summarized in Tables 4.2
and 4.3.

The

Zy'

values are plotted and shown for comparison

In Figure 4.2.
Thus the elasticity of the state personal income tax
is a variable dependent on income and tax filing conditions.
It is Important to discuss how much that elasticity might
change during the relevant time frame for these projections.
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Table 4.1
Relationship between Adjusted Gross Income
and Income Elasticity of the Louisiana
Income Tax:
Case A
Series A
Adj us ted
Gross
Income

Federal
Income
Tax

State
Income
Tax

$ 6600
8000
10000
12000
16000
20000
24000
28000
34000
36000
40000
70000

$

$

511
705
1048
1371
2146
3031
4011
5111
6986
7678
9115
22344

0
22
51
81

137
191
244
294
364
386
460
1010

ey

7.30

3.92
2.98
2.33
2.09

1.97
1.91
1.87
1.87

3.49
2.52

Ey

0
6.12
2.89
2.05

1.64
1.41
1.27
1.17
1.08
1.02
1.82
1.76
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Table 4. 2
Relationship between Adjusted Gross Income
and Income Elasticity of the Louisiana
Income Tax: Case B

Series B
Adjusted
Gross
Income

Federal
Income
Tax

State
Income
Tax

$

$

$

8000

10000
12000
16000
20000
2*1000
28000
3*1000
36000
40000
50000
70000
100000
150000
200000
275000
300000
1000000

569
905
1228
1952
2760
3652
4636
63*1*1
6956
8270
11915
20*1*15
3*1500
601(60
883*10
132*115
147290
563790

Gy

9
36
63
117
169
219
267
335
357
399

18.56
5-57
3.78
2.74
2.37
2.19
2 .10
2.03
2.02
2.01

496

2.02

1070
1388
2050
2634
3421
3715
14425

2.62
2.88
2.93
3.04
3.22
4.85
4.16

Ey

13.10

3.84
2.60
1.81
1.51
1.34
1.21
1.10
1.10
1.04
0.94
1.05
1.03
0.90
0.83
0.82

1. 24
1.06
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Table 4.3
Relationship between Adjusted Gross Income
and Income Elasticity of the Louisiana
Income Tax: Case C

Series C
Adj usted
Gross
Income

Federal
Income
Tax

State
Income
Tax

$

$

$

4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
10000
12000
16000
18800
19000

20000
25000
30000
40000
50000
70000
100000
130000
137500
140000
170000

302
491
681

942
1122
1530
1952
2876
3591
3644
3915
5420
7090
10915
15352
25615
42280
59915
64378
65685
83715

18

25
38
50
64
89
115
164
198
200
223
333
436
623
786
1055
1409
1723
1800
1849
2297

cy

Gy

4.44
3.97
3.13
2.79
2.52
2 .24
2.09
1.95
1.90
3.79
3.58
3.00
2.75
2.57
2.55
2.65
2.84
3.02
3.05
4.54
4.44

3.14
2.73
2.15
1.87
1.63
1.45
1.33
1.17
1.11
2.23
2.01
1.58
1.40
1.09
0.97
0.86
0.77
0.77
0.78
1.16
1.13

Figure 4.2
Income Elasticity of Louisiana
Personal Income Tax

Series

Series B

Se ri es

C

Ajusted Gross Income Per Household, XIO^
Source:

Tables 4.2,4.3, and 4.4
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It will be sufficient to show how elasticity changes in
only one of the cases previously presented; Series B Is
chosen as most typical.

Beginning with AGI of $12,000,

let income grow at 5 percent per annum.

After five years

time, the elasticity measure will have fallen from 3.78 to
2.84.6

After ten years, income will have grown to $19,547,

and elasticity fallen to 2.40.

This decline will be more

rapid as income changes are more rapid.

In these times of

significant inflation, It will not be surprising that money
incomes grow at least as fast as the value used for this
example.
Partial Elasticities.

The previous section suggests

that the elasticity of the state personal income tax with
respect to total personal income (and per capita income
under the assumption of income equality), must decline as
those measures of income rise.

The partial elasticity with

respect to population is unity, if an increase in population
does not alter the patterns of income distribution or
consumption.

This project will assume that such is the

case and test its results for proof of this hypothesis.
Tax liability is a function of money income rather
than real income.

An Increase In real per capita Income,

all else unchanged, will cause an Increase In tax revenues
through the increase in nominal income (PCI), which is the

6At that point in time, AGI will be $15,315, which
generates $108 in Louisiana Personal Income Tax liability.
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product of th? change in real per capita income (R?Y) time.::
the price level (CPI), or APCI = ARPY x CPI.

A given

percentage change in real income generates an equal percent
age change in nominal income.

A similar result holds for

increases in the general price level: the revenue effect is
only felt through the increase In money income.
Corporate Income Tax.

The state corporate Income

tax, assessed at a single rate and having rather modest
exemption, should be a nearly proportional tax.

As such,

its Income elasticity should be quite stable in value.

The

paragraphs which follow will discuss these statements in
more detail.
The exemption makes the income elasticity of the
corporate income tax exceed unity, but decline as net income
rises.

In the limit, this elasticity would approach unity

as the exemption becomes relatively less Important.

The

federal corporate income tax Is progressive, and thus has
a higher average tax rate at larger values of net income.
This reduces the taxable base for Louisiana Income tax
purposes.

In the limit, only 52 cents of each dollar of

net Income is taxable in Louisiana.

Thus the average

effective tax rate has a limiting upper value of .04 x
(1-.48) ■ .0208 or 2,08 percent and a limiting maximum
elasticity of 1.92.

The Income elasticity of this tax Is

largest, when viewed in the aggregate of all corporate
taxpayers, if all corporations earn the same net income.
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Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 Illustrate the rar-ge of values for
the Income elasticity of the corporate Income tax.
Table 4.4
Corporate Income Tax Elasticity
Net
Income
$

0
2000
2564
3000
4000
5000
10000
20000
24700
25000
50000
100000
200000
500000

Federal
Income Tax
$

0
400
577
660
880
1100
2200
4400
5434
5500
17500
41500
89500
233500

State
Income Tax
0
0
0
14
45
76
2 32
544
691
700
1220
2260
4 340
10580

E
MTR/ATR

e"
#ATR/J£AY
0
0
0
6.88
2.79
2.05
1. 34
1.15
1.12
0.74
0.85
0.92
0.96
0.98

$

—
8.82
3-57
2.63
1.72
1.47
1.43
1.43
1.64
1. 77
1.84
1.89

The assumption underlying the Illustration Is that the
corporation taken to be typical does all business in
Louisiana, and thus obtains the largest possible exemption.
Relaxing this assumption causes the elasticities to more
quickly approach their limiting values.

Methods of deter

mining the income elasticity of the Louisiana personal income
tax aggregated over all taxpayers, have been discussed.
Let the value of the elasticity so obtained be ep .

A method

of determining the elasticity of the corporate Income tax
with respect to changes in net corporate Income was presented
In the preceeding paragraphs.

Let the elasticity so obtained

Figure A .3

Corporate Income Elasticity of Louisiana
Corporate Income Tax
e

o

M

A

U> o

VI Ol

Corporate Net Income Xl()3

Source:

Table A.A

o

o

o
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be e c<

Each of these elasticities is a pur? number.

It

makes no difference at this point that these two elasticities
are calculated from different bases.

Let the fraction of

total income tax revenues derived from individual sources
be Wp, and the fraction derived from corporate Income be
Wc , where Wp + W c = 1.

Then the elasticity of the income

tax, with respect to movements in the tax base (personal
plus corporate net income) Is
ey * ep ‘wp + ec ’w cThis measure is properly a base elasticity, and not an
Income elasticity since two different Incomes comprise the
base of the tax.

However, the two elements of the base

generally move In the same direction, although the corporate
component Is the more volatile of the two.

Thus it should

not be misleading to refer to the measure calculated
above as an income elasticity, and to calculate that
elasticity with respect to total personal Income.
Income Tax Estimating Equations.

Of all taxes and

tax groups Included in this dissertation, the personal
Income tax has the strongest link to the Independent
variables which measure Income because the base of this tax
Is not very different from the income measures used.

For

this reason, and for the fact that the income tax is one of
the most productive individual taxes levied by the State of
Louisiana, it is Important that the tax revenue estimating
equation provide a measure of the income elasticity of
the tax.
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Over the period studied, the rate structure of the
Income tax had remained constant.

Thus there was no need to

Incorporate into the model a variable for the tax rate.
There were shifts in tax revenues due to factors
other than movements of the economic variables.

Institution

of a system of general withholding and the temporary non
deductibility of federal income taxes paid resulted in
shifts in tax revenues significant enough that the esti
mating model should measure their effects.
variables D4 and D5 were constructed:

Thus dummy

is unity for the

years 1970-1971-1972* and zero otherwise; and variable D5
is zero for years before 1961, unity thereafter.
The income elasticity of the state income tax is
increased if federal income taxes paid are deductible for
purposes of computing state imcome tax liability.

The

extra deduction leads to lower tax bills, while most tax
payers remain in the same marginal tax bracket as before.
There is some offset to this, as some taxpayers revert to a
lower marginal tax rate, hence lowering Income elasticity.
It is presumed that the elasticity-increasing effect is
much stronger than the elasticity-decreasing effect.

State

personal Income tax brackets are broad enough that few
taxpayers will shift to a lower marginal rate.
A purpose of modelling this shift was to determine
how much state Income tax revenue was foregone by excluding
federal income tax, what would be the new growth rate of
tax revenues with respect to income growth, and how long
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Figure

Schematic Representation of Shifts
in Income Tax Revenues

Log of
Income
Tax
Revenues

I960

1965

1970

1975

Withholding is instituted; many individuals who
previously failed to file commence filing
^Withholding becomes near-universal; again some
non-reporters are forced to comply
cFederal income tax paid loses and regains its
status as a special deductible item on state tax returns;
those taxpayers at the taxable margin begin to pay income
tax, then cease to pay income tax
^State income tax returns are tied to federal tax
returns; greater compliance results
New state constitution defines taxable income to be
almost identical to Federal Adjusted dross Income
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it would
The

take the system to make up for those lostrevenues.

base shifts described above are shown graphically in

Figure 4

.

It was further argued that the Income elastic

ity of the state income tax could be expected to decline
over time.

An equation which models the features Just

described would appear as
=

ft.

tpi (a+bt+eD4+fD5 ). iocD4 *10d^5

(*(.22)

The constant A reflects the system of deductions, exemptions,
and marginal tax rates; t Is a time index.

The coefficients

a and b^ determine the time path of income elasticity;
coefficients e and f measure the shifts in Income elastic
ities resulting from tax base changes.

Coefficients c_ and

d measure the shifts In the tax revenue function as a result
of those base changes.

No rate variable appears in this

equation, or in other Income tax models, because the income
tax rate schedules remained constant during the relevant
time period.
A second model of the Income tax revenue function,
presented below, explicitly includes a declining income
elasticity.
TRlnc ■ A-TPIa ^k“t ^+bD^+cD5*l0dD^ •10eD5

(4.23)

where k is a constant, and all other symbols are as
previously defined.
The models discussed above utilized the income
measure total personal income.

Those models readily con

verted to models using either the per capita incomepopulation, or the real per capita Income-consumer price
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index-population measures.

The model

TR.
* A .pCIa+bt+cD4+dD5•pope •iofD^ *106D5
Inc

(4.24)

displayed a structure similar to that of equation 4,22.

The

elasticity shift variables were not appended to the pop
ulation variable.
Automotive Tax Group
Revenues of the three taxes comprising the auto
motive tax group should be expected to rise as the state's
total personal income rises.

The taxed items are in part

consumer goods, and are not considered to be inferior
goods.

In part the taxed goods are destined for business

use; but the end result is the same*

Higher Income and

higher spending levels will require more vehicles and fuel
to transport the merchandise.

As services constitute an

increasing portion of total output, this increase will be
more moderate.

Thus the income elasticity of the revenues

of this tax group should be positive.

Since most individuals

in this state are dependent on automotive transportation,
this Income elasticity might be thought to be less than
unity.
Progressive federal income tax schedules exact
ever higher percentages of earned income as income rises.
This in turn leaves progressively less disposable Income.
Thus a one percent increase in Income at a high Income
level will cause a smaller percentage increase in spending
on goods in the automotive tax group than a one percent
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Income Increase at a lower Income level.

Changes In work

and living patterns in the future may alter the dependence
of Louisiana citizens on automobiles, and hence change the
income elasticity.
In addition to the various forms of Income
variables, a variable to reflect rate changes seemed
necessary to properly model this tax group.

Both dummy

variables and actual rate variables were tried, with better
results (larger values of the t, F, and R2 coefficients)
obtained using the actual rate.

This variable was generally

the cents-per-gallon rate on gasoline, since this commodity
was the major revenue producer in this group, and since
some of the other rates moved much in line with that rate.
The sales tax rate was included, since automobile sales
are subject to that tax.

The dummy variable D3, to account

for shifts in tax revenues due to the change to biennial
collections for passenger auto licenses, also was necessary.
Thus the automotive tax revenue function which modelled the
above features was
TRaut = rsa *rgb *TPlc+<it+eD3.iof,EI3 j
where

(4.25)

TRaut “ tax revenue of automotive tax group
rs = sales tax rate
rg = gasoline tax rate
c, d = parameters denoting time path of income
elasticity
e = parameter denoting shift in income elasticity
f * parameter denoting shift In tax revenue
function
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A second model of revenue generation of this group
of taxes was
TRaut * rga -A*TPIb+ct*10dD3,
where

(4.26)

A = constant

This model assumed a negligible impact on revenues by sales
tax rate changed, and a negligible influence on elasticity
by D3*
Sumptuary Tax Group
The income elasticity of the revenues of the
sumptuary tax group should be positive, as the goods are
not inferior goods in any general sense.

The income

elasticity is probably less than unity, as the consumption
of these goods (taxed on nonprogressive schedules) rises
less rapidly than does TPI.

The income elasticity will

decline as incomes grow, as federal income taxes rise faster
than income, leaving smaller proportions of disposable income.
The taxes in the sumptuary tax group have a more
tenuous link to income levels than do the other non
severance taxes studied.

It was therefore important to

carefully study the empirical results with respect to the
significance of the income variable.

While it was possible

that the Income variable would add no explanatory value to
the models, such was not generally the case.
The model which would seem best suited a priori
to estimation of the sumptuary tax group revenues would
contain an income variable, a variable to test for time-
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dependent income elasticity, and variables to reflect
shifts in revenue and in income elasticity at the two
major rate shifts.

In the sumptuary tax group, rates were

changed on several occasions, but the rates were several in
number, and many were complex schedules.

Rather than utilize

a single rate to represent all rates and rate schedules,
these rate changes were treated by a dummy variable Dl.
The simplest model which meets these criteria was
TR_lim * A .TPi a+bt+cDl.1 0 dDl
suni

(4.27)

Equation 4.27 displayed declining income elasticity if
the coefficient b_ was estimated to be negative.

A second

possible type of sumptuary tax group model explicitly
included a declining income elasticity.
TRsum * A-TPia^-^^+bDi-lO001

(4.28)

Both models could be reformulated by substituting PCI—
POP and RPY— CPI— POP for the income measure TPI.
Other Taxes
This residual grouping of taxes contains some items
that should not be considered income related, and some that
should be.

The Corporate Franchise Tax, Occupational

License Taxes, and the Excise License Tax should rise with
Income, reflecting greater production and general business
expansion.

These are the major components of Other Taxes,

and should dominate the effects of the remaining items.
Thus a positive income elasticity is expected.

But the

direction of movement of this elasticity is not obvious.
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It will be left to the regression analysis to determine
whether any significant change has occurred.
Only one of several administrative and legislative
rate and base changes seemed of sufficient magnitude to
model.

That event was the change in the collection date

of the Corporate Franchise Tax, in 1958.

The significance

of this change was tested by a variable taking on the
value 1 in fiscal 1958, 0 otherwise.

This variable was not

significant In any models for this tax group, and so was
deleted.

Thus the basic model was
TRoth = A-TPIa+bt

(*J.29)

An alternative form, using PCI and POP as the independent
variables, was
TRoth = A*PCIa+bt*POPc

(4.30)

Summary
For four of the five taxes and tax groups studied,
a priori information and analysis suggests that the income
elasticity of individual taxes and tax groups varies with
time or income.

These hypotheses will be tested in the

regressions which follow, as Income- or time-dependent
elasticities will be incorporated into the forecasting
equations, in the same manner as changing elasticities
were built Into the model to forecast income tax revenues.
Contrasting with the content of the next section,
these changes in income elasticities may be a partial
offset to the phenomenon that the income elasticity of a
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tax structure rises toward that of the most elastic tax of
the

structure.

Thus Income elasticity of a tax structure

can

be considered to be Increasing toward a decreasing

limit.
ANALYSIS OP THE DEPENDENCY OP THE INCOME
ELASTICITY OF A TAX STRUCTURE UPON
THE LEVEL OF INCOME
Previous sections have shown that it is possible
for

individual taxes to have elasticities which vary with

Income changes.

This section will prove that it is possible

for a structure of constant elasticity taxes to have a
system elasticity that changes with Income changes.

These

two results will be combined in a later section to
Illustrate movements in elasticity of a more realistic tax
structure.

Finally, these results are extended to provide

an analysis of the time path of the Income elasticity of the
current Louisiana tax structure.
The Upward-Bound
Elasticity Theorem
The following example suggests that the income
elasticity of a tax structure grows as Income grows.

The

example Is purposely simplified, Involving only two taxes,
each of constant elasticity.

Let tax A be elastic with

respect to income (eA « 2), and let it account for .5 of
tax revenue at t ■ 0.

Let tax B be Inelastic with respect

to Income (Eg * .5) and let it account for ,5 of tax
revenue at t * 0.

Let Income grow at a constant rate of
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Table 4 . 5
Symbols Utilized In Elasticity Exercise
Y

* Adjusted Gross Income (the tax base)

TRa

= tax revenue generated by tax A

TRB

= tax revenue generated by tax B

TTR

= total tax revenue (TRA + TRB )

a

= share of total tax revenues generated by
tax A (TRa t TTR)

1-a

» share of total tax revenues generated by
tax B (TRg f TTR)

eA

= Income
elasticity of tax A (percentage
change in TRA * percentage change in Y

£g

= income elasticity of tax B (percentage
change in TRg * percentage change In Y

es

= income elasticity of tax structure,
computed by

TR.
TRrj
+ ER * — E ;thus es
TTR
n TTR *
*

^A* —

can be written a*eA + (l-a)‘eB
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4 percent per /ear.
The w*. ighted average incomv elasticity of the tax
structure is .5 x 2 + .5 x .5 = 1.25.

As income grows by

4 percent, revenue grows by 4 percent x 1.25 " 5 percent
from t * 0 to t 1 1.

As income grows 4 percent, eA remains

2 , eB remains .5 ; but TRA has risen 8 percent, TRg only 2

percent.

At t = 1 the share of total tax revenues generated

by tax A was
=

* V [1 + (.0*1 x 2)]
— ci ii .
5
[1 + T T W X 1.25)/
,5 J*
The share of total tax revenues from tax B was
l

n » [1 + (.Oil x .5)]
- JiPf7
“
5
n + (.oit x i.25)]
■ e57The elasticity of the tax structure has risen to .51*13 x
2 + .*1857 x .5 - 1.2715, up from 1.25.

Income again rises *1 percent between t = 1 and t = 2 .
A revenues rise 8 percent, B revenues, 2 percent.

This

will remain unchanged, since the individual tax revenue
income elasticities are here defined as constants.

The

system shows a revenue increase of .08 x .51*13 + .02 x
.*(857 “ .0509, reflecting the increase in elasticity over
the previous year.

This same value could have been obtained

by multiplying the income changes by the new elasticity:
.0*1 x 1.2715 * .0509.

The ratio T R ^ / T T R

is now .51*13 x

. = .5286; T R ^ / T T R has f a l l e n to .*1857 x 1
— =
1.0509
B
1.0509
.*171*1; system elasticity has risen to .5286 x 2 + ,*171** x
.5 - 1.2929.
The elasticity of the system will continue to rise
over time (as income increases), approaching a limit of
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e^.

The rate of change slows over time as the ratio

TRAk * TRAk-l approaches unity, and TRBk t TRBk-l
TTRk + TTRk_1
TTRk 4- TTRk-1
approaches 1.02 - .944. Thus the elasticity of this simple

l70%

tax structure is dependent on the level of income, and, as
income grows over time, is dependent on time.

However, it

is not true that after k years of income increases that
A's share » •5flO_8]k

because the denominator is rising

[105J
as overall elasticity rises.

The time path of the income

elasticity of this same tax structure, over ten time periods,
is given in Table 4.6.
Elasticity is increasing by decreasing amounts,
falling by less than .001 per year.

Elasticity will show

almost linear trend over short to Intermediate time frame.
System elasticity Eg changes over time, as
changes:
at = at-l x
p
at-l x

AY
Y eA
AX * eSt-l
Y

(4.31)

AY
1 + T~ e A
1 + AY [a^-i* e
Y

(4.32)

1 +
1 +

This formula is obviously recursive.

That is,

given a set of initial values, a time series for

can be

obtained.
"St

at *eA + d - H ) ’eB
f

p

AY
a t-1 1 + Y eA
1 + AY .^st-l
k
Y

*

^

tr— i

•

1

AY
+ Y ~ eA

B

1 + AX -est-:
Y
^
(4.34)
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This gives system elasticity in t'Vrms of

ts

previous value and other system parameters.
AY
1 + Y CA_________ _______ ____
‘t-l
St
1 + AY [at-1.eA + (I-o^.-l ) •e b ]
Y
Ay
. 1 + 7 ~ EA_____________________
1 + A Y [ > t - l * eA + (l-at-l)*ee^

'B

Y

(4.35)

These formulae show that changes in the weights
a and 1-a are responsible for the increase in the income
elasticity of the tax structure.

The weights in turn are

changing because the revenues of the taxes of the structure
grow at different rates.

The relatively more elastic

taxes of a tax structure grow faster than the relatively
less elastic taxes.

Thus the weights assigned to the

relatively more elastic taxes rise, while the weights
Table 4.6
Time Path of Income Elasticity,
Original Two-tax Model

t
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

£S
1.2500
1.2714
1.2928
1.3142
1.3354
1.3565
1.3774
1.3981
1.4186
1.4388
1.4586

Source: Primary

eSt-eS(t-l)
.0214
.0214
.0214
.0212
.0211
.0209
.0207
.0205
.0202
.0198

a
.5000
.5143
.5285
.5428
.5569
.5710
.5849
.5987
.6124
.6258
.6391
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attached to the relatively less elastic ta/.es fall.

The

income elasticity of the tax structure thus rises as income
rises.
The rate of change of the income elasticity of a
tax structure will be more or less rapid according to
several factors.

The rate of change in the income

elasticity of a tax structure is more rapid as the
relatively more elastic individual taxes generate less
revenue (have smaller weights) than the less elastic taxes.
The more rapid the rate of increase in income, the more
rapid will be the change in Income elasticity.

The

greater the disparity in the income elasticities of the
individual taxes, the faster will be the change in the
system income elasticity.

Other simplified models will

now be examined in order to provide support for these
statements.
A model differing from the previous two-tax
model only in the weights assigned to the taxes A and B was
examined.

The new weights were a * 0.2 and 1-a * 0.8.

Initially, eg * 0.8; after ten years of income growth of
4 percent per year, eg rose to 0.96033, a 20.0 percent
increase.

In the original model, eg Increased 16.7 percent,

from 1.25 to 1.43877.

If the Initial weights had been

a « 0.4 and 1-a ■ 0.6, and all else unchanged, the income
elasticity of the tax structure would have increased by
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17.3 percent,
In comparing the rates of change of es across the
three variations above, a pattern was noted in the rate of
change of eg within each of the models.

Where the

relatively more elastic tax contributed less than half of
total tax revenues (o < 0.5), system income elasticity
grew by increasing Increments.
decreasing Increments.

Where a > 0.5, es grew by

The intuitive extension of this

phenomenon is that, in a system of

k

taxes, eg increases

at an Increasing rate as the relatively more elastic taxes
contribute shares of total tax revenues smaller than 1/k.
The original two-tax model was altered to have a
rate of income Increase of 10 percent per year, rather than
4 percent; no other initial conditions were changed.

The

system income elasticity grew over ten years from eg * 1.25
to eg - 1.65236.

This was an Increase of 32.2 percent,

compared to 16.7 percent for the original model.

As

expected, faster rates of income growth generated faster
increases in the income elasticity of the tax structure.
Finally, the original model was altered to examine
the role of disparity of the income elasticities of the
individual taxes of a tax structure.

The new set of income

elasticities were e ^ « 1.5 and eg * 1.0, all else unchanged.
This structure had the same Initial system income elasticity
as the original model, although the individual tax
elasticities were much nearer each other in size.

After
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ten years of Income growth at

k

pe7*cent per* year, Kg rose

only to 1.27138* a 1.7 p e r c e n t Increase.

The less

disparate set of income elasticities in this variation of
the model led to a slower rate of change in the income
elasticity of the tax structure.
These models have demonstrated that the income
elasticity of a tax structure can vary over time, even
though the income elasticities of the individual taxes are
constant.

This demonstration and the accompanying analysis

constitute intuitive proof of the Upward Bound Elasticity
Theorem.

The model which follows applies this principle

to a tax structure similar to that of the state of Louisiana.
An Extended Example of the
Upward-Bound Elasticity Theorem
As indicated in an earlier paragraph, the income
elasticity of the tax structure can be expected to move in
the same direction as total personal income moves.

This

statement is true, regardless of the absolute size of the
individual tax elasticities, and regardless of their weights
in the tax structure, so long as they are positive and
unequal.

The impact of this statement will be demonstrated

in the following example.
This second model utilizes a structure of five tax
groups, each of which has a constant income elasticity.
initial conditions, while hypothetical, are similar in

The
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magnitude to those of the current Louisiana tax structure.
Let the current value of Total Personal Income be $10,000
million, and let that Income grow at a constant rate of 5
percent per year.

Let the tax structure be given by the

following table.

The current elasticity of this tax

structure is ego “

x 0.30 + 1.0 x 0.25 + 1.4 x 0.20

+ 0.8 x 0.15 + 0.7 x 0.10 * 0.72.

Thus the system is at

this point relatively inelastic.
In the next year, income will rise to $10,500
million.

The tax revenues are now $1036.

The details of

the revenue and share movements are to be found in the body
of Table 4.7*

Revenues rise by 3.6 percent while income

rises 5 percent; this simply shows the elasticity of the
Table 4.7
Initial Conditions For Model Two
Tax

^Income
Elasticity

Tax Revenue
x 109

Proportion of
Total Taxes

Severance tax

0.0

$ 300

0. 30

Sales tax

1.0

250

0.25

Income tax

1.4

200

0.20

Automotive taxes

0.8

150

0.15

100

0 .10
1.00

Sumptuary taxes
0.7
0 . 7 & 5
eS0
Source: Primary

TTR =

Ittt)
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structure to be 0.72, as shown abo’
/e.

The severance tax

already Is declining In share of total revenues.

The

elasticity of the overall tax structure Is now: eSj ■
0.0 x 0.250 + 1.0 x 0.266 + 1.4 x 0.234 + 0.8 x 0.152
+ 0.7 x 0.099 - 0.79.
Ten years Into the future tax revenues will have
grown to $1463.7, and the elasticity of the tax structure
will be esl0 * 0.0 x 0.205 + 1.0 x 0.278 + 1.4 x 0.269
+ 0.8 x 0.152 + 0.7 x 0.096 = 0.84.
The relatively Inelastic Automotive Tax group
gains slightly In its share of total tax revenues before
t * 10.

This Is so because this tax Is more elastic than

the system as a whole at that time.

Over time, or more

precisely, with income growth, this advantage will vanish,
and this group eventually declines in share.

Since the

system elasticity will exceed the Automotive Tax group
elasticity before ten years have passed in the above
example, Its share will have begun to decline at that point.
Of those taxes whose revenues vary with income, only the
Sumptuary Tax group revenues decline from the outset.

By

reasoning similar to that employed above, this must be due
to the fact that this tax group alone is less elastic than
the tax structure as a whole.
As can be seen in Table 4,8, this structure achieves
unitary income elasticity at t ■ 26, and that elasticity
will continue to grow.

This is so even though the income

elasticities of individual taxes did not change.

Another
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Table 4. c
Movement of Income Elasticity
of A Structure of
Five Taxes
Tax

I n c o m e T a x P r o p o r t i o n
Elasticity
Revenue
of Total
(X1C>9)
Taxes
t-0
0.0
1.0
1.4
0.8
0.7

Severance Tax
Sales Tax
Income Tax
Automotive Taxes
Sumptuary Taxes

ES0 -0.720

$ 300.0
250 .0
200.0
150 .0
100.0

0. 30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10

TTR-$1000.0

1.00

t= 1
Severance Tax
Sales Tax
Income Tax
Automotive Taxes
Sumptuary Taxes

0.0
1.0
1.4
0.8
0.7
ES1 *0.733

$ 300.0
262.5
214 .0
156.0
103-5

0.2896
0.2534
0.2066
0.1506
0.0999

TTR=$1036 .0

1.0000

$ 300.0
319-0
280 .6
182.5
118.7

0.2498
0.2657
0.2336

TTR=$1200.8

1.0000

$ 300.0
407-2
393-2
222.0
141.1

0.2050
0.2782
0.2688
0.1517

TTR*$1463•7

1.0000

t-5
Severance Tax
Sales Tax
Income Tax
Automotive Taxes
Sumptuary Taxes

0.0
1.0
1.4
0.8
0.7
*0.784

e S5!

0.1520
0.0989

t-10
Severance Tax
Sales Tax
Income Tax
Automotive Taxes
Sumptuary Taxes

0.0
1.0
1.4
0.8
0.7
eS 1 0 “ °-843

0.0964
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Table 4. 8 (Continued)

Tax

Income
Elasticity

Tax
Revenue
(X109)

Proportion
of Total
Taxes

t-20
Severance Tax
Sales Tax
Income Tax
Automotive Taxes
Sumptuary Taxes

0,0
1.0
1.4
0.8
0.7
es20-0.949

$ 300.0
663-3
773.9
328.7
199-9

0.2929
0.3417
0.1451
0.0879

TTR=$2265-0

1.0000

$ 300.0
846.6
1085.5
400.0
236.3

0.1046
0.2952
0.3785
0.1395
0.0824

TTR=$2868.4

1.0000

$ 300.0
888.9
1161.5
415-9
244.6

0.0994
0.2952
0.3858
0.1381
0.0812

TTR*$ 3010.9

1.0000

0.1325

t**25
Severance Tax
Sales Tax
Income Tax
Automotive Taxes
Sumptuary Taxes

0.0
1.0
1.4
0.8
0-7
eS25"°*994
t*26

Severance Tax
Sales Tax
Income Tax
Automotive Taxes
Sumptuary Taxes

0.0
1.0
1.4
0.8
0_*..7_
e S26*1 *°°3

S o u r c e : Primary
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of the important assumptions of this hypothetical example is
that no exogenous change, such as legislative action with
respect to tax bases and rates, occurs.

Thus the model

shows the smooth time path of an unchanging tax structure.
The increase in income elasticity which accompanies economic
growth would occur even if all taxes in the tax structure
were relatively income-inelastic, and if no incomeindependent revenues, such as the severance taxes, existed.
An Example of a Tax Structure
with Changing Individual Tax
Income Elasticities
The Upward-Bound Elasticity Theorem holds for a
structure of taxes whose income elasticities are non-nega
tive, unequal, and constant.

Vickrey's independence

assumption is not required, but his additive assumption is.7
The Louisiana tax structure does not meet these
requirements: the Income elasticities are not constant over
wide ranges of income.

This section will analyze changes In

the income elasticity of a tax structure, the individual
taxes of which have changing income elasticities.

This

prepares the way for practical application of the knowledge
previously gained concerning movements of tax structure
income elasticity.
The tax structure to be considered at this time
consists of six taxes and tax groups, to conform with the

^Vickrey, op. cit., p. 140.
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forecasting base used throughout this dissertation.
parameters of this model are in Table 4.9.

The

The initial

shares are the actual shares of the six taxes of the fore
casting base in fiscal 1973-74.

Under this proposed

structure, system elasticity will still move toward the
most elastic component as income rises; but the elasticities
of all components are slowly falling, largely the result of
progressive federal income taxation.

Thus the limit toward

which the system moves is itself declining.
has an initial income elasticity of 0.688.

This structure
Given a constant

rate of income increase of 10 percent per year, the elastic
ity of the tax structure rises slowly, peaking at £3 ■
1.2303 at t - 8 8 .
Table 4.9
Income Elasticity Movement, Changing
Elasticities of Individual Taxes
Initial Share
of
Tax Revenue
Severance Tax
Sales Tax
Income Tax
Automotive Tax
Sumptuary Tax
Other Taxes

Initial Income
Elasticity
0.0
1.0

.3063
.2667
.1323
.1379

0.8

.0780
.0788

0.7
0.9

1.4

Definition
of Elasticity
Change
none
£q *(1-.001 *t )
e0 *(l-.0 0 2 't)
e0 *(l-.0 0 1 't)
e0 *(1-.001 *t )
Cq•(1 -.0 0 1 *t )

Source: Primary
At the point of maximum system elasticity, the
individual Income elasticities are:
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Severance Tax
Sales Tax
Income Tax
Automotive Tax
Sumptuary Taxes
Other Taxes

0.0
0.9120
1.1536
0.7296
0.6384
0.8208

Thereafter Eg declines, reflecting the fact that Individual
tax elasticities are declining.

In fact, the largest

revenue producer has the fastest decreasing elasticity, at
the time elasticity peaks.

Variations of this model

suggest that faster income change and/or slower elasticity
decline lead to larger values for peak elasticity.
The importance of the model is this: the regressions
of tax revenues against the appropriate income and dummy
variables, as described In an earlier section, provide
estimates of the individual tax income elasticities and of
their rates of change.

Thus the model described here could

use the parameters as provided by the regressions, and show
the possible time path of the income elasticity of the
current Louisiana tax structure.
The chapter containing the revenue forecasts will
also forecast the time path of the income elasticity of
the Louisiana tax structure.

The forecasting method will

use the technique Just developed.

By combining reliable

estimates of elasticities and their rates of change with
the known current shares of revenues generated by the
respective taxes, the future path of the income elasticity
of Louisiana's tax structure can be charted.

It is obvious

that, given the appropriate estimates and parameters of

another tax structure, the future path of its income
elasticity can be predicted.

Thus the technique developed

here, to incorporate changing income elasticities into the
regression model, can be of value to other tax structures,
notably those of other states whose tax revenues are
predominately income-related.

C hapter 5

EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE TAX
REVENUE MODELS
It is the purpose of this chapter to test the models
developed in Chapter ^ .

The reader is first reminded of the

specific goals of this research.

The mechanics of the

regressions are explained in detail.

The models are then

tested to determine which will be used to produce the tax
revenue forecasts.

These forecasts appear in Chapter 6.

The results of the forecasting are discussed from three view
points: the future trend of tax revenues for the State of
Louisiana, possible alternative tax policies, and the proof
of the hypotheses presented in Chapter
This paragraph serves to remind the reader of the
two-fold Intent of the research undertaken here.

First,

the research is to provide Intermediate and long-run
(two to ten year horizon) estimates of the revenues of
certain taxes levied by the State of Louisiana, to provide
additional data for those individuals and agencies that
are responsible for the planning of the state's future
fiscal activities.

For longer-term estimates, if reliable

enough, will provide an extra measure of knowledge about
future revenues, and hence set the stage for determining
what the state can or cannot "afford" in terras of its
1U5
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offerings of public goods and services.

This Is more

Important for those state activities which require long
periods of time— two years to twenty years or more--to plan,
activate, and bring to fruition.

The second major purpose

Is to seek substantiation of the hypotheses proposed in
Chapter 4.

The first of these hypotheses was that as

income grows, the income elasticity of the tax structure
also grows; this is the so-called "Upward-Bound Elasticity
Theorem" of Chapter 4.

Evidence of the validity of this

hypothesis will be obtained by examining the statistical
significance of the revelant coefficients of the independent
variables of the regressions performed and analyzed in
later sections of this chapter.

By similar examination,

tests will confirm or deny the hypothesis of time-dependent
income elasticities of the individual taxes being modelled.
All models of the tax revenue functions were
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), a single
equation econometric technique.

OLS is appropriate in such

cases where the variable labelled as dependent has no
influence over the variables labelled independent.

This

implies that, for the tax revenue models, the amount of
tax revenue for a specific tax must have no influence over
the current level of income.
It seems unreasonable that a higher tax rate on
sales, alcohol, or tobacco would so alter spending habits
as to significantly alter the aggregate level of income.
Clearly, such tax rate changes could cause some economic
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dislocation, but the aggregate number of Jobs and level of
Income should be relatively unaffected.

The state income

tax rate could conceivably affect the level of income by
making Job opportunities in Louisiana more or less favorable
to opportunities elsewhere.

Thus a high income tax rate

might encourage Job seekers to go to neighboring states.

But

the income tax is only one influence on mobile Job seekers.
Certainly they should consider the entire tax burden, not
Just the income tax liability; and the tax burden itself
is probably a small influence over Job location.
The severance taxes perhaps have the greatest
potential for reverse causation.

Increased severance tax

revenues, rather than the result of higher incomes, may be
the cause of higher Incomes.

Since the petroleum industry

is such a large component of the state's employment and
Income, Its success, through multiplier effects, affects
the employment and income of the state.

This does not

create a need for simultaneous equations, since the revenues
of the severance taxes are not to be estimated by using
income as an independent variable.

Rather, severance tax

revenue estimates will be adapted from other sources.
Another cause for use of estimating methods other
than OLS would be that one tax influences the revenues of
another tax.

For the most part, these influences seem

negligible: how much would gasoline tax revenues rise or
fall if Corporate Franchise tax revenues rose by $1 million?
Certainly, some Interdependencies do exist: as vehicle
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license revenues rise, gasoline tax revenues will also.

As

alcoholic beverage dealer permits rise, so might alcoholic
beverage tax revenues.

These interdependencies have been

negated by the use of tax groups.

In most cases, taxes

dependent on one another are in the same tax group, so that
their revenues are treated as an aggregate and not as
individual tax revenues.

In this way, the use of OLS would

still be valid.
The models introduced in Chapter 4 were fitted by a
step-wise regression program which allowed the user to
"force" selected variables into or out of the regression.
The variable labels used are listed in Table 5.1.

The

particular package utilized in these and other regressions
of this dissertation was BMD-02R.1

The results of these

curve-fittings are given in the following paragraphs.
Before proceeding to the testing phase, some brief
mention of the criteria used to judge the empirical results
is necessary.

Use of

as a criterion for selecting

equations was of limited value, since all R^ values were
quite acceptable, with few falling below ,90.

Most Impor

tance was placed on the significance (t-values) of the
variables judged a priori and by the analysis of Chapter 4

iBMD Biomedical Computer Programs, W. J. Dixon,
editor.
University of California Press, 1974. BMD-02R
is the Stepwise Regression program and Is discussed on
pages 305-331 of this manual.
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Figure 5.1

List of Tax, Income, and Dummy Variables
Used in Regression Studies

Variable
Name

Variable
Description

LSAL

Base 10 logarithm of Sales Tax revenues in
103 dollars

LINC

Base 10 logarithm of Income Tax revenues in
103 dollars

LAUT

Base 10 logarithm of Automotive Tax Group
revenues in 1 0 3 dollars

LSUM

Base 10 logarithm of Sumptuary Tax Group
revenues in 103 dollars

LOTH

Base 10 logarithm of Other Taxes revenues in
103 dollars

LSR

Base 10

logarithm of Sales

tax rate

LGR

Base 10

logarithm Gasoline

tax rate

RPY

Real per capita income, in dollars, 1967 base

CPI

Consumer price index, in decimal value, 1967
base

POP

Louisiana population, in thousands

PCI

Louisiana per capita Income, in current dollars
PCI = RPY » CPI

TPI

Louisiana total personal Income in 103 dollars
TPI - PCI * POP

LRPY

Base 10

logarithm RPY

LCPI

Base 10

logarithm CPI

LPOP

Base 10

logarithm POP

LPCI

Base 10

logarithm PCI
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LTPI

(Continued)

Base 10 logarithm TPI

D1

Dummy variable * 1 for years prior to 1952,
after 1967 for significant general tax
changes; otherwise 0

D2

Dummy variable = 1 for years with wholesale
sales tax collections, otherwise 0

D3

Dummy variable for years of biennial license
collections = 1 for even years, 196*) and after

D*4

Dummy variable = 1 when federal income tax was
not deductible, otherwise 0

D5

Dummy variable = 1 after general withholding
instituted for income tax, otherwise 0

D6

Dummy variable = 1 when food and drugs exempt
from sales tax, otherwise 0

SD11

Dummy variable,

* LTPI

when D1 = 1,

otherwise 0

SD12

Dummy variable,

= LTPI

when D2 = 1,

otherwise 0

SD13

Dummy variable,

= LTPI

when D3 “ 1 *

otherwise 0

SD14

Dummy variable,

= LTPI

when D*J = 1,

otherwise 0

SD15

Dummy variable,

= LTPI

when D5 = 1,

otherwise 0

SD16

Dummy variable,

= LTPI

when D6 = 1,

otherwise 0

SD21

Dummy variable,

= LPCI

when D1 = 1,

otherwise 0

SD22

Dummy variable,

= LPCI

when D2 = 1,

otherwise 0

SD2 3

Dummy variable,

= LPCI

when D3 “ 1,

otherwise 0

SD2*l

Dumrv variable,

= LPCI

when D*l = 1,

otherwise 0

SD25

Dummy variable,

= LPCI

when D5 = 1,

otherwise 0

SD26

Dummy variable,

» LPCI

when D6 * 1,

otherwise 0

SD31

Dummy variable,

» LPOP

when D1 = 1,

otherwise 0

SD32

Dummy variable,

- LPOP

when D2 - 1,

otherwise 0
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(Continued)

SD33

Dummy variable, = LPOP when D3 = 1

otherwise 0

SD3U

Dummy variable, = LPOP when DU

-

1

otherwise 0

SD35

Dummy variable, = LPOP when D5

=

1

otherwise 0

SD36

Dummy variable, = LPOP when D6 = 1

otherwise 0

SDUl

Dummy variable, = LRPY when D1 = 1

otherwise 0

SDU2

Dummy variable, = LRPY when D2

=

1

otherwise 0

SDU3

Dummy variable, - LRPY when D3

=

1

otherwise 0

SDUU

Dummy variable, = LRPY when DU = 1

otherwise 0

SDU5

Dummy variable, = LRPY when D5

1

otherwise 0

SDU6

Dummy variable, = LRPY when D 6 = 1

otherwise 0

SD51

Dummy variable, = LCPI when D1 = 1

otherwise 0

SD52

Dummy variable, = LCPI when D2

=

1

otherwise 0

SD53

Dummy variable, = LCPI when D3

=

1

otherwise 0

SD5U

Dummy variable, = LCPI when DU

=

1

otherwise 0

SD55

Dummy variable, = LCPI when D5

=

1

otherwise 0

SD56

Dummy variable, = LCPI when D6

YT1

Product of LTPI and t, where t = calendar year
at beginning of fiscal year

YT2

Product of LPCI and t

YT3

Product of LRPY and t

PT1

Product of LPOP and t

PT2

Product of LCPI and t

XT1

Product of LTPI and (k- t ) , where k = 3000, an
arbltrary constant

-

1, otherwise 0
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to be Important to the model structure.

Thus an equation

with a very high R2 , but with an insignificant income
relationship, would have a low chance of being selected as
the estimating equation.

Although no specific criteria were

used, there was a tendency to require higher levels of sig
nificance (a ■ .01 or .02) of the variables Judged more im
portant; less essential variables were subject to less
stringent tests (a * .05 or .10).
Among empirical results roughly equal in quality
according to the partially subjective tests above, prefer
ence was given to results with smaller standard errors.

A

standard error of 1.0 represents an order of magnitude,
since the models are log-linear.

Thus a calculated stand

ard error of 0.25 would build a 2o confidence interval, the
upper and lower ends of which were an order of magnitude
apart.
SALES TAX MODEL SELECTION
In Chapter 4, several models of sales tax revenue
generation were considered.

Those models, with the

appropriate regression equations, are shown below.

The

paragraphs which follow describe the process by which these
models and certain variations of them were used to arrive
at the best model of the sales tax revenue function.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the respec
tive coefficients.

The first sales tax model was

TRsal “ rsa -TPIbt

(4.16)
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LSAL * .68154 LSR + .00046 YT1

(.03127 )

(.00000 )
R2 = 1.0000

C5 -1)

The average deviation of the residuals of this equation
was 0.0137, or approximately 3.2 percent of sales tax
collections.

The extremely large R2 value was generated by

the origin force, as this model has no constant term or
intercept.

Thus an "uncorrected" R2 value is presented.

The residuals of this regression appeared to follow a
cyclical pattern, with turning points in 1956, 1 9 6 1 , and
1966.

No explanation of this possibly autocorrelated

phenomenon is provided.
The second model explaining sales tax revenues was
TR

sal

* ra. rppibt+cD2+dD6.10eD2.xofD^
s

LSAL =.56096 LSR
(.13885)

+ .00045 YT1
(.00002)

(4.18)

- .09096 SD12
(.09367)

+ .45035 SD16 + .63874 D2 - 3.15257 D6
(.21367)
(.64298)
(1.5 1 2 6 3 )
R2 = 1.0000

(5.2)

Neither SD12 nor D2 were significant; repeating the
computations without these variables produced the regression
LSAL

=.61456 LSR
(.07544)

+ .00045 YT1
(.00001)

- 2.42303 D6
(1.40276)

+ .34399 SD16
(.19764)
R2 * 1.0000

(5.3)

which was the best fit of the model
TRsal * r3a *TPIbt+cD6*10dD6

(5.4)

This equation has an income elasticity which grows slowly
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over time, and which is shifted {upward) by the food and
drug exemption.

The residuals followed a pattern similar

to that described in equation 5*1 above.
Regressing sales tax revenues against the sales tax
rate, total personal income, and the two dummy variables
D2 and D6 produced no improvement; the coefficient of D2
was not significant.
TRSai = rsa -TPIbt+cD6*10dD2*10eD6

(5-5)

resulted in the regression equation
LSAL

-

.50468 LSR + .00044 YT1+ .01456 D2
{.12601)
(.00002)
(.01340)

- 2.62365 D6 + .37531 SD16
(1.40922)
(.19893)

R2 = 1.0000

(5.6)

The third sales tax model was
TRsal = rsa -Abt*TPIc+dD2+eD6*10fD2*10&D6
LSAL

(4.21)

= 1.06019 LSR + 1.00327 LTPI + .31946SD16
(.08474)
(.02144)
(.19715)
- 2.33014 D6
(1.39908)
R2 * 1.0000

The failure of thevariable
suggests thatthe term

Abtis

t to appear in

(5.7)
equation 5.7

in reality constant.2

Neither

dummy variable associated with wholesale collections
appeared.

Thus the results shown in equation 5-7 were

2The variables t, SD12, and D2 were not admitted
by the regression algorTthm; the F value of the regression
could not be improved by .00001.
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for the model
TRsal “ rsa *TPIb+eD6*10dD6

(5.8)

The coefficient of SD16 suggested that the income elastic
ity of the sales tax rises from 1.00327 to
ey * 1.00327 + .31946
* 1.3227,
with the exemption of food and drugs from the tax.

Since

the elasticity shift coefficient was not highly significant
(t * 1.6204), this model was tested:
TRsal

" rga *TPIb *iodD6

(5-9)

It generated the regression fit
LSAL = 1.07512 LSR + 1.00705 LTPI
(.08717)
(.02205)

- 0.06346 D6
(.02587)

R2 = 1.0000

(5.10)

In this model, income elasticity is a constant, at approx
imately unit value.

The exemption of food and drugs causes

a downward shift in revenues of approximately 16 percent
(antilog of .06346).
A final variation of equation 4.21 deleted all
dummy variables, but retained the constant:
TRsai

- A*rsa 'TPIb

(5.11)

The regression fit for this model was
LSAL = -0.61220 + 0.71476 LSR +1.00704 LTPI
(.07383)
(.02203)
R2 = .9954

(5.12)

This comparatively naive model displayed a rate elasticity
of 0.71476, which as expected was less

than unity.

The
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equation also displayed an Income elasticity of 1.00704,
or approximately unity.

The absolute deviation of the

residuals was .0132, or approximately 3 percent of sales tax
receipts.
All models above used total personal income as the
income measure.
variations.

These models were transformed into two

First, total personal income was replaced by

per capita income and population.

Second, total personal

income was replaced by real per capita Income, consumer
price index, and population.
Varying the model of equation 5.11 to use the set
of Income variables PCI— POP resulted In the regression
LSAL = - .72275 + .72794 LSR + .98683 LPCI
(.10791)
(.12041)
+ 1.06367 LPOP
(.33224)
R2 = .9955
A slightly more
TRsal

(5.13)

sophisticated model;
= r3a -A*PCIb+cD6-POPd+eD6

(5.14)

was attempted, but the variable representing the coef
ficient e was not admitted by the regression.

The resulting

fit was
LSAL * - 1.21648 + .73484 LSR + 1.41919 LPCI
(.11618)
(2.28257)
+ .98882 LPOP - .00003 SD26
(.52074)
(.00016)
R2 » .9958
Neither LPCI nor SD26 were significant.

(5.15)
Other models

utilizing the pair of variables PCI— POP, and all models
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utilizing RPY— CPI— POP, were of little value.
equations tested had very high

While all

values and P values, those

equations including RPY, CPI, and POP as the primary set of
independent variables had a marked tendency to show no sig
nificant relationship of sales tax revenues to the income
measure.

Further, the sales tax rate was frequently not

admitted by the stepwise regression, even though program
tolerances were set to encourage additional variables to
be introduced.

Finally, as the number of variables present

was increased, there was a tendency for the significance of
coefficients to decline and for standard errors to increase.
This final problem was undoubtedly due to increased multicollinearity.
In summarizing the sales tax equation selection
process, it was noted that the dummy variable D2 and its
related slope-shift variables were seldom significant.

The

variable D6 and the related slope-shift variables were
typically significant.
but not D2.

Thus the best model included D6,

The tax rate variable was generally signifi

cant, so it was included in the model selected.

In choosing

the variable (or set of variables) which represented
income, there was some evidence that using the measure TPI
led to more credible results than did the use of (1) PCI
and POP, or (2) RPY, CPI, and POP.

The final decision for

this model selection concerned the type of time-dependent
elasticity.

The best results were found in elasticities

which increased linearly over time.

Thus the preferred
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sales tax model was that of equation 5.4
TRsal * r3a-TPIbt+cD6*10dD6

(5-4)

INCOME TAX MODEL SELECTION
The paragraphs which follow outline the results of
testing the income tax revenue generating models of Chapter
4, and variations thereof.

The empirical results of all

three models 4.22-4.24 were similar in that the use of both
revenue shift and elasticity shift dummy variables rendered
most coefficients nonsignificant.
models were formulated.

Therefore, some simpler

The first of these utilized only

the revenue shift dummy variables in a variation of
equation 4.24.

This implied that the effect on income

elasticity of removing the deduction for Federal income
taxes paid was negligible.

The model tested was

TRinc “ A*TPia+bt.iocD4.i0dD5

(5.16)

LINC = - 15.8827 + 1.72453 LTPI - .00237 YT1
(.93270)
(.00403)
+ .21592 D5 + .47468 D4
(.15420)
(.10951)
R2 = .9680

(5.17)

The coefficient of LTPI was 1.72, but the income
elasticity is the exponent a+b_t, which was, for the year
1975,
ey - 1.72453 - .00237 (1975)
- 1.72453 - 4.68075
- - 2.95622
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This result carried little weight since the coefficient of
YT1 was not significant.
Fitting the model of equation 5-17 resulted in the
variable YT1 not being significant. This would imply that the
coefficient b of the exponent a+bt was zero.

Dropping the

non-significant variable resulted in the simplified model
TRinc * A*TFIa *10bDi| *10cD5

(5.18)

This formulation assumed that the secular decline in income
elasticity discussed in Chapter 4 was not a significant
magnitude.

Equation 5.18 was thus a model of constant

income elasticity.

The regression results for this equation

were
LXNC « - 3.38874 + 1.17608 LTPI + 0.20889 D4
(.11884)

(.04704)

+ .06604 D5
(.04596)
R2 = .9671
All coefficients were highly significant.

(5.19)
The elimination

of YT1 from equation 5.17 did not significantly reduce the
of the relationship.
Altering the form in which the variables D4 and D5
appeared generated the model
TRinc “ A-TPIa+bDi,+cD5

(5.20)

This equation assumed that the revenue shifts accompanying
the variables D4 and D5 were not significant features.
LINC * - 3.30053 + 1.16263 LTPI + 0.02947 SD14
(.12109)
(.00658)
0.01034 SD15

(.00677)

R2 - .9675

(5.21)
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All coefficients were significant.

Surveying the

equations 5.19 and 5.21, it appeared that the shifts which
occurred in 1964 and 1970 were both significant, but the
form in which they should be modelled was left ambiguous.
Variations of equation 4.23 were tested in a similar
manner.

The most important such model was
TRinc “ A-TFI3^ - ^ •10bE)iK10cD5

(5.22)

The dummy variables shift the revenue function, but do not
alter the income elasticity.

This reformulation produced a

much better fit than did equation 4.23:
LINC » - 5.47984 + .00143 XT1 + .20755 D4
(.00014)
(.04685)
+ .08303 D5
(.04434)
R2 - .9674

(5.23)

All variables were significant at a * .01 or .02; the R^
value was acceptable.
The income elasticity of this model declines slowly
over time.

In 1975, that elasticity would be

ey = .00143 (3000-1975)
= 1.4658
Omitting the elasticity shift variables from
equation 4.24 left the equation
TRinc * A*PCIa+b^ .popc+dt.ioeD4.iQeD5^

(5.24)

but the resulting regression showed the coefficient of
D5 nonsignificant, and showed large standard errors for the
coefficients of LPCI and LPOP.

Omitting the nonsignificant
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D5 left
TRinc “ A*PCIa+bt*POPc+dt*10eDl4 ,

C5 *25 )

which gave the following result:
LINC - - 22.015 - 2.51198 LPCI + 6.269*15 LPOP
(1.12715)
(4.42164)
+ .12523 YT2 - .11057 PT1 + .33512 D4
(.0*4351)
(.04510)
(.08840)
R2 = .9840
To determine the income elasticity

of

(5.26)

this result, note

that the partial elasticities (for fiscal 1975) were
e?Ci - - 2.51198 + .12523-1975
« 244.81925
and

Epop = 6.26945 - .11057*1975
■ - 212.1142

Letting

and g£ assume their historical averages of 9

percent and 1.5 percent, then the total income elasticity is
r

_ .09*244.82 - .015*212.11

y

.09 + .015
« 30.30

This clearly unreasonable result was undoubtedly due to the
increased standard errors of the coefficients of LPCI and
LPOP.

The true values of the parameters estimated by

equation 5.25 could conceivably have quite a wide range:
from .258 to 4.766 for LPCI, and from - 2.574 to 15.113
for LPOP (using the estimate plus or minus two standard
errors as an approximate measure).

Once again, the problem

of multicollinearity has reduced the value of the regressions.
In fitting such variations as
TRlnc * A*PCIat*POPb *10cDi|*10dD5

(5.27)

162

and

TRinc * A* PCIat+bDl*+cD5 •POPd

(5.28)

the results, as determined by a stepwise regression, did
not admit the variable PT2, which is associated with the
coefficient a.

Finally, the model

A*PCIa -P0Pb *10cDit-10dD5

(5.29)

generated the result
LINC = 2.81858 + 1.84400 LPCI - 1.21981 LPOP
(.27118)
(.90289)
+ .15978 D4 + .10292 D5
(.04547)
(.04292)
R2 - .9754

(5.30)

However, this model contains no provision for the shift or
time path of the elasticities with respect to per capita
income and population.
to the other models.

The formulation is thus inferior
Since the coefficient of LPOP is not

significant, and since the R

2

value is not greatly larger

than that of other models, this result will not be retained.
In testing models of the income tax revenue function
using the set of income variables RPY— CPI— POP, few
usable results were obtained.

In order to build meaningful

models, as many as ten or twelve Independent variables had
to be Included; but those variables caused so much multicollinearity that very few variables emerged significant.
There were several cases of very unreasonable coefficients,
and of coefficients of perverse sign.

An example of these

unreasonable results was
TFL
me

«

a

*RPYat+eD4+PD5.cPIbt+g D 5 .popct+hD5.iodD4
(5.31)
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The resulting regression was
LINC - - 20.575^9 - .00115 YT3 - .00284 PT2
(.00084)
C.00114)
+ .00468 PT1 + 1.16107 SD35 + .79173 SD44
(.00165)
(1.44174)
(2.11862)
+ 6.96142 SD45 - .98999 SD55 + .06340 D4
(2.17376)
(1.35611)
(.17443)
(5.32)
(5

R2 - .9859
As can be observed, most of the slope-shift variables

(SD35* SD44, and SD55) were not significant; the standard
errors were far too large to generate usable results.
In summary, the various models of the income tax
revenue function using income measure TPI

proved more

reliable than either (1) PCI and POP or (2) RPY, CPI and
POP.

The latter two forms often resulted in regression

fits in which estimated coefficients had perverse signs and
large (greater than unity) standard errors.

The dummy

variables D4 and D5 were generally both significant.

The

time-dependent elasticities were generally nonsignificant.
The model with the combination of best fit and most
reasonable coefficients was
TRlnc - A*TPia+bD4+cD5
which is the model of the fit shown In equation 5.21.

(5.20)
An

alternative equation had a slightly smaller R2 and generally
smaller t-values, but modelled a declining income elasticity.
This equation was thus preferred a priori and by the
analysis of Chapter 4.

The model in question was

TRlnc * A - T P I ^ k - t ) - i o bDi,-10cD5

(5 .2 2 )
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AUTOMOTIVE TAX GROUP
MODEL SELECTION

In Chapter 4, various models of revenue generation
for this tax group were proposed.

Those models, and

important variants of them, gave the empirical results which
follow.
In testing equation 4.25, the coefficient of LTPI
was not significant, and its standard error quite large.
Income elasticity showed a tendency to rise over time in
this relationship.

This led to the formulation of an

alternative model, omitting the constant term c In the
exponent of T P I :
TRaut

=

r s a * rg b

LAUT = -

■TPIdt+eD3.10^03

.10817 LSR
(.03903)

+

(5-33)

.44533 LGR + .00039 YT1

(.07823)

(•00001)

- .60929 D3 + .08323 SD13
(.48402)
(.06953)
R2 = 1.0000

(5-34)

The second automotive tax group revenue function
presented in Chapter 4 was
TRaut " A-rga*TPIb+ct+dD3-lOeD3,

(4.26)

which generated the empirical equation

LAUT - 1.62129 + .*14*149 LGR - 1.70347 LTPI
(.06420)
(1.25629)
+

.00116 YT1 - .48162 D3+ .06524 SD13
(.00057)
(.43935)
(.06303)
R2 = .9960

This equation estimates ey to be
ey - - 1.70347 + .001l6t + .06524.

(5.35)
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For fiscal 1975, this would be
ey = - 1.70347 + .00116-1975 + .06524
* - 1.70347 + 2.291 + .06524
- 0.65277
Here too, the elasticity displays a slow upward trend.
The standard error of the LTPI coefficient Is quite large,
and neither dummy variable Is significant.
Deleting the elasticity shift effect of D3 left the
model
TRaut * A-rga *TPIb+ct-10eD3

(5.36)

LAUT - 1.33489 + .46230 LGR - 1.31985 LTPI

(.06196)

(1.20242)

+ .00098 YT1 - .02692 D3
(.00055)
(.00722 )
r2 = .9958

(5.37)

Equation 5.37 estimates the income elasticity of the
automotive tax group to be
e ■ - 1.31985 + .00098 *t
J
This elasticity rises slowly over time.

For fiscal 1975,

this would result in
ey - - 1.31985 + .00098*1975
= - 1.31985 + 1.93550
= .61565
Still, the coefficient b was not significant.

This suggested

that an improved equation could be formulated as
(5.38)
LAUT - .33559 + .44764 LGR + .00038 YT1 - .02621 D3
(.0 6 0 7 8 )
(.00 0 0 1 )
(.0 0 7 2 2 )
R2 - .9956

(5.39
(5.39)
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The R2 value was not significantly lower than in 5-35 or
5-37.

All coefficients were significant; standard errors

were small.

This result indicated that income elasticity

would b e , in 1975
£y » .00038*1975
- .75050
Substituting the pair of variables PCI— POP for
TPI in 5.40 generated the model
TRaut “ A*rga *PCIb t *P0Pct*10dD3

(5-40)

LAUT - - 0.07687 + 0.50756 LGR - 0.02721 D3
(.08914)
(.00733)
+ .00035 YT2 + .00049 PT1
(.00004)
(.00012)
R2 = .9958

(5.41)

The income elasticity exhibited by this model was, for 1975
ey - £1 ‘Bl + £2*S2
81 + 62

_ (.00035-1975)'.09 + (.00049*1975)*.015
.09 + .015
= -07673
.115
= .667
The following model of the automotive tax group
revenue function utilized the set of income variables
RPY— CPI— POP.

It was constructed on the same theoretical

considerations as equations 5.38 and 5.40.
TRaut “ A.rga*RPYbt.cPIct.popdt.ioeD3

(5.42)
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LAUT * -0.114 35 + 0.50669 LGR + 0.00036 YT3
C.09131)
(.00008)
+ 0.00033 PT2 + 0,00048 PT1 - 0.02766 D3
(.00 0 0 8 )
(.00013)
(.00776)
R2 * .9957

(5.43)
p
While all coefficients were highly significant, the R value
showed no improvement over either of the comparable models,
the results of which were shown in equations 5.39 and 5.41.
In all of the automotive tax group revenue models considered
above the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to the gaso
line tax rate varied little: the range of estimates was
0.43811 to 0.55202.

This estimate is perhaps more inelastic

than previously suspected.
In estimating the coefficients of the various models
for this tax group, the gasoline tax rate was generally a
significant variable, as was the dummy variable D3.

The

income measure TPI was not the only one capable of producing
credible results.

The following equations adequately

modelled the revenue function of the automotive tax group.
* r a .r b ,rppjdt+eD3. iofD3
®
O

(5.33)

TRaut = A*r D a * T P I c t *10eD3
TRaut - A-r„a *PCIb t *POPct*10dD3

(5.38)

TRaut

g

(5.40)

All three models displayed an increasing Income elasticity.
Equation 5.33 was preferred to the others on the basis of
the inclusion of an additional significant independent
variable, the sales tax rate.
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SU MP TU AR Y TAX GROUP
M OD EL SELEC T IO N

The models suggested by equations 4.27 and 4.28 and
variations thereof were empirically tested.
are shown in the paragraphs below.

The results

Equations 5.44 shows the

regression which best fitted the model of equation 4.27.
LSUM = 2.81813 - 2.41347 LTPI + 0.00137 YT1

(2.19216)

(.35624)

-0.16892 D1 + 0.02847 SD11
(.35624)
(.05294)
R2 = .9853

(5.44)

None of the independent variables were significant.
Dropping the slope-shift variable SD11 from equation
4.27 left the model
TR„£) Lull - A-TPIa+bt-10cD1

(5.45)

LSUM = 5.32637 + 0.33816 LTPI + 0.00116 YT1
(.21806 )
(.00086 )
+ 0.05097 D1
(.01911)
R2 - .9838

(5.46)

While all coefficients were significant at a = .10, further
improvements were desired.

Since the coefficient of YT1 was

positive, the regression indicated that income elasticity
was rising.

An increasing income elasticity could also be

modelled by the equation
TRsum

“ A*TPIb t *10cD1

(5.47)

LSUM - 0.90209 + 0.00029 YT1 + 0.02037 D1
(.00001)
(.00755)
R 2 - .9844

(5.48)
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The regression results for equation 4.28 displayed
problems similar to those of 5.44: large standard errors
and nonsignificant variables.

Thus a simpler model was

constructed, which omitted the elasticity shift variable
associated with Dl.

This model was

TRsum " A*TPIa (k-t) *10bD1

(5.49)

LSUM * - .83081 + .00079 XT1 + .01752 Dl

(.0 0 0 0 2 )

(.00 825 )

R2 - .9815

(5.50)

was the best regression fit of this model.
Equations modelled after the PCI— POP and RPY—
CPI— POP sets of Income variables were generally unsatis
factory in that the standard errors were much larger due to
increased multi-collinearity.
The income measure TPI was the only one to provide
credible results for the Sumptuary Tax Group.
variable Dl was generally significant.

The dummy

Thus adequate

results were obtained from two equations.

Equation 5.47

had the higher R2 and P values of the two.
TRgum * A-TPIbt*10cD1

(5.47)

Equation 5*49
TRgiuIi " A-TPiaCk-t >•l0bD1

(5.49)

although it had a lower R2 and lower t-values, was also
chosen.

This latter explicitly modelled a declining Income

elasticity, which the analysis of Chapter 4 indicated was
the preferred form of elasticity movement.
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OTHER TAXES M O D E L SELECTION

Two models of the relationship between income and
this residual tax group were presented in Chapter
equations 4.29 and 4.30.

The first model

TRoth * A*TPIa+bt

(4.29)

generated the regression
LOTH - 4.05818 - 8.51953 LTPI + .00438 YT1
(3.57217)
(.00162)
R2 = .9780

(5.51)

The standard error and the coefficient of LTPI both seem
much too large.

Since income elasticity of this model was

increasing, the following model was tested:
T^oth

"A-TPlbt

(5.52)

LOTH - - 2.19238 + .00051 YT1
(.00002)
R2 « .9725

(5.53)

Income elasticity of this model would be, in 1975
ey - .00051*1975
- 1.007
A variation of equation 5.52, using the Independent variables
PCI— POP, was tested:
TRoth

“A*PCIat*P0Pbt

(5.54)

LOTH - 5.79987 + .00023 YT2 + .00129 PT1
(.00007)
(.00021)
R2 - .9831

(5.55)

The regression results for equation 4,30 exhibited
very large standard errors, and were discarded.

A slightly
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simpler equation related to that model was then tested:
TRoth

" A - P C i a . P 0 Pb

(5.56)

LOTH * - 7.5^313 + .58734 LPCI + 2.9050 LPOP
(.13681)
(.45033)
R 2 = .9829

(5.57)

This equation had an R2 no higher, and standard errors
considerably larger, than those of equation 5.55.
The additive form (a+bt) of time-dependent elastic
ity did not behave well; neither did equations utilizing
the independent variable set RPY — CPI--POP.

Of the

remaining equations, the most reasonable results were
obtained from 5-52 and its related form 5-54.

Of these,

equation 5.52 had the higher t-values.
T R 0 th

" A-TPIbt

(5.52)

TRoth

* A-PCiat.popbt

(5.54)

The equations outlined above are used in the
following chapter to formulate estimates of future revenues
of each of the taxes and tax groups.

These estimates are

aggregated to obtain an estimate of total tax revenues.

The

selected regression equations and their resulting estimates,
are used to analyze the time trend in the income elasticity
of the tax structure of the State of Louisiana.
SUMMARY
A large number of alternative models have been
examined for each of the five taxes and tax groups.
following paragraphs present the equations, chosen to

The
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model the revenue generating processes of the nonseverance
taxes.
Sales tax revenues were best modelled by equation
5.4, which displayed an Increasing Income elasticity.
Modelling Income tax revenues proved more troublesome.

The

best fit, equation 5 .20, displayed a constant Income elas
ticity.

Equation 5-22 was slightly lower In quality of fit,

but displayed a declining, and hence preferred, income elas
ticity.

Equation 5.33 was chosen to model automotive tax

group revenues.

The sumptuary tax group modelling process

posed a problem similar to that noted in choosing an income
tax model.

The best fit was found in equation 5.47, but a

slightly lower quality fit was found in a preferred formula
tion, equation 5.49.

Finally, the best model of the

residual group Other Taxes was equation 5.52.
Thus the equations chosen to model nonseverance tax
revenues were
1.

TRsal

- r sa •TPIbb+c^ •10^ ^

(5.4)

2 (a). TRinc - A ,T P Ia +bD4+cD5
A .TPIa(k-t).iobD**.10cD5
2 (b). TR.
inc
r * * r b .TPIct+dD3.10eD3
3.
TRaut
3
S
4(a). TRsum - A-TPIbt*10cD1

(5.47)

4(b). TRsum se A-TPIaCk_t)*10bD1

(5.49)

5.

A * T P I bt
TRoth -

(5 .20)
(5.22)
(5.33)

(5.52)

Chapter 6
FORECASTS AND SUMMARY
In Chapter

various models of tax revenue genera

tion were hypothesized.

In Chapter 5, those models and many

variations of them were tested.

The summary of the previous

chapter presented several equations, at least one for each
tax and tax group, selected as best fits for the various
models of tax revenue generation.
One purpose of this chapter is to utilize those
regression equations to forecast future levels of revenues
generated by each of those models.
stages.

This is done in two

First, the values of the independent variables are

projected.

Several time series of future levels of the

independent variables are prepared.

Each series explicitly

makes a different set of assumptions regarding the time
trend of real per capita income growth, population growth,
and inflation.

These projections are substituted into the

regression equations to project future tax revenues.

For

those models in which a tax rate or tax base variable was
present, forecasts are presented to illustrate the impact
of a policy decision to alter that tax rate or base.
The coefficients of the equations recommended in
Chapter 5 do more than enable the forecasting mechanism.
They provide empirical measures of the income elasticities
173
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of the various taxes and tax groups.

The form of these

elasticities and their values are used to predict the time
path of the income elasticity of the Louisiana tax structure.
This chapter concludes by summarizing the major
contributions of the dissertation, which are four in
number.
1.

The development of an improved methodology for
long-range forecasting of state tax revenues.

2.

The development of the Upward-Bound Elasticity
Theorem.

3.

The use of that methodology and theorem to
produce estimates of individual tax revenues
and total tax revenues.

4.

The suggestion that the income elasticity of
the tax structure of the State of Louisiana
is increasing slowly, to exceed unity in
approximately ten years.
PROJECTING THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Forecasts of tax revenues rely in turn on forecasts
of the values of the variables which determine those
revenues: total personal income (TPI), per capita income
(PCI), real per capita income (RPY), consumer price index
(CPI), and population (POP).

The first need is to generate

some hypothetical future values for the basic variables
RPY, CPI, and POP.

Since this dissertation rests largely

on functions which grow according to power formulae
(growth in the manner of compounding interest) these
hypothetical values in turn must be derived from estimates
of future growth rates of these variables.

175

That is, given the present values of RPY, CPI, and
POP, and assuming a set of future growth rates for each
variable, future values of all variables TPI, PCI, RPY, CPI
POP, are obtained.

These values, mapped through the regres

sion functions selected for forecasts, generate revenue
estimates for the various taxes under consideration.
On the following pages are found, first, alternate
time series for each of the three variables RPY, CPI, and
POP, reflecting different future growth rates for those
variables; second, different combinations of growth patterns
of these three variables, producing different scenarios
of growth in TPI.
Tables 6.1 through 6.3 contain the extrapolations of
the values of the Independent variables RPY, CPI, and POP.
Table 6.4 contains selected sets of extrapolations for the
independent variable TPI.

Table 6.1 contains seven possible

growth paths for real per capita income; entries are in 1967
dollars.

Each series represents a different long term

growth rate for the independent variable.

For each series,

it Is assumed that RPY falls 1 percent in 1974, 4 percent in
1975; that income rises 2 percent in 1976, 4.5 percent in
1977; and that the growth rate declines over three years
time to the limiting value indicated in the column subhead.
Table 6.2 contains four possible sequences for the
consumer price index, 1967 base; each series assumes a
different long term rate of inflation.

Each sequence assumes
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inflation to 1977 at rates forecast by the Federal Budget
Team.1

Inflation is then assumed to decline steadily until

the limiting value indicated by the column subhead is
reached.

Table 6.3 provides seven possible time paths for

the state’s population.

Each series is based on a different

assumption regarding long-term population growth.

Series

1 and 2 each assume a long-term annual growth rate of 0.6
percent.

That limiting value is reached in five years time

in Series 1, three years time in Series 2.

Similar state

ments hold for Series 3 and 4.
Table 6.4 contains five representative time paths
of total personal Income, which is the product of RPY, CPI,
and POP.

Thus different combinations of the three latter

variables generate different paths for total personal income.
The three-digit descriptor for each series indicates (1)
which RPY series was chosen, (2) which CPI series was
chosen, and (3) which POP series was chosen.

Thus income

path 3-3-5 is built from the third series of RPY extrap
olations, the third series of CPI extrapolations, and the
fifth population growth pattern.

Of all possible combina

tions of the RPY, CPI, and POP series, Income path 1-1-1
represents the most conservative foreseeable growth in TPI.
Income path 6-1-7 approximates the same average growth rates

1"Economic Premises Are Given that Back Revenue
Estimates," Wall Street Journal, February 4, 1975, p. 4.
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as pertained over the time period studied, 1948-1974.
Income path 3-3-5 assumes the same average growth rates as
obtained during the period 1969-1974.

Income path 5-4-3

assumes moderate real growth, substantial inflation, and
slow population growth; these values are thought to be
reasonable estimates of future growth rates in Louisiana.
Income path 7-4-7 represents the largest foreseeable growth
rates In the variables RPY, CPI, and POP.
Table

6.1

A c t u a l 3- a n d P r o j e c t e d V a l u e s o f
Real Per C a p i t a I n c o m e (RPY)

1971-1985

m ------ ur—

nr~rwr—

m ----- rrr— m

A n n u a l G r o w t h R a t e of R P Y

Year

1 .0%

1.5%

2 .0%

2.3%

2.5%

3.0%

3.7%

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

$2722
2 845
2953
2923
2807
2863
2991
3081
3127
3159
3190
3222
3254
3287
3320

$2722
2845
2953
2923
2807
2863
2991
3097
3174
3221
3270
3319
3368
3419
3470

$2722
2845
2953
2923
2807
2863
2991
3097
3174
3237
3302
3368
3435
3504
3574

$2722
2845
2953
2923
2807
2863
2991
3105
3201
3275
3350
3427
3506
3587
3667

$2722
2845
2953
2923
2807
2863
2991
3105
3201
3281
3363
3448
3534
3622
3713

$2722
2845
2953
2923
2807
2863
2991
3111
3220
3317
3416
3519
3664
3733
3845

$2722
2845
2953
2923
2807
2863
2991
3117
3239
3359
3483
3612
3745
3884
4028

a A c tual v a l u e s for 1971-73 are c a l c u l a t e d f r o m p e r
c a p i t a i n c o m e v a l u e s in S t a t i s t i c s o f the D e v e l o p i n g S o u t h ,
F e d e r a l R e s e r v e Ba n k o f A t l a n t a , p,
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Tab1e 6.2
Actuala and Projected Values of
Consumer Price Index
1971-1985

-------------- m -------Year
1971
1972
1973
197^
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

ttt ~—

— n v ------ ~ n r r

Inflation rate, in percent per year
3.0
^,0__________ 5.0__________ 6 .0
121.3
125.3
133.1
147-7
164.if
177.3
189.0
198.8
206.9
214. 4
220.8
227.4
234. 3
241. 3
248.5

121.3
125.3
133.1
147.7
164. 4
177.3
189 .0
199.8
206 .9
215.2
224 .8
232.8
242.1
251.8
261.8

121.3
125. 3
133.1
147.7
164 .4
177.3
189.0
199.8
208. 7
219-2
230.1
241.6
253.7
266.4
279-7

aActual values for 1971-1974 are from Federal
Reserve Bulletin January, 1976, p. A53.

121.3
125.3
133.1
147.1
164.4
177.3
189.0
200. 3
212.3
225.1
236.2
248.2
260 .6
273.6
287. 3
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Table 6.3
Actuala and Projected Values of Population
of State of Louisiana
1971-1985
(population In thousands)

Year

{1 )
(5)
percent per year
Popiillation (Irowth Rate, in ]
0 .66
0 .6C
1.1
0 .8C
0 .8b
0.9

1971
1972
1973
197**
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
198*1
1985

3693
3738
376*1
3802
3836
3867
389*1
3917
39*10
396*1
3988
*1012
*1036
*1060
*108*1

3693
3738
376*1
3738
3809
3832
3855
3878
3902
3925
39*19
3972
3996
*1020
*10*1*1

3693
3733
376*1
379*1
382*1
3855
3886
3917
3923
3980
*1012
*104*1
4076
4109
4142

3693
3738
3764
3802
3836
3867
3897
3929
3960
3992
4024
4056
4088
4121
4154

3693
3738
3764
3780
3832
3867
3901
39 36
3972
4008
4044
4080
4117
4154
4191

3693
3738
3764
3805
3847
3890
3932
3976
4019
4064
4108
4153
4199
4245
4292

<7r
1.5
3693
3738
3764
3820
3878
39 36
3995
4055
4116
4177
4240
4304
4368
4434
4500

aActual values for 1971-1973 are from Statistical
Abstract of Louisiana, Fifth Edition (197*0, Table I-2T,
page 2.
^limiting value reached In 1978, declining from
1.1 percent
climiting value reached In 1976, declining from
1.1 percent
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Table 6.4
S e l e c t e d P r o j e c t i o n s o f Tot a l
(In m i l l i o n s of c u r r e n t

Year

TPIllla

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

$16,414.2
17,701.9
19,629.1
22,012.5
23,991.6
25,466.0
26,847.9
28,089.2
29,395.4
30,770.9
32,201.8
33,693.8

tpi617
$16,491.9
17,895.8
19,979.7
22,584.0
25,079.0
27,421.4
29,705.0
31,980.1
34 ,441. 3
37,088.6
39,940.2
42,997.2

TPI335
$16,319.2
17,683.6
19,629.1
22,063.8
24,355.1
26,311.2
28,438.7
30,725.6
33,199.4
35,878.1
38,775.7
41,894.8

Source: Tables 6. 1-6.3
aTPIijk ' RPY(1)* CPI(J )•P0P(k)

Personal
dollars)

Inco m e

TPT74 7
$16,491.9
17,895.8
19,979.7
22 ,344 .5
25,316.9
28,303.5
31,582.8
34,911.6
38,585.1
42,629.5
47,118. 3
52,076.3

TPI543
$16,379.9
17,646.6
19 ,568.2
21,967.5
24,361.3
26,829.3
29,394.1
31,896.3
34 ,608.3
37,538.8
40,719.3
44,184.5

l8l
FORECASTING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The hypothetical future values of the income
variables, which were set forth In the previous section, are
now applied to the relevant regression equations, in order
to forecast revenues of the six taxes and tax groups.

Two

distinct models of tax revenue generation are studied.
First, those equations pointed out at the close of
Chapter 5, as the best fits for each of the taxes, are
compiled into Model

I.

Revenues for the individual taxes,

and for their sum, total taxes, under existing tax rates
and under selected tax rate changes, are produced.

The

revenue forecasts are then used to analyze the future
time path of the Income elasticity of the entire Louisiana
tax structure.

Second, a set of equations, not necessarily

the best fits, but preferable a priori and according to the
analysis of Chapter ^ , are compiled Into Model II.

As will

be seen, some individual tax equations are common to both
models.

The procedures described above for Model I are

duplicated in Model II.
Model I
Both first and second forecasting models contain
an equation for forecasting each of the six taxes and tax
groups.

The first model contains the equations Judged

best fits of the various revenue generators described in
Chapter 5-

None of these equations displays decreasing

Income elasticity.
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Sales tax.

Sales tax revenue forecasts are made

using the model
TRsal * rsa *TPIbt+cD6 *10dD6

(5.4)

estimated by
LSAL * .61456 LSR + .00045 YT1 - 2.42303 D6
+ .34399 SD16

(5.3)

Tab1e 6.5
Sales

Tax R e v e n u e F o r e c a s t s ,
(in m i l l i o n s )

Fiscal
Year TPI111
1975
1976
1980
1985

$376.5
431.1
654.2
900.4

TPI617

$

376.2
431.1
702.4
1,179.0

I

TPI747

TPI335

381.8
440 .6
741.2
1,217.5

$

Model

381.8
440 .6
799.5
1,543.1

$

TPI543
$

375-2
429.5
731.6
1 ,259.2

If the sales tax rate were raised to 4 percent, with no tax
base changes, the resulting sales tax revenues would be as
shown ;In Table 6 .6 .
Table 6.6
Sales Tax Revenue Forecasts , Model I,
Four Percent Sales Tax Rate
(in millions)
Fiscal
Year
1975
1976
1980
1985

TPI111
$

449.5
514.5
780.7
1,074.6

TPI6l7
$

455,6
525.9
884,5
1,452.9

tpi335
$

449.0
514.5
838.2
1,407,0

tpi747
$

455.6
525.9
954.1
1,841.6

TPI54 3
$

447.8
512.5
873.1
1,502.7
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The Income elasticity of this sale? tax model rises
slowly over time, from 1.2327 in 1975 to 1.2372 in 1985Severance taxes.

Future levels of severance tax

revenues are primarily dependent on two factors: the speed
of the decline in physical production of crude oil,
condensate and natural gas, and the rate of price changes
for crude oil and condensate.

Professors Beard and Scott

provide two sets of projections.2

The more pessimistic set

assumes that crude oil and condensate production decline ten
percent per year through 1979-80, while natural gas
production declines nine percent annually.

Crude oil and

condensate prices are projected to rise in line with the
overall price index: nine percent in 1975-76, six percent
annually thereafter.

The less pessimistic forecasts assume

the rate of decline in oil production to fall slowly from
ten percent in 1975-1976 to six percent annually in
1979-80.

Gas production was forecast to decline at a

declining rate, from eight percent in 1975-76 to five
percent in 1979-80.

Changing technology in exploration and

production, and pressures of demand and price, seem to make
the latter projections the more reasonable set.

Projections

beyond the horizon of the Beard-Scott work were made by
continuing into the future the smallest of the rates of
production decline: six percent for crude oil, five percent
for natural gas.

2Beard and Scott,

op . cit. , p. 4.
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The less pessimistic forecasts by Beard and Scott,
as derived from Information In Tables 5 and 6 of "Revenue
Projections for Louisiana State Government, Fiscal Years
1974/75-1979/80" are as follows.
Table 6.7
Revenues from Severance Tax on
Crude Oil, Condensate, and Natural Gas
(In millions)

Source:

Fiscal Year

Tax Revenue

1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80

$552.0
537.0
515.0
499.0
4 89.0
485.0

Beard and Scott, o p . clt. , Tables 5 and 6, p. 12,

Applying the smallest rates of production decline further
into the future, revenues would be

1980/81
1985/86

Oil
$3lITo
327.0

Gas
$lFB7o
126.0

Total
$4'7'57o
453.0

These forecasts, plus those of the minor severance taxes,
produce the following projections of total severance tax
revenues.

Implicit in these totals is the assumption of

a steady decline ($.5 million per year) in the revenues of
the minor severance taxes.

Continuing this same assumption,

the forecasts for 1980/81 and for 1985/86 would be $489
million and $461,5 million, respectively.
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Table 6.8
Total Severance Tax Revenues
Forecast by Beard and Scott
(In millions)
Tax Revenue

Fiscal Year

$566.0
550.5
528.0
511.5
501.0
496.5

1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
Source:

Beard and Scott, 0£. clt., Table 2, p. 4.
Income tax.

income

The Income tax

modelassumingconstant

elasticity subject to shifts is used forModel

I.

This model is represented by the equation
TRlnc “ A.TPia+bD4+cD5

(5.20)

The regression fit of this equation is
LINC » - 3-30053 + 1.16263 LTPI + .02947 SD14
+ .01034 SD15

(5.21)

The dummy variable D4 is zero, and D5 is unity, for all
years of the forecasts.

Thus the estimated income elastic

ity of the Louisiana income tax is I.I6263 + .01034 1.17297.
The estimates of future income tax revenues are
found in Table 6 .9 .
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Table 6.9

Income Tax Revenue Forecasts, Model I
(In millions)
fllscai
Year

TPI111

TPI617

Tpi335

TPI747

TPI543

1975
1976
1980
1985

$158.9
179.4
259.0
338.1

$l6l .0
183.2
291.7
450.1

$158.7
179.4
277.1
436.6

$161.0
183.2
313.4
563.5

$158.3
178.7
288.1
464.7

Automotive tax group.

Forecasts for the taxes

pombined Into this group are made from the model
TRaut “ rsa.rgb.TPIdt+eD3.10fD3

(5.33)

and Its regression equation
LAUT = - .10 817 LSR + .44533 LGR + .00039 YT1
(5.34)

- .60929 D3 + .08323 SD13

There are Initially five sets of forecasts, corresponding
to the five different time paths of total personal income
previously chosen.

The forecasts presented In Table 6.10

assume unchanged tax rates and bases.
Table 6.10
Automotive Tax Group Revenue Forecasts, Model I
(in millions)
Fiscal
Year

TPIm

TPI6l7

TPI335

TPI747

tpi543

1975
1976
1980
1985

$181.7
197.0
264.4
319.2

$183.2
200.0
288,3
385.5

$181.4
196.9
277,5
377,5

$183.1
199.9
303.5
446,8

$181.1
196. 3
285.4
393.4

The estimated coefficients of the model Imply that an
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Increase In the sales tax rate would decrease automotive tax
group revenues slightly.

The cross-elasticity is - .10817.

An increase in the gasoline tax rate would significantly,
but less than proportionately, Increase revenues for the
group.
Table 6.11 contains illustrations of both sales tax
and gasoline tax rate increases, as applied to the time
path of total personal Income 5-4-3,
Table 6.11
Effect of Sales and Gasoline Tax Rate Changes on
Automotive Tax Group Revenues
(in millions)
Gasoline tax
Sales tax
1975
1976
1980
1985

8$
34
$181.1
196.3
285.4
393-4

8$
44
$175.6
190.3
276.7
381.3

10it
34
$200.1
216.8
315.3
434.5

104
44
$193.9
210.2
305.6
421.2

Thus an increase in the sales tax rate would increase sales
tax revenues, but decrease automotive tax group revenues.
Since the sales tax revenue function has less than unit
rate elasticity, the increased revenues of a higher sales
tax rate are further dampened.
Sumptuary tax group.

Forecasts are made using the

model
TRsum “ A . T P I b t . l O c D l ,

(5.47)
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Its regression fit
LSUM = .90209 + .00029 YTI + .02037 D1,

(5*48)

and the five time series for movements of total personal
income as described earlier.
Table 6.12
Sumptuary Tax Group Revenue Forecasts, Model I
(in millions)
Year

TPI111

TPI617

TPI335

TPI74 7

TPI54 3

1975
1976
1980
1985

$118.5
126.4
154. 2
180.2

$119.3
127.6
163.4
207. 3

$118.4
126.4
159. 4
204. 2

$119.3
127.6
169.3
231.5

$118.3
126.1
162 .5
210.6

The revenues forecast here display an income
elasticity which grows slowly over time, from .57275 in
1975, to .57565 In 1985.

The rate of growth In sumptuary

tax group revenues reflects both this income elasticity and
the rate of growth In total personal income.
Other taxes.

The forecasts of revenues from this

tax group are made according to the revenue-generation
model
TRoth - A - T P l b t

(5.52)

and the r e s u l t i n g r e g r e s s i o n fit of that e q u a t i o n ,
LOTH = - 2.19238 + .00051 YTI

(5.53)

This tax group Is modelled with an income elasticity which
increases over time.

The range of estimated values of that

income elasticity is 1.0073 for 1975, 1.0124 for 1985.
Table 6.13 provides five sets of other taxes revenue
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estimates, ba: ed on five possible

ncome p.ths.

Table 6.13
Other Taxes Revenue Estimates, Model I
(In millions)
Fiscal
Year

TPI111

TPI617

iP*335

TPIm

TPI543

1975
1976
1980
1985

$128.3
143.6
203. 9
268,0

$129.7
146.2
225. 8
343.0

$138.2
143. 6
216.1
334.1

$129.7
146.2
240.2
4l6.4

$127.9
143.1
223.4
352.6

Total tax revenues.

The forecasts which follow are

based on future movements in total personal income
represented by time path 5-4-3.

Real per capita income is

thus assumed to grow at 2.5 percent per year.

This rate

exceeds the 2.0 percent average annual gain from 1969 to
197^, but falls short of the 3-0 percent average annual gain
from 194 8 to 1969.

Thus the 2.5 percent growth rate

falls between that of the post-World War II economic
expansion and that of a relatively slow-growing economy.
Such an intermediate value is a reasonable estimate of future
real per capita income growth; this estimate assumes that the
national economy is managed so that no severe recessions or
economic disruptions occur.

Inflation is assumed to occur

at an annual rate of 6 percent*
largely on two observations.

This assumption is based

First, inflation has

>een

more severe, nationwide, in the past decade than in the two
decades preceeding it.

Second, at least part of that

Inflation can be traced to deliberate federal policy aimed
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at reduction in the rate of unemployment.

It is assumed that

such policy will be continued in future years, so that
future rates of inflation will approximate those of the past
several years.

The population growth rate is assumed to

decline to 0.8 percent per year.

This value is lower than

annual growth rates prevailing in the past decade and
quarter-century, and is in keeping with both state and
national long-term trends toward lower birth rates.

Addi

tionally, it is assumed that there are no administrative/
legislative tax rate or tax base changes.

The income time

Table 6.14
Total Tax Revenue Forecasts, Model I,
Income Path TPI543
Estimated Revenues
1980/81
1976/77

1975/76

Tax
Salesa
Severance0
Income0
Automotive^
Sumptuary6
Oth e r

$

Total

$1,511.8
aSource:
^Source:
^Source:
“Source:
e Source:
^Source:

375-2
550.5
158.7
181.1
118. 3
127.9

Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table

$

429.5
528.0
179.4
196.3
126 .1
143.1

$1,602.5

1985/86

7 31.6
489.0
277.1
285.1
162.1
223.4

$1,259.2
461.5
436 .6
393.4
210.6
352.6

$2,169.1

$3,113.9

$

6.5
6.8
6.9
6.10
6.12
6.13

path 5-4-3 represents a 9.6 percent
rate in total personal income.

average

annual growth

This is a rate of Increase
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comparable to that used by other researchers.

Before

concluding the analysis of this model, forecasts of total
tax revenues will be calculated for income time paths 1-1-1
and 7-4-7, to provide pessimistic and optimistic projections
in addition to the expected values generated by path 5-4-3In Table 6.15 are found the ratios of the individual
tax and tax group revenue estimates to the estimate of
total tax revenues.

The more elastic taxes show increasing

proportions of total tax revenues.

This trend Is reinforced

by the absolute decline of severance revenues, and would be
further reinforced by use of the more pessimistic set of
Beard/Scott estimates of severance revenues.
Also as predicted in Chapter 4, those taxes whose
elasticity falls below the tax structure average elasticity
Table 6.15
Ratio of Tax Revenue Estimates to Total
Tax Revenue Estimates
1975/76

1976/77

1980/81

1985/86

.2482
.3641
.1050
.1198
.0783
.0846

.2680
.3295
.1120
.1225
.0787
.0893

.3373
.2254
.1278
.1316
.0749
.1030

.4044
.1482
.1402
.1263
.0676
.1132

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

Sales
Severance
Income
Automotive
Sumptuary
Other
Total
Source:

Table 6.14

^Beard and Scott, op. clt., p. 4; and Legler and
Papke, o p . clt. , p. 176.
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will decline In share.

In the forecasts shewn, the auto

motive and sumptuary groups show declining shares of total
taxes In 1985 and 1980, respectively.

This happens as

the system average elasticity grows to exceed the elastic
ity of the tax groups.
The next step will be to measure the Income
elasticity at each of the four forecast years.

The income

elasticities of the various taxes are given in the table
below.
Table

6.16

I nco m e E l a s t i c i t i e s ,

Sales
Severance
Income
Automotive
Sumptuary
Other

Model

I

1975/76

1976/77

1980/81

1985/86

1.2327
0
1.1730
0.7703
0.5931
1.0073

1.2332
0

1.2350

1.1730
0.8539
0.5934
1.0078

1.1730

1.2372
0
1.1730
0 .7742
0.5960
1.0124

0
0.8554
0.5946
1.0098

The weighted average income elasticity of the
Louisiana tax structure thus varies over time as the
individual elasticities and their weights vary.
Forecasts of total tax revenues and of income
elasticity time paths were calculated using two additional
income patterns.

Income time paths T P I m

and TPI 747 were

selected to provide lower and upper bounds for future values
of nominal tax revenues.

Forecasts for these two income
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T a b 1 e 6.17

Time Path of Income Elasticity, Model I,
Income Path TPI,
‘54 3
Year
1975/76
1976/77

.6531
.7032

1980/81

.8276

1985/86

.9175

Source:

Table 6,15 and 6.16

patterns, and for the expected Income path TPI^^, are
summarized in two tables below.

Table 6.18 compares the

total tax revenue forecasts of the three patterns.

Table

6.19 compares the projected time path of income elasticity
for the selected income time paths.
Table 6.18
Alternative Forecasts of Total Tax Revenues, Model I
(in millions)
Year
1975/76

1976/77
1980/81
1985/86

Tpp543

TPI747

$1,511.8
1,602.5
2,169.1

$1,525.3
1,625.5
2,314.9
3,662.8

TPP111

$1,514.5
1,605.5
2,024.7
2,467.4

3 ,113.9

The projections differ most markedly in the 1980/81 and
1985/86 forecasts.

Thus must be true, since the different

income series were Identical prior to 1974-75.

The

differing assumptions concerning growth rates become more
apparent with the passage of time.

Income path TPIj^i
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generates forecasts which exceed those from T P I ^ ^ due
to the differing population growth rat e assumptions.
Table 6.19 summarizes the movement in income
elasticity projected by each of the three selected income
paths.

The different time paths occur only because the

levels of income are different; the income elasticities of
the individual taxes are the same throughout Model I.
Table 6.19
Alternative Time

Year

TPIlll

1975/76
1976/77
1980/81

TPI

.6531
.7032
.8276
.9175

techniques

illustrated

n o w be a p p l i e d to a v a r i a t i o n

model.

This

declining
equation

.6567

.7087
.8458
.9489

variation

inco m e

contains

elasticities.

in

the p r e v i o u s

o f the

two t a x e s
The

Income

first

which have
tax e s t i m a t i n g

is

sumptuary

tax g r o u p e q u a t i o n

(5 .2 2 )

Is

T R ei,„ “ A - T P i a ( k - t ) .iobDl
sum
3
an d all

section

forecasting

TRlnc « A .TPia(k-t).10bD4.10cD5
The

I

II
The

will

Model

TPI543

.6537
.7037
.8078
.8685

1985/86

Model

Paths of Income Elasticity,

other equations
The

specific

are u n c h a n g e d

equation

(5.49)
from Mod e l

for e s t i m a t i n g

I.

Income

tax
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revenues is
LINC * - 5.^7984 + .00143 XT1 + .20755 D4
+ .08303 D5

(5.23)

This equation models two sources of revenue shifts, but
does not allow those shifts to affect the income elasticity.
The income elasticity depends on the time variable alone,
and declines slowly:
el 975 * -00143 x (3000-1975) = 1.46575
e1985 ” -00143 x (3000-1985) = 1.45145
The tax

revenue estimates which follow are based on equation

5.23 and on the

five hypothetical time paths of total

personal income.
Table 6.20
Income Tax Revenue Estimates, Model II
(In millions)
Fiscal
Year

income

Income

Path 111

Path 617

1975
1976
1980
1985

$168.6
191.6
274 .8
338.1

$171.4
196.6

318.5
481. 7

Income
Path 3 35
$16 8.4
191.6
298.9

463.8

Income

Path 747
$171.4
196 .6
348. 2
636.1

income

Path 54 3
$167.9
190.7
313.6
501.1

The best fit for this variation of the sumptuary
tax group revenue generator Is
LSUM = - .83081 + .00079 XT1 + .01752 D1

(5.50)

The income elasticity of this tax group falls slowly with
time :
e1975 “ .00079 x (3000-1975) - .80975
e1985 “ .00079 x (3000-1985) - .80185
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The table below contains estimates of futu 'o sumptuary
tax group revenues, based on the equation above and on five
hypothetical income paths.
Table 6.21
Sumptuary Tax Group Estimates, Model II
(in millions)
FiscalIncome
Year
Path 111
1975
1976
1980
1985

IncomeIncomeIncome
Path 617
Path 335
Path 747
$114. 7
123.8
161.6
202 .7

$113.7
122.0
148.9
167.0

$113.6
122 .0

$114.7
1 2 3 .8
169-7
236 .8

156.0

198.9

Income
Path 5*13
$113.4
121. 7
160 .2
207.5

Total tax revenues of this model are forecast as
shown in Table 6.22.
Table 6.22
Total Tax Revenue Forecasts, Model II,
Income Path TPI 543
1975/76

Tax
Sales3
Severance*5
Incomec
Automotive^
Sumptuarye
Other**

$

Total

$1,516,1

aS o u r c e
^Source
cS o u r c e
d Source
e Source
^Source

375.2
550.5
167.9
181.1
113.4
127.9

T a b l e 6.5
T a b l e 6.8
T a b l e 6 .20
T a b l e 6.10
T a b l e 6.21
T a b l e 6.13

fcstimatecT^e venues
1980/81
1976/77
$

429.5
528.0
190.7
196.3
121.7
143.1

$1,609.3

$

1985/86

731.6
489.0
313.6
285.4
160.2
223.4

$1,259.2
461. 5
501.1
393.4
207.5
352.6

$1,203.3

$3,175.4

197

The ratios of the individUr.l tax and tax g.'oup
forecasts to the total tax revenue forecasts are given in
Table 6.23.

The elasticity estimates of Table 6.2*1,

combined with the relative shares of total taxes in Table
6 .2 3 , yield the weighted average income elasticity of the

entire tax structure.

These values are shown in Table 6.25.

The income elasticities of Table 6.25 are higher
than those of Table 6.17 primarily because of the larger
estimate of the income elasticity of the income tax.

To a

lesser degree, the changed forecasts for income tax revenues
and sumptuary tax group revenues, and their declining
elasticities, contribute to the change.
Table 6.23
Ratio of Tax Revenue Estimates to Total Tax
Revenue Estimates, Model II
Tax

1975/76

1976/77

1980/81

1985/86

Sales
Severance
Income
Automotive
Sumptuary
Other

.2475
.3631
.1107
.1195
.0748
.0844

.2669
.3281
.1185
.1220
.0756
.0889

.3321
.2219
.1423
.1296
.0727
.1014

.3966
.1453
.1578
.1239
.0654
.1110

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

Total
Source:

Table 6.22
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Table 6 .?"

Income Elasticities, Model II
Tax
Sales
Severanee
Income
Automotive
Sumptuary
Other

1975/76

1976/77

1980/81

1985/86

1.2327
0
1.4658

1.2332
0
1.464 3
0.8539

1.2350
0

1.2372
0

1.4586
0.8554

0.7742

0.8058
1.0098

0.8019

0.7703
0.8098

0.8090

1.0073

1.0078

1.4515

1.0124

Table 6.25
Time Path of Income Elasticity, Model II,
Income Path T P I ^ ^
Year
1975/76
1976/77
1980/81
1985/86

£y

.7050
-7576
.8905
.9805

Accuracy of Forecasts
The reliability of the forecasting techniques was
tested by comparing actual tax revenues for fiscal years
1974/75 and 1975/76 to forecasts of those years’ tax revenue
by the estimating equations of Models I and II.

These fore

casts were prepared from the income patterns previously used
and from the actual values of personal income.

This

additional measure was Introduced to display the accuracy
of the estimating equations In the absence of error in
projecting the independent variables.
Three significant phenomena were apparent.

First,

all estimates of total non-severance tax revenues were below

the actual tax revenues.

Second, the forecasting error was

compounded by errors In the forecast of personal Income.
Third, the estimates obtained from Model II were clearly
superior to those of Model I,

Such estimates lend more

support to the hypothesis of declining income elasticities
of some individual taxes.

Table 6.26 compares the forecasts

obtained from Model II, using both projected and actual
income levels, to actual tax revenues.
Table 6.26
Comparison of Actual Tax Revenues, 1974/75 and
1975/76, to Forecast Values, Model II
Fiscal Year 1974/75
Tax

TP I

Forecast

Actual
TP I
Forecast

Forecast

Actual
Tax
Revenue

Forecast

Sales
Income
Automotive
Sumptuary
Oth e r

$365.1
187.5
174.6
100.4
110. 7

$339.8
154.1
166.5
108.2
117.6

0.931
0.822
0.954
1.078
1.062

$349.7
159.5
169. 8
110. 3
120.4

0.958
0.851
0.973
1.099
1.088

Total NonSeverance

$938.3

$861.8

0.918

$909.7

0.970

Fiscal
Tax

TPI

*

543

Actual

•

Actual

Y e a r 1975/76

.

Forecast

Actual
TPI
Forecast

Forecast

Actual
Tax
Revenue

Forecast

Sales
Income
Automotive
Sumptuary
Other

$421.3
205. 4
183.6
106. 5
118. 9

$375.2
167.9
181.1
113.4
127.9

0.891
0. 817
0,986
1.065
1.076

$400.2
181.2
188.5
118. 3
134. 8

0.950
0.882
1.027
1.111
1.134

Total Non-

$1035.7

$965.8

0.933

$1023-0

0.988

Severance

543

*•

Act u a l

■
*

Actual
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The largest forecast errors occurred in the income
tax revenue function.

The estimate was $33*1 million low in

197V75, $37*5 million low in 1975/76.

The simplest ration

alization is that the model understated the increase in
income elasticity and/or revenue due to increased enforce
ment levels in the 1970's.

The non-severance tax revenue

forecast was 0.918 of actual in 197^/75, 0.933 in 1975/76.
Actual personal income in 197^ was $16,766 million,
compared to the projected value of $16,380 million.
Similarly, 1975 personal income was $18,591 million, which
exceeded the forecast of $17,6^7 million.

Forecasts based

on actual income levels were 0.970 and 0.988 of actual non
severance revenues in 197^/75 and 1975/76.

These ratios

suggest that considerable accuracy was gained by the use of
more precise values of the independent variables.
POLICY

IMPLICATIONS

The paragraphs which follow outline the effects on
total tax revenues and on the income elasticity of the tax
structure of an increase in the state sales tax rate to
*1 percent.

The effects are measured using forecasting

Model II and income path TPI-,.,,.

The moderate real growth,

substantial inflation, and slow population growth which
characterize T P I ^ ^ represent the time path of Income with
the highest likelihood of occurring, according to the author.
The forecasts of tax revenues which would result from this
policy action are found in Table 6.27.
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Of course,
time p a t h not

so

c a s t i n g process.
f r o m one

inco m e

any o f the

far p r e s e n t e d ,
Estimates
pattern

Total

be

can

ca n be

to a n o t h e r

Table

p a t h s , o r any o t h e r

fi v e time

us e d

for the

r e v i s e d by
that

fore-

shifting

appears more

likely

6.27

Tax R e v e n u e F o r e c a s t s , Model II, 4 P e r c e n t
Sales Tax Rate, I n c o m e Path TPI^/j^

1975/76

Tax

447.8
550.5
167.9
175.6
113-4
127.9

oalesa
S e v e r a n c e 13
Income^
Automotived
Sumptuarye
Other*"

$

Total

$1,583.1
aSource:
bSource:
cS o u r c e :
^Source:
eSource:
^Source:

1976/77
$

512.5
528.0
190.7
190. 3
121.7
143.1

$1,686.4

1980/81
$

1985/86

873.1
489.0
313.6
276.7
160.2
223.4

$1,502.7
461.5
501.1
381. 3
207.5
352.6

$2 ,336.0

$3,406.8

T a b l e 6.6
T a b l e 6.3
T a b l e 6 .20
T a b l e 6 .10
Tab l e 6 .21
T a b l e 6.13

Table 6.28 transforms the entries in Table 6.27 Into ratio
form.

Each new entry shows the ratio of total tax revenues

generated by each tax and tax group for each year forecast.
The time trend in each of the individual taxes
and tax groups behaves very much as indicated in Chapter 4.
The most significant difference between the hypothetical
results of Chapter 4 and the estimates of elasticities
provided here is that the absolute decline in severance
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Table 6.28

Ratio of Tax Revenue Estimates to Total
Tax Revenue Estimates, Model II,
4 Percent Sales Tax Rate
Income Path TPI ^^3
Tax

1975/76

1976/77

1980/81

1985/86

Sales
Severance
Income
Automotive
Sumptuary
Other

.2829
.3^77
.1060
.1109
.0716
.0808

•3039
.3131
.11 31
.1129
.0722
.0849

.3738
.2093
.1343
.1184
.0686
.0956

.4411
.1355
.1471
.1119
.0609
.1035

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

1.0000

Total

Source: Table 6.27
tax revenues results in more rapid change in income elastic
ities than does the constant value assumed in Chapter 4.
The automotive tax group and the sumptuary tax group
display declining shares of total tax revenues In 1985/86
and 1980/81, respectively.

These tax groups have become

less elastic than the average for the entire tax structure.
This is almost precisely as Indicated in Chapter 4.
As explained earlier, total tax revenues rise less
than the increase in sales tax revenues, as a small decline
in automotive tax group revenues accompanies the increased
sales tax rate.

The individual tax and tax group income

elasticities are unchanged; they are found in Table 6,22.
Table 6.29 displays the time path of the income elasticity
of the tax structure under this policy change.
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Table 6.2 9
T i m e Path o f I n c o m e E l a s t i c i t y , M o d e l
h Percent Sales Tax Rate
Year

ey

1975/76
1976/77

.9106

1985/86

.9995

administrative

Increased

income-elastic

thu s

i n c o m e e l a s t i c i t y o f t h e tax

increased gasoline
increase

(or o t h e r

no o t h e r

increase
hastens

unit

in the
the

structure.
the

tax

o f the S t a t e of

practically

in r e v e n u e s bee n
tax

(and wit h

in tax rates,

structure

The

tax

ra t e

changes

the tax

ten years.

first-year increase

the

tax

is p r o j e c t e d to b e c o m e

in a p p r o x i m a t e l y
slightly

sal e s

or legislative

or enforcement)

Louisiana

the

.7289
,7808

1980/81

W i t h an

b a ses,

II

elastic
rat e o f a

increase
H a d the

result

in
same

o f an

income-inelastic

source),

in i n c o m e e l a s t i c i t y o v e r ti m e w o u l d h a v e

been

slowed.
This

s e rves

to e x p l a i n w h y

the

tax

a l r e a d y b e c o m e unit

elas t i c .

Elasticity

and o f the h y p o t h e t i c a l

empirical

The o r e m ,
e vidence,

Income-elastic

the tax

y e a r s ago.

(and not

co recent)

inelastic

sources:

tax

In v i e w of the U p w a r d - B o u n d

structure
The reason

in l a r g e m e a s u r e d u e to t h e

s t r u c t u r e has not

fact

e x a m p l e s and

could have become
that

it d i d not

that m a n y of t h e r e c e n t

i n c r e a s e s h a v e b e e n on

gasoline,

is

liquor and

income-

tobacco,

oil

and

unit
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natural

gas.

By I n c r e a s i n g the

produced by these
structure

sources,

sha r e o f total

tax

falls.

w i d e r a n g e of

I n come

for the

elasticities.

Thus

it

is t h e o r e t i c a l l y
the

inc o m e

s t r u c t u r e by r a i s i n g or l o w e r i n g

rates on s e l e c t e d taxes.
can

taxes which display a

s t a t e to d e l i b e r a t e l y m a n i p u l a t e

e l a s t i c i t y of its tax

revenues

revenues

the i n c o m e - e l a s t i c l t y o f the

T h e S t a t e of L o u i s i a n a l e v i e s

possible

tax

The

then be m a t c h e d

potential

growth

to the p o t e n t i a l

in tax
growth

in

expenditures.

S U M M A R Y OF F I N D I N G S

This

final

s e c t i o n of the d i s s e r t a t i o n

to a s u m m a r y of Its

contributions.

d i v i d e d Into two b r o a d areas:
empirical

Advances

in m e t h o d o l o g y ,

an d

in M e t h o d o l o g y

o f state

tax

re v e n u e

borrowed many

techniques,

relevant

but

techniques.

l o g - l i n e a r mo d e l s .

subject
has

The contribution

of

individual

in t o a u n i f i e d model.

b e g i n n i n g w i t h G r o v e s a n d Kahn, utilized
S i n g e r i n i t i a t e d the use o f d u m m y

(in l i n e a r m o d e l s )

Dockel m o d e l l e d

the

this d i s s e r t a t i o n

o r i g i n a l i t y o f the

their combination

researchers,

variables

l i t e r a t u r e on

forecasting,

r e s e a r c h is not the

Several

advances

c o n t r i b u t i o n s ar e

results.

From a very extensive

this

These

Is d e v o t e d

elasticity

to m o d e l

r e v e n u e shifts.

shifts perhaps without

realizing
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it.

Wilford and others treated total personal income as

the product of per capita income and population.

Several

researchers, learning from the omission of Groves and Kahn,
included rate variables in their models.

Several researchers

have built Cor attempted to build) models with inter
dependence of taxes.

This dissertation utilizes all of the

above features in its models of tax revenue generation.

To

the author's knowledge, this combination of features is
unique.

The equation used to model the revenue generation

process of the automotive tax group illustrates many of these
features.

The sales tax rate appears explicitly, which

indicates interdependence.

The exponent of TPI, which is

the income elasticity of the tax group, is time-dependent
and subject to shifts.

The dummy variable

D3

shifts the

revenue function as well as its income elasticity.
In addition to properly adapting a number of extant
techniques In the building of state tax revenue generation
models, this dissertation has added features which are, for
the most part, original.

Several authors had commented

that, while their models assumed constant Income elastic
ities, variable elasticities might in fact be more realistic.
However, no researcher explicitly and knowingly utilized
income elasticities which varied with time or with income.
Wilford noted that the income elasticity which he estimated
was an average for the time series.
Thus this dissertation, in building exponents of the
income variable(s) in forms incorporating a time variable,
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has explicitly modelled variable income elasticities.
These forms of income elasticities are necessary to a
properly specified model of the revenue generating process
of many of the state's taxes.
Several researchers, among them Dockel, Wilford,
and Richardson, have observed that the Income elasticity
of the tax structure rose over time.

Dockel ascribed the

rise to exogenous change; Wilford gave no explanation.
The forecasts by Beard and Scott imply a rising income
elasticity, but they do not comment on that feature.
Richardson alone, in an article written at about the same
time as parts of this dissertation, notes that the rise in
income elasticity is due to endogenous factors.

His

writings imply that the more elastic taxes contribute
greater portions of total tax revenues over time, and hence
alter the weights used to compute income elasticity.
This dissertation has formalized that concept, with
an analysis of the Upward-Bound Elasticity Theorem.

This

theorem states that the income elasticity of a tax structure
tends, over time, to approach the income elasticity of the
most elastic component of that structure.

This effect was

precisely demonstrated for a structure of constant-elasticity taxes, and was simulated for a more realistic structure
which contained some variable-elasticity taxes.
Significance of Forecasts
In addition to developing an Improved methodology
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for the use of an elasticities approach to ;:tate tax
revenue forecasting, this dissertation has applied that
methodology to the problem of forecasting tax revenues for
the State of Louisiana,

However, this methodology can be

useful in developing models of tax revenue generation for
the tax structures of other states.
These forecasts serve three purposes.

First, the

forecasts provide to various legislators and administrative
officials reliable estimates of the nominal amount of money
generated by the state's taxes, as currently levied, In
the intermediate and long run.

As stated before, an

elasticities approach is most effective over a relatively
long time horizon.

The estimates can be revised to reflect

varying patterns of future income growth.
Second, policy-makers are given information
concerning the impact, on individual tax revenues and on the
aggregate total tax revenues, of various tax policy changes.
This is accomplished through manipulation of the tax rate
variables and the dummy variables which reflect shifts in
tax rates, tax bases, or tax administration.

The previous

section provided estimates of the Impact on total tax
revenues of an increase in the sales tax rate, for a
specific pattern of Income growth.

The same techniques

can be employed to determine the impact of even higher tax
rates, or increases In other tax rates, such as the gasoline
tax rate.

These Impacts can be measured at the supposed

time path of income or at any other income growth pattern.
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Finally, the forecasts of tax reverses enable the
estimation of the time path taken by the income elasticity
of the tax structure.

All of the estimates published in

this dissertation indicate an income elasticity currently
significantly below unity, but growing at a moderate rate.
None of the estimate

how income elasticity growing to

exceed unity by fiscal 1985, but the shortfall is very
slight in all cases.

The estimates suggest that the income

elasticity of the tax structure will rise more rapidly as
income grows more rapidly, and that income elasticity will
be increased if policy changes Increase rates on the
relatively elastic taxes.

Specifically, income elasticity

is estimated to become practically unitary by 1985 if
income grows approximately 9*6 percent annually, and if the
sales tax rate is increased to 4 percent.
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